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Abstract
Alongside the ever increasing traffic demand, the fifth generation (5G) cellular net-
work architecture is being proposed to provide better quality of service, increased data
rate, decreased latency, and increased capacity. Without any doubt, the 5G cellular
network will comprise of ultra-dense networks and multiple input multiple output tech-
nologies. This will make the current centralised solutions impractical due to increased
complexity. Moreover, the amount of coordination information that needs to be trans-
ported over the backhaul links will be increased. Distributed or decentralised solutions
are promising to provide better alternatives.
This thesis proposes new distributed algorithms for wireless networks which aim to
reduce the amount of system overheads in the backhaul links and the system complexity.
The analysis of conflicts amongst transmitters, and resource allocation are conducted
via the use of game theory, convex optimisation, and auction theory.
Firstly, game-theoretic model is used to analyse a mixed quality of service (QoS)
strategic non-cooperative game (SNG), for a two-user multiple-input single-output (MISO)
interference channel. The players are considered to have different objectives. Follow-
ing this, the mixed QoS SNG is extended to a multicell multiuser network in terms
of signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) requirement. In the multicell multiuser
setting, each transmitter is assumed to be serving real time users (RTUs) and non-real
time users (NRTUs), simultaneously. A novel mixed QoS SNG algorithm is proposed,
with its operating point identified as the Nash equilibrium-mixed QoS (NE-mixed QoS).
Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Egalitarian bargain solutions are then proposed to im-
prove the performance of the NE-mixed QoS. The performance of the bargain solutions
are observed to be comparable to the centralised solutions.
Secondly, user offloading and user association problems are addressed for small cells
using auction theory. The main base station wishes to offload some of its users to
privately owned small cell access points. A novel bid-wait-auction (BWA) algorithm,
which allows single-item bidding at each auction round, is designed to decompose the
combinatorial mathematical nature of the problem. An analysis on the existence and
uniqueness of the dominant strategy equilibrium is conducted. The BWA is then used
to form the forward BWA (FBWA) and the backward BWA (BBWA). It is observed
that the BBWA allows more users to be admitted as compared to the FBWA.
Finally, simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA), altered SMRA (ASMRA),
sequential combinatorial auction with item bidding (SCAIB), and repetitive combina-
torial auction with item bidding (RCAIB) algorithms are proposed to perform user
offloading and user association for small cells. These algorithms are able to allow bundle
bidding. It is then proven that, truthful bidding is individually rational and leads to
Walrasian equilibrium. The performance of the proposed auction based algorithms is
evaluated. It is observed that the proposed algorithms match the performance of the
centralised solutions when the guest users have low target rates. The SCAIB algorithm
is shown to be the most preferred as it provides high admission rate and competitive
revenue to the bidders.
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Statement of Originality
The contributions of this thesis are mainly on the development of various distributed
resource allocation algorithms for wireless networks. The novelty of the contributions is
summarised below and it is supported by various international journal and conference
publications.
In Chapter 3, various algorithms under mixed quality of service (QoS); namely, strate-
gic non-cooperative game (SNG) and bargain game are proposed. The mixed QoS SNG
is capable of achieving higher average sum rate, with less power consumption, as com-
pared to maximum ratio transmission scheme. In addition, a mixed QoS distributed
algorithm that utilises alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is proposed
and shown to converge to an optimal centralised solution using simulation results. The
results have been presented in:
1 B. Basutli and S. Lambotharan, “Distributed beamformer design under mixed
SINR balancing and SINR-Target-Constraints,” in IEEE International Conference
on Digital Signal Processing, Jul. 2015, pp. 530-534.
2 B. Basutli and S. Lambotharan, “Extending the bargain region using beamforming
design under mixed QoS constraints,” in IEEE International Conference on Digital
Signal Processing, Jul. 2015, pp. 511-515.
In Chapter 4, an extended mixed QoS SNG is proposed for multicell multiuser wireless
networks. In addition, Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain games are proposed
to improve the solution attained by the mixed QoS SNG. Numerical simulations revealed
that, on average, the mixed QoS sum rate achieved by the bargaining games is compa-
rable to that of the centralised Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. This work
has been presented in:
3 B. Basutli and S. Lambotharan, “Game-Theoretic beamforming techniques for
multiuser multi-cell networks under mixed QoS constraints,” submitted to IET
Signal Processing (provisionally accepted subject to revision).
In Chapter 5, both backward bid-wait-auction (BBWA) and forward bid-wait-auction
(FBWA) are proposed for user offloading and user association mechanism in heteroge-
neous networks (HetNets). Both the proposed algorithms significantly increase the net-
work capacity and recover the revenue that could be lost in the absence of small cells.
The BBWA with fixed preference profile is the most preferred algorithm by the macro
x
Contents xi
base station (MBS) and the small cell access points (SCAs). The proposed algorithm
is able to provide closer to optimal solution with significant saving in complexity. This
work has been presented in:
4 B. Basutli and S. Lambotharan, “Auction based competition of hybrid small cells
for dropped macrocell users,” submitted to IET Signal Processing (provisionally
accepted subject to revision)
In Chapter 6, various auctioned based algorithms, namely; simultaneous multiple-
round ascending auction (SMRA), altered SMRA (ASMRA), sequential combinatorial
auction with item bidding (SCAIB), and repetitive combinatorial auction with item
bidding (RCAIB) are proposed to increase the network capacity in HetNets. The SCAIB
algorithm is the most preferred algorithm since it provides higher admission rate and
competitive revenues for the SCAs. The proposed algorithms match the performance of
the centralised solution at low target data rates. This work will be presented in:
5 B. Basutli and S. Lambotharan, “Offloading macrocell users to hybrid small cells
via auctioning in HetNets,” to be submitted to IEEE Access.
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S1 ∩ S2 Intersection set with all members which are in both S1 and S2.
S(n) The nth member of a set S.
∀x Means that a statement holds for all x (in the set that
x belongs to).
x ∈ S If S is a set: x is a member.
If S a stochastic distribution: x is a realization.
X  Y Means that X−Y is positive definite.
X  Y Means that X−Y is positive semi-definite.
x  y Means that the vector x majorizes y.
x > y(x ≥ y) Means that xi > yi(xi ≥ yi) for all vector indices i.
IM The M ×M identity matrix.
1M The M × 1 matrix (i.e., vector) of only ones.
0M The M ×M matrix of only zeros.
0M×N The M ×N matrix of only zeros.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Wireless
Communication
Modern wireless communications have a history that dates back to the 19th century.
Prediction of the existence of electromagnetic (EM) waves in 1867 by Maxwell was
verified by Hertz in 1887. In 1890, Branly developed a coherer for detecting radio waves.
The first wireless radiotelegraph transmission by Guglielmo Marconi in 1895 [2], opened
more doors to research in wireless communications. Successive research achievements in
this area catapulted radio communications into our contemporary lives.
Paramount wireless services like global position system (GPS), commercial television
(TV), and voice communication, have revolutionised our lives and they remain a neces-
sity. In the past years, additional services like multimedia applications, online-gaming,
mobile social networks, wireless internet access for real-time video and music and many
more, immensely seized our attention. The demand of these services by end users is
highly attached to other externalities like security, safety, health, and even personal
feelings.
1.1 Motivation
Unfortunately, the service provision for the explosive demand of wireless commu-
nication services does not come without difficulties. Scarce and expensive resources
such as spectrum, and inexorable constraints like interference leakage, quality of service
1
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Figure 1.1: An example of a cellular network. Each colour represent a particular
frequency band.
(QoS), channel capacity, transmission power, delay tolerance and many others, define
the breadth and width of the wireless system limitations, as well as the economical im-
plications. These challenges are foreseen to perpetuate into the future with increased
magnitude. Therefore, resource management for wireless communication networks is
a very critical area in network planning and optimisation. The management of radio
resources is now in the forefront of research, and it is seen as a high investment by the
service providers.
In the recent years, research advancements in the provision and management of re-
sources for wireless communications have ushered us with a plethora of mathematical
tools and methods. Choice of most appropriate tools and methods will be determined
by underlying characteristics of the wireless communication systems including cellular
network structure, interference model, etcetera. Hence a brief description is provided
below.
1.2 Cellular Networks
A wireless “cellular” system is related to a wireless communications system divided
in small sections called “cells”. Figure 1.1 shows an example of a cellular network.
Each cell comprises of a base station (BS), mobile users and a set of frequencies. It is
Chapter 1. Introduction to Wireless Communication 3
usually assumed that both the BS and mobile users have capabilities to transmit and
receive information. The signal transmission from the BS to the mobile users is called
the downlink transmission, and the inverse is called the uplink transmission.
1.2.1 First Generation Systems
The Nordic Mobile Telephone/Total Access Cellular System (NMT/TACS), Ad-
vanced Mobile Phone Systems (AMPS), and Japanese Total Access Communication
System (JTACS) are some of the first-generation (1G) systems. These systems were
mostly analogue. The 1G systems had separate downlink and uplink frequencies for each
user as shown in Figure 1.2a. This access scheme of transmission is referred to as the
frequency division multiple access (FDMA). Figure 1.2 shows different access schemes
with frequency division duplexing (FDD). The 1G systems supported data rates up to
2.4 kbps. Some impediments in 1G systems included lack of security, low capacity, and
reckless handoff [3].
1.2.2 Second Generation Systems
In the late 1990s, new second-generation (2G) systems were deployed with the inten-
tion to improve the capacity experienced in the 1G systems. The 2G systems such as
the Global System for Mobile (GSM) communications utilised digital modulation for-
mats and time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme (see Figure 1.2b). In TDMA,
interference from other users is avoided by allocating the full bandwidth to a user for
a particular time slot. These systems are capable of supporting data rates up to 64
kbps. The FDMA and the TDMA schemes, try to eliminate interference as much as
possible. But these scheme can be inefficient in terms of capacity. Further improvements
on the 2G systems, under the 2.5G systems, include the General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS), Enhanced Data Rate for GSM Evolution (EDGE) [4], and utilization of code
division multiple access (CDMA) scheme [3, 5] (see Figure 1.2c). In CDMA, different
spreading codes are assigned to each user to allow simultaneous transmission on the
same frequency. Since the orthogonality of the spreading codes in CDMA can be lost,
due to system imperfections, systems that utilise CDMA suffer from significant level of
interference.
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Figure 1.2: Multiple access schemes with Frequency Division Duplexing. In Fig-
ure 1.2a, each user is allocated separate uplink and downlink frequencies. In Figure 1.2b,
different time slots are allocated for different users. In Figure 1.2c, all users utilize the
whole time slots and frequency bands by using different spreading codes.
1.2.3 Third Generation Systems
In order to address the challenges in the 1G and the 2G systems, the third-generation
(3G) systems were introduced in the late 2000, with data rates up to 2 Mbps. Together
with CDMA, Wideband CDMA (WCDMA), global roaming, and improved voice qual-
ity, elevated the 3G systems. An example of a 3G system is the Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS). Unfortunately, the services offered in 3G drain
the mobile handset battery at a higher rate as compared to 2G handsets. The utiliza-
tion of the Evolution-Data Optimized (EVDO), High Speed Uplink/Downlink Packet
Access (HSUPA/HSDPA), instigated other intermediate wireless generations between
3G and 4G. This includes the 3.5G and the 3.75G, with data rate up to 5-30 Mbps.
In 3.75G, Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology and Fixed Worldwide Interoperabil-
ity for Microwave Access (WIMAX) technologies were introduced. These technologies
utilise the Orthogonal/Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA/SC-
FDMA) and Scalable OFDMA (SOFDMA) schemes [3]. SOFDMA is the IEEE 802.16e
OFDMA mode for fixed and mobile WIMAX. In SOFDMA, the sub-carrier frequency
spacing remains constant, but the fast Fourier transform size of the channel bandwidth
is scaled.
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Figure 1.3: Examples of CoMP techniques. In Figure 1.3a there is no coordination
and cell-edge users experience strong interference. In Figure 1.3b BSs coordinate and
there is reduced interference as BSs try to place nulls in the direction of users in different
cells. In Figure 1.3c both BSs serve the cell edge users.
1.2.4 Fourth Generation Systems
In January 2012, the International Telecommunication Union Radio Standards Sec-
tor (ITU-R) approved the International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT)-Advanced
Specifications of Fourth Generation (4G) wireless networks [6]. At present, the Third
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is working on the LTE-Advanced technology.
The initial phase of LTE-Advanced, the LTE-A increase the spectrum efficiency by using
carrier aggregation, enhancement of multi-antenna techniques, and transmission band-
width beyond 20 MHz [7]. With the argument that some of the technologies in LTE-A
are reaching their theoretical limits, 3GPP is also working on LTE-B, to make further
improvements. LTE-B is mainly developed for capacity boosting of at least 30 folds in-
crease of LTE-A [8]. Increasing traffic demand due to social networking, online gaming,
video streaming and sharing, cost and energy consumption, will hopefully be improved
in LTE-B. Enhacements of multi-antenna techniques, Multi-Radio Access Technology
(Multi-RAT), LTE Hotspot Improvement (LTE-Hi), and small cells are amongst the key
features of LTE-B [8]. The last two chapters of this thesis investigate various resource al-
location and beamforming methods for improving network capacity using existing small
cells.
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1.3 Interference Channels
One of the solutions to spectrum scarcity is frequency reuse. The interference channel
(IFC) is a mathematical model wherein the base stations (BSs) share the same frequency
band. Interference avoidance techniques in schemes such as TDMA and FDMA can be
very inefficient. By allowing interference to occur via aggressive frequency reuse, and
concurrently deploying interference management techniques, can improve the spectrum
efficiency. When neighbouring cells use the same frequency band, it is highly probable
for concurrent transmission to occur, thereby inducing interference across and within
cells. To reduce the negative impacts brought about by this setup, interference manage-
ment techniques such as the coordinated multipoint (CoMP) transmission and reception
techniques are being used.
CoMP techniques can be classified as coordinated scheduling and coordinated beam-
forming (CS/CB), joint transmission (JT), and transmission point selection (TPS) [9],
as depicted in Figure 1.3. Under CS/CB, as shown in Figure 1.3b, BSs share channel
state information (CSI) for cell edge users, but the data for each user is only available
at the serving BS. With the CSI knowledge at each BS, beams are designed such that
nulls are placed in the direction of users in the other cell. In JT, BSs share both CSI
and data so that cell edge users can be served by multiple BSs at once (see Figure 1.3c).
These techniques were standardised the 3GPP for the LTE (3GPP LTE) technology.
The 3GPP LTE techniques use multiple transmit and receive antennas to enhance the
quality of the received signal and additionally suppress the interference.
1.3.1 Multi-antenna Communications
Multi-antenna techniques are used to provide spatial separation of users via beam-
forming technique. Beamforming is a signal processing technique for spatial filtering of
signals in antenna arrays. It is a physical layer technique used for interference man-
agement in multi-antenna systems. This is achieved, for example, by controlling the
radiation pattern of the antenna array, thereby concentrating transmission power to the
intended user while placing nulls in the direction of other users. In essence, using differ-
ent amplitudes and phases of the transmitted signal causes the signal to add in desired
directions and cancel in undesired directions. Beam steering allows beams to form in
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Figure 1.4: An example of a the antenna array system and array radiation patterns.
Figure 1.4a depicts an uplink system with K mobile users and a BS with M -element
antenna array for receiving. An example of radiation patterns created with planar array
and circular are shown in Figure 1.4b and Figure 1.4c.
the directions of users with clear line-of-sight (LOS). In cases where there is no LOS,
beam steering allows multipath components to add up coherently in areas around the
affected users. Due to the required space between antenna elements in an array, it is
more practical to implement arrays at the BS than at the mobile devices.
Beamforming techniques are used in switched beam and adaptive beamforming sys-
tems. Switched beam systems use a particular beam pattern, from a predefined beam
patterns, at any given time. On the other hand, adaptive beamforming systems adjust
the beam pattern according to the dynamic measurements made. Figure 1.4a shows an
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uplink system with K mobile users and a BS with M antennas. Each mobile users is
assumed to be transmitting single data stream. The received signals are superimposed
to each other. By using the beam weight at each antenna element, the signal can be
intelligently decoded. The antenna array can either be linear, circular or planar. Radi-
ation patterns produced by planar and circular arrays are illustrated in Figure 1.4b and
Figure 1.4c, respectively. The fact that the beam resolution increases with the num-
ber of antenna elements at the transmitters, has triggered the instigation of research in
massive MIMO. Massive MIMO system is when a BS uses arrays of antennas consisting
of hundreds of antenna elements to communicate to single antenna users, over the same
frequency band and time [10, 11]. Massive MIMO systems use a time division duplex
(TDD) technique, wherein the uplink and downlink transmissions on the same frequency
occur at separated times.
1.4 Problem Statement
With the continued efforts to optimise wireless resources, it is undeniable that new
challenges in the wireless communications networks keep on emerging. For example,
computational complexity grows as the wireless system become very large, indoor traffic
dominates the total mobile traffic with 60 percent voice traffic and 70 percent data
traffic originating from indoors [6], increased backhaul traffic and energy consumption.
Though some of these challenges will remain inevitable, it is still vital to explore other
means to reduce their impact on the overall system performance. Before stating the
general problem in this thesis, first consider a generic optimisation problem [12]
minimize
r
f (r) , subject to r ∈ Q, (1.1)
where f (r) is the cost function, vector r is the optimisation variable, andQ is the feasible
region. The optimisation variable resembles a list of user parameters and Q depends
on factors like maximum transmission power, noise, transmission strategy, reception
strategy, and many more.
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Figure 1.5: A multiuser multi-cell network topology with heterogenous users. There
are to types of users: the non-real time users NRTUs and real time users RTUs.
1.4.1 Problem Description: Part 1
In the first part of this thesis, the optimisation variables are viewed as the worst case
user signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINR). With the worst case SINR as the
variable, then (1.1) becomes a max-min problem. A network with heterogeneous users,
as shown in Figure 1.5, is considered. The network has two types of users; real-time
users (RTUs) and non real-time users (NRTUs)1. The RTUs require delay intolerant
services and have a specific QoS (SINR) target, whereas the NRTUs require delay toler-
ant services and accept any best-effort QoS they can get. Special cases of this problem
occur when only a particular set of users is present at certain BS, for example, if a
certain BS serves only RTUs or NRTUs. The aim is to develop novel and distributed
algorithms when the BSs’ objective is to maximise the worst case SINR of the NRTUs,
subject to the SINR constraints of the RTUs, and transmission power constraints.
1.4.2 Problem Description: Part 2
With the aim of increasing the network capacity, the second part of this thesis treat
the optimisation variables as the number of users. This type of variable turns (1.1) into
a cardinality maximisation problem. As shown in Figure 1.6, the network consists of
one macrocell owned by the mobile network operator (MNO), privately owned small
cells access points (SCAs), macrocell users (MUs), small cell host/home users (HUs)
and small cell guest users (GUs). The GUs are the MUs that the macrocell base station
(MBS) is willing to offload to the small cells. The aim is to take advantage of the already
1It should be noted that latency requirements for the NRTUs in terms of propagation, transmission,
and processing are not considered. Essentially, the RTUs are priority users and therefore there are given
high preference over the NRTUs.
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Figure 1.6: A heterogeneous network consisting of one macro base station (MBS) and
hybrid small cells access points (SCAs). All transmitters operate on non-overlapping
frequency bands. Each SCAs is serving its home users (HUs). The are guest users
(GUs) that have been dropped by the MBS.
existing small cells to offload traffic from the MBS. The SCAs are willing to tender for
service provision to the MBS as long as it is profitable to do so. Admission of GUs by
the SCAs can only occur under the QoS constraints of the HUs, and the transmission
power constraints. This problem is formulated as a surplus maximisation problem, via
auction mechanism.
1.5 Research Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of this thesis is to use optimisation techniques for distributed
beamforming and resource allocation in wireless communication networks. Specific re-
search problems addressed in this thesis are summarised as follows:
1. The CoMP transmission and receive techniques in 3GPP LTE are a remarkable
step towards the improvement of the wireless system performance and it has stim-
ulated a profusion of research output found in the literature. Most of the literature
proposes centralised solutions wherein the CSI for multiple users is shared amongst
transmitters. The CSI needs to be transmitted via backhaul links. With an in-
creasing traffic, the CSI can be very large. Sharing coordination messages can
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be subjected to delays, thereby depriving the system from achieving a better per-
formance. In addition, the backhaul links may have capacity constraints. The
objective of this thesis is to find new algorithms that would relieve the backhaul
links from the coordination information, while the system achieves a reasonable
performance.
2. Coordination can be well managed when the interfering transmitters belong to the
same operator. But, spectrum scarcity will result in neighbouring cells that belong
to different operators. A similar scenario may arise when there is an outage on the
backhaul links between neighbouring cells that operate in the same frequency band.
Furthermore, hostile environments and financial constraints may discourage the
implementation of backhaul links. This would create a competition amongst cells.
The objective is to propose and analyse fully decentralized solutions. Performance
analysis shall be considered to measure the performance loss under fully distributed
solutions.
3. Most of the existing literature on radio resource management in wireless commu-
nication networks assumes that the users are of the same class or type. It is highly
improbable to encounter this in real-life. Hence, the objective of this thesis is to
develop distributed algorithms for wireless networks with RTUs and NRTUs. Since
the RTUs require delay intolerant services, they have high priority and therefore
become part of the constraints. Considering a network with RTUs and NRTUs
allows BSs to have different objective functions.
4. Deployment of new access points (APs) for admitting more users requires a lot
of capital investment and more spectrum acquisition. Taking advantage of low
powered APs like SCAs, can help MNOs to realise increased network capacity, via
network densification. SCAs allow aggressive frequency reuse within macrocells
and thereby improve spectrum efficiency, power efficiency and network capacity.
In order to reduce the operators’ capital expenditure (CAPEX), usage of already
deployed small cells will be ideal for offloading traffic from macrocells. Unfor-
tunately, some of the SCAs belong to customers. A lot of contributions in the
literature propose incentivised frameworks wherein the operator can offload their
users to the already existing third party owned SCAs in exchange of payments.
Since most of these private owners are business minded, incentives will therefore
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attract private owners to participate in these offloading mechanisms. Hence, the
objective is propose new algorithms that will address the competition amongst the
private owners who are already eager to participate in incentivised frameworks.
The aim is to study and analyse how the system performance is improved by
engaging private owners via auctioning mechanisms.
5. In order to meet the expected high traffic volume increase in wireless communica-
tions, 5G networks are proposed to achieve gigabit-level throughput [13–15]. One
major part of the 5G network is the hyper-dense deployment of small cells. But the
main challenge of these multi-tier networks is the random deployment, dynamic
on-off, flexible connection to cellular core networks and flat system architecture
[14]. For example, small cells can be turned on/off by the customer according to
their traffic demands. In networks with densely deployed small cells, in order to
manage the quickly changing channel and traffic parameters, the need for a cen-
tral control node becomes obsolete. Moreover, the diverse backhaul links in 5G
networks (id est, S1 interface, X2 interface, internet IP, wireless, fiber) [16] are
mostly capacity limited. Hence, when small cells are densely deployed, it becomes
a problem to transport the massive backhaul traffic to and fro the core network
[13]. It is therefore essential to develop distributed algorithms for carrier selection,
synchronisation, power control, and etcetera [14]. To address these challenges, this
thesis aims develop distributed algorithms that will encourage the small cells to
always be turned on. Regardless of the presence of HUs, customers will generate
revenue by turning their small cells on. Distributed algorithms will reduce the
overheads in the backhaul links.
1.6 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides a survey on resource allocation techniques and discusses the
relevant mathematical models used in this work. Various resource allocation techniques
using beamforming are introduced.
Chapter 3 addresses the problem described in Section 1.4.1 by applying game-theory
and convex optimisation. In particular, downlink beamforming design under mixed QoS
criterion is studied. First, a two-user model, wherein one BS is serving an RTU and
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the other BS is serving a NRTU, is considered. Maximum ratio transmission (MRT)
and zero forcing (ZF) beamforming techniques are analysed to show the inefficiency
of the performance of noncooperative solutions. A comparison to optimal beamforming
techniques under sum-rate maximisation and max-min is conducted. Lastly, the problem
is extend to a multicell multiuser scenario. Each BS is considered to be serving RTUs and
NRTUs. A dual decomposition technique is used to develop a distributed algorithm. The
performance of the proposed algorithm is compared to that of the centralised solution.
In Chapter 4, a game-theoretic approach for the downlink beamformer design in a
multicell multiuser wireless network under a mixed QoS criterion is proposed. A novel
mixed QoS strategic non-cooperative game (SNG) algorithm, wherein BSs determine
their downlink beamformers in a fully distributed manner, is proposed. The mixed QoS
SNG is supplemented with a fall back mechanism, which converts the problem to a pure
max-min optimisation problem in cases of infeasibility of the mixed QoS problem. In
order to improve the Nash equilibrium (NE) operating point obtained by the mixed QoS
SNG, the mixed QoS bargain games (BGs) are studied. In particular, the Egalitarian
and Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) bargain solutions are proposed.
In Chapter 5, an auction based beamforming and user association algorithm for a
wireless network with a macrocell deployed with multiple SCAs, is proposed. Accord-
ingly, the MBS wishes to offload some of its users to a number of SCAs in exchange of
payments based on auctioning. The SCAs compete for serving the MBS users. This
user association and user offloading problem is solved by the proposed novel bid-wait
auction (BWA) method. Two scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, the MBS
initially admits the largest possible set of MUs, which it can serve simultaneously, and
then auctions off the remaining (dropped) MUs to the SCAs. The SCAs are willing
to admit GUs in addition to commitments of serving their HUs. Thus, the SCAs can
admit GUs (i.e. dropped MUs) provided that the QoS of their HUs is not compromised.
This problem is solved by the proposed forward BWA (FBWA) algorithm. In the second
scenario, the MBS aims to auction off as many MUs as possible, and then admits the
largest possible set of remaining MUs. This is solved by the proposed backward BWA
(BBWA) algorithm. The proposed methods provide decentralized solutions resulting
into exchange of only minimal signalling information between the SCAs and MBS, and
the solution is shown to be close to optimum.
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Chapter 6 further investigates the auction based algorithms for offloading MUs from
the MBS. The same system model in Chapter 5 is considered. First, a simultaneous
multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA), for allocating MUs to the SCAs, is proposed.
Taking into account the overheads incurred by SCAs during valuation in the SMRA, fur-
ther improvements are obtained through the proposed altered SMRA (ASMRA) and the
combinatorial auction with item bidding (CAIB) algorithms. In particular, sequential
CAIB (SCAIB) and repetitive CAIB (RCAIB) algorithms are proposed. The analysis
shows that the valuation function used by the SCAs is gross substitute, hence the prove
of existence of the Walrasian equilibrium (WE), is conducted. It is shown that truthful
bidding is individually rational for all the proposed algorithms. Finally, validation of the
proposed solutions with reference to the optimal solution, is conducted via numerical
simulations.
Chapter 7 gives a summary of the contributions made by this thesis. Potential
research problems are also stipulated.
Chapter 2
Radio Resource Management
Techniques for Wireless
Communications Network
This chapter introduces the techniques and theories which will be used in the rest of
this thesis. The main focus is on multi-antenna techniques, convex optimisation, game
theory and auction theory. Examples are used to show how these techniques can be
applied within the context of resource allocation in wireless communication networks.
2.1 Resource Allocation
A generic system model for a MISO downlink network has the following character-
istics: Consider a multicell multiuser wireless network consisting of N = |N | BSs, and
K = |U| single antenna users. The users are partitioned amongst the BSs such that BS
n serves a set Un ⊆ U of users. A BS that is serving user k is denoted by nk. Assume
that each BS is equipped with M antennas. The transmitted signal for user k is given
by
xk(t) = wksk(t), (2.1)
where sk(t) ∈ C represents the information symbol at time t and wk ∈ CM is the
transmit beamforming vector for user k. Without loss of generality, assume that sk(t)
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is normalised, such that E{|sk(t)|2} = 1, as the power of the signal can be incorporated
into wk. All data streams are assumed to be independent, id est, E{sk(t)si(t)∗} = 0 if
k 6= i. It is assumed that the BSs operate on the same frequency band. The received
signal at the k-th user can be written as
yk(t) = h
H
nk,k
xk(t) +
∑
i∈U\k
hHni,kxi(t) + ηk(t), (2.2)
where hnk,k ∈ CM is the random channel vector from BS nk to user k, and ηk(t) ∈
CN (0, σ2) is the circular symmetric zero mean complex Gaussian noise with variance
σ2. The notation U \ k denotes a set U excluding member k. The downlink SINR of the
k-th user is given as
SINRDk =
Desired signal power︷ ︸︸ ︷
|hHnk,kwk|2∑
i∈Unk\k
|hHnk,kwi|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra-cell Interference power
+
∑
n∈N\nk
∑
j∈Un
|hHn,kwj |2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter-cell interference power
+ σ2︸︷︷︸
Noise power
. (2.3)
Note that the users are coupled by cross-talk [17]. This is a challenge when designing
distributed algorithms. One of the most common resource allocation problem in wireless
communications systems is based on the transmit beamforming. This problem can be
formulated as minimisation of transmitted power at the BS subject to the SINR targets
as
PPMP : minimise{wk},∀k
∑
k∈U
‖wk‖2, subject toSINR ≥ γk, ∀k ∈ U , ∀n ∈ N , (2.4)
where γk is the minimum SINR threshold required by user k. The problem in (2.4)
can be converted into its convex equivalent form and solved efficiently using convex
optimisation tools [12,18].
Sometimes the SINR targets in (2.4) may turn out to be infeasible. This may occur,
for example, when some of the users are in deep fading and/or experience significant
shadowing effects, the channels of some users are highly correlated, or there is lack
of resources at the BSs. To overcome these problems, a max-min fairness approach is
sometimes used. The approach, referred to as the SINR balancing technique, maximises
the worst case SINR subject to the available total transmission power [17, 19] and is
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formulated as
PSB : maximise{w},∀k
min
k
(SINRk), subject to
∑
k∈U
‖wk‖2 ≤ ϕmaxn , n ∈ N , (2.5)
where ϕmaxn is the maximum available transmit power at the BS n. This problem was
analysed in [17] and it was solved using an iterative algorithm by exploiting the uplink-
downlink duality. It should be noted that problems in (2.4) and (2.5) have the SINRs
of the users either in the objective or as the constraints.
In the following sections, discussions on mathematical theories and tools used to
solve the problems in (2.4) and (2.5) are provided. Even though there is a plethora
of mathematical tools and techniques such as genetic algorithm, simulated annealing,
and matching theory, the focus will be on convex optimisation, game-theory and auc-
tion theory. The reason is that game theory and auction theory are known to provide
lightweight coordination information amongst agents, which is the main focus of this
thesis. Furthermore, convex optimisation is a core subject on optimisation techniques
and it offers solutions that are tractable.
2.2 Convex optimisation
Most of the resource allocation problems require mathematical optimisation, in par-
ticular convex optimisation. Hence, this section provides literature background in convex
optimisation, as it is the core theory to the problems in this thesis. Wireless commu-
nication networks are often characterised by the wireless resources, system constraints
and requirements that can be interpreted using mathematical functions. The strong
relationship between these characteristics is ineluctable; hence, it can foster conflicting
requirements and demands. Optimisation is a mathematical science that studies how to
make good and informed decisions when confronted with such conflicting requirements
and demands [20]. Convex optimisation is the minimisation of a convex objective func-
tion, subject to convex constraints [12, 21]. The optimal solution of a convex problem
guarantees to be the best solution [12, 20] since the local optimum is also the global
optimum1.
1The reader is referred to [12] for detailed explanation, derivations and proofs.
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Consider an optimisation problem as defined in the standard form [12],
minimise f0(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m,
hi(x) = 0 i = 1, . . . , p,
(2.6)
where x ∈ Rn is the optimisation variable, function f0 : Rn 7→ R is the objective function
or cost function, functions fi : Rn 7→ R are the inequality constraints, and functions
hi : Rn 7→ R are the equality constraint functions. The domain D or the feasible
set of (2.6) contains all the feasible points that satisfy fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m and
hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p, and it is given by
D =
m⋂
i=0
dom fi ∩
p⋂
i=0
domhi. (2.7)
The notation dom f means the domain of f . Problem (2.6) can be viewed as a max-
imisation problem by setting the objective function to −f0, subject to the constraints
therein. Now, a convex optimisation problem has the form
minimise f0(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m,
aTi x = bi i = 1, . . . , p,
(2.8)
where f0, . . . , fm are convex functions
2. The equality constraint functions hi(x) = a
T
i x−
bi must be an affine
3. The domain of (2.8) is a convex set given by
D =
m⋂
i=0
dom fi. (2.9)
2.2.1 Quasiconvex optimisation
The problem (2.8) is called quasiconvex optimisation problem if the objective function
f0 is quasiconvex
4. In resource allocation, the SINR balancing problem PSB defined in
(2.5), is considered as a quasiconvex optimisation problem [22], and it is worthy studying
2f : Rn 7→ R is called convex if ∀x1,x2 ∈ dom f , and θ ∈ [0, 1], f (θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≤ (1− θ) f(x2).
3f : Rn 7→ R is called affine if ∀x1,x2 ∈ dom f , and θ ∈ [0, 1], f (θx1 + (1− θ)x2) = (1− θ) f(x2).
4f : Rn 7→ R is called quasiconvex if ∀x1,x2 ∈ dom f , and θ ∈ [0, 1], f (θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≤
max (f(x1), f(x2)) .
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its general solution structure through convex feasibility problems. Assume that f0 in
(2.8) is quasiconvex, then there is a family of functions φt : Rn 7→ R such that, φt(x) is
convex in x for fixed t ∈ R, and t-sublevel set of f0 is 0-sublevel of φt, id est,
f0(x) ≤ 0⇐⇒ φt(x) ≤ 0. (2.10)
For every x, φt(x) is a nonincreasing function of t. Therefore, for a variable s ≥ t then
φs(x) ≤ φt(x). (2.11)
For every fixed t, a convex feasibility problem for (2.8) has the form
find x
subject to φt(x) ≤ 0,
fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
Ax = b.
(2.12)
If p? is the optimal solution of (2.8), then a solution to (2.12) which gives p? ≤ t indicates
feasibility, and a solution that result in p? ≥ t indicates infeasibility. Commonly a
bisection method (also referred to as the binary search method) is used to solve the
quasiconvex optimisation problem (2.8), by solving the convex feasibility problem (2.12)
over an interval [l, u] containing p? [12,20]. In Algorithm 1, (2.12) is solved at midpoint
t = (l+u)/2 to check if p? is in the lower or upper half of the interval, repeatedly until a
set tolerance  is reached. After every iteration the interval is halved; and hence, exactly
dlog2 ((u− l) /)e iterations are required.
Algorithm 1: Quasiconvex optimisation via Bisection method
Data:  > 0, l ≤ p?, u ≥ p?
Result: t? ≥ p?
1 while l − u >  do
2 Set t = l+u2
3 Solve (2.12) at t
4 if feasible then
5 set u = t;
6 else
7 set l = t;
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2.2.2 Duality Theory
Duality provides a powerful approach for dealing with resource allocation problems.
A dual problem has three main advantages [12,20]:
1. The dual problem is convex even if its primal is not.
2. The number of variables in the dual program is usually less than those in the
primal program. The number of variables in the dual program is equal to the
number of constraints in the primal program.
3. The maximum value achieved by the dual program is often equal to the minimum
value achieved by the primal program.
In the Lagrangian function, the constraints are augmented to the objective function
through Lagrangian multipliers. The Lagrangian function L : Rn × Rm × Rp 7→ R of
(2.8) is defined as
L(x,λ,ν) = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νihi(x), (2.13)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint, and νi is
the Lagrange multiplier associated the equality constraint and domL = D × Rm ×Rn.
Now, the Lagrangian dual function g : Rm × Rp 7→ R, is defined as the minimum value
of the Lagrangian function over x and it is given by
g(λ,ν) = inf
x∈D
L(x,λ,ν). (2.14)
The dual function is concave even if (2.8) is nonconvex. For any given feasible point
x˜ of (2.8), g(λ,ν) ≤ f0(x˜) should hold. The dual function yields lower bounds on the
optimal value p? of (2.8). For any λ  0 and for any value ν
g(λ,ν) ≤ p?. (2.15)
See [12, Section 5.1.3] for proof. If x˜ is a feasible vector for (2.8), it can be concluded
that
g(λ,ν) = inf
x∈D
L(x,λ,ν) ≤ L(x˜,λ,ν) ≤ f0(x˜), (2.16)
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and that the lower bound is obtained by maximising the lower bound. The Lagrange
dual problem associated with the primal problem (2.8) becomes
maximise
λ,ν
g(λ,ν), subject toλ  0. (2.17)
It follows that (λ?,ν?) are the dual optimal or optimal Lagrange multipliers if they are
optimal for problem (2.14).
Definition 2.1 (Weak duality)
If d? denotes the optimal value of the Lagrange dual problem (2.14), then it represents
the best lower bound on the optimal value p? of the primal problem (2.8). The weak
duality is defined by the inequality
d? ≤ p?. (2.18)
The weak duality holds if the primal problem is nonconvex and d? and p? are infinite.
Definition 2.2 (Strong duality)
The optimal duality gap is defined as the difference p? − d? and it is always non-
negative. If the duality gap is zero then strong duality holds, implying that
d? = p?. (2.19)
The strong duality does not always hold even when the primal problem is convex;
and therefore, constraint qualifications are necessary to qualify this.
Example 2.1 (Constraint qualification, Slater’s condition)
If the primal is convex, and there exists an x ∈ relintD such that
fi(x) < 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, Ax = b, (2.20)
then, strong duality p? = d? holds, and the dual problem is attained. The notation
relintD is the relative interior of set D.
Once the Slater’s condition is satisfied, optimality conditions are assessed by the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of strong duality between the primal and the dual prob-
lems. Figure by (Lucas V. Barbosa).
Definition 2.3 (KKT Conditions)
Assume f0, . . . , fm and h1, . . . , hp are differentiable. Let x
? and (λ?,ν?) be the
optimal solution to primal and dual problems, respectively, with zero duality gap.
KKT conditions suggest that the gradient for L(x,λ?,ν?) must vanish at x?, id est,
∇f0(x?) +
m∑
i=1
λ?i∇fi(x?) +
p∑
i=1
ν?i∇hi(x?) = 0, (2.21)
giving the following additional KKT conditions:
fi(x
?) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
hi(x
?) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p,
λ?i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.22)
λ?i fi(x
?) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Example 2.2 (Duality)
Consider a linear conic programming primal dual pair in (2.23)[20, 21]
Pp : minimise
x
αTx
subject to x ∈ K,
Cx = β.
⇐⇒
Pd : maximise
y, z
βTz
subject to y ∈ K′,
CTz + y = α.
(2.23)
where Pp is a primal conic problem over cone K, and Pd is a dual conic problem
over cone K′. Note that the objective function value ofPd never exceeds that ofPp.
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Therefore, the following conditions should hold
αTx ≥ βTz,
xT(CTz + y) ≥ (Cx)Tz,
xTy ≥ 0.
 (2.24)
Since Pp is convex, if the Slater’s condition is satisfied, then x?Ty? = 0 is true.
This yields strong duality. Combining Pp and Pd result in the following min-max
problem
Pp-d : minimise α
Tx− βTz (2.25)
subject to x ∈ K, y ∈ K′, (2.26)
Cx = β, CTz + y = α, (2.27)
whose solution always satisfies (2.19). That is, the gap at the saddle point is 0.
Figure 2.1 is a mnemonic that illustrates the relationship between thePp andPd. Note
that if strong duality exists, the duality gap is 0, meaning that f(x) and g(z) (dashed
line) touch at the saddle value.
2.2.3 Downlink Beamformer Design Via Lagrangian Duality
Works in [17,21,23–30] have used Lagrangian duality for downlink beamformer design.
These works derived several uplink-downlink duality properties that offer very insightful
and tractable structures. Uplink-downlink duality suggests that, the minimum power
required to satisfy a certain set of SINR targets in the downlink MIMO channel, is
equal to the minimum power required to achieve the same set of SINR targets in the
uplink channel. The uplink-downlink properties are demonstrated through the following
example adopted from [21].
Example 2.3
Consider a downlink and uplink networks in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b respectively. There
is a set U := {1, 2, . . . ,K} of users, each denoted with k. Assume each user is equipped
with a single antenna, while the BS is equipped with M > 1 antennas. The received
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Figure 2.2: Block diagram for single-cell network in the downlink and uplink.
signal at the k-th user in the downlink is
yk = h
H
kx + ηk, ∀k ∈ U , (2.28)
where hk ∈ CM is the channel vector between k-th user and the BS, x ∈ CM is the
transmitted signal, and ηk is the additive white Gaussian noise. Let x =
∑
k∈U wksk,
where sk is the complex scalar denoting the information signal for the k-th user, and
wk ∈ CM is the beamforming vector for the k-user. Without loss of generality, let
E|sk|2 = 1, since the power can be embedded in the beamforming vector. Now (2.28)
becomes
yk = h
H
k
(∑
k∈U
wksk
)
+ ηk, ∀k ∈ U . (2.29)
The SINR for the k-th user in the downlink is given by
SINRDk =
|hHkwk|2∑
j∈U\k
|hHkwj |2 + σk
. (2.30)
Let the primal problem of the network be of the formPPMP in (2.4). Note thatPPMP
is not convex due to the SINRs constraints. The Lagrangian of PPMP (without
intercell interference term) is given by
L(wk, λk) =
∑
k∈U
‖wk‖2 + 1
σ2k
∑
k∈U
λk
∑
j∈U\k
|hHkwj |2 +
∑
k∈U
λk
(
1− 1
γkσ
2
k
|hHkwk|2
)
=
∑
k∈U
λkσ
2
k +
∑
k∈U
wHk
IM + ∑
j∈U\k
λi
σ2k
hjh
H
j −
λk
γkσ
2
k
hkh
H
k
wk, (2.31)
where λk ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the k-th SINR constraint.
The dual objective is defined as g(λk) = min
wk
L(wk, λk). Assume that
∑
k∈U ‖wk‖2
is differentiable, and let w?k and λ
?
k be the optimal solutions to the primal and dual
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problems, respectively, with zero duality gap. Then KKT conditions suggest that
the gradient for (2.31) should be zero at w? id est, ∂L/∂w?k = 0,∀k ∈ U [12]. This
results in
wk +
∑
j∈U\k
λi
σ2k
hjh
H
j w
?
k −
λk
γkσ
2
k
hkh
H
kw
?
k = 0,
⇒
IM + ∑
j∈U\k
λj
σ2k
hjh
H
j
wk = λk
σ2k
(
1 +
1
γk
)
hkh
H
kwk,
⇒ wk =
IM + ∑
j∈U\k
λj
σ2k
hkh
H
k
−1 hkλk
σ2k
(
1 +
1
γk
)
hHkwk, (2.32)
where IM is an M ×M identity matrix. The term λkσ2k (1 +
1
γk
)hHkwk is a scalar and it
accounts for the allocated power [19]. Therefore, the optimal wk should be colinear to
(IM +
∑
i∈Un\k λi/σ
2
khjh
H
j )
−1hk, hence the normalised optimal beamforming vectors
w?k, k ∈ U are
w?k =
√
ϕk
(
IM +
∑
j∈U\k
λj
σ2k
hjh
H
j
)−1
hk∥∥∥∥∥∥
(
IM +
∑
i∈U\k
λi
σ2k
hjhHj
)−1
hk
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
w˜?k
, (2.33)
where ϕk is the beamforming power and w˜
?
k is the unit-norm beamforming direction
for the k-th user. The vector w˜?k is referred to as the minimum mean square error
(MMSE) filter [17,19,21,23–30]. The dual problem Pd-PMP is defined as
Pd-PMP : maximise{wk}∀k
∑
k∈U
λkσ
2
k,
subject to
IM + ∑
j∈U\k
λjhjh
H
j
  λk (1 + 1
γk
)
hkh
H
k .
(2.34)
With reference to Figure 2.2b, the total power minimization problem for the uplink
PUPMP is formulated as
PUPMP : minimise{ϕk}∀k
∑
k∈U
ϕk, subject to SINRUk ≥ γk. (2.35)
where
SINRUk =
ϕk|w˜Hk hk|2∑
j∈U\k
ϕj |w˜Hj hk|2 + σkw˜Hk w˜k
. (2.36)
Chapter 2. Radio Resource Management Techniques 26
Now substituting MMSE filter into (2.35) yields
PUPMP : maximise{wk}∀k
∑
k∈U
ϕk,
subject to
IM + ∑
j∈U\k
λjhjh
H
j
  λk (1 + 1
γk
)
hkh
H
k .
(2.37)
By noting that ϕk = λkσ
2
k, thenP
U
PMP(2.37) andPd-PMP(2.34) are identical, except
that the maximise is replaced with minimise, and the inequality of the constraints
are reversed.
2.3 Decomposition Techniques
As discussed above, the Lagrangian duality has proven to be a very useful tool in
resource allocation. This section discusses how the Lagrangian function can be used
in distributed algorithm design. Since the problems encountered in resource allocation
have conflicting variables, it becomes a prerequisite to decompose these problems in
order to derive distributed algorithms.
2.3.1 Primal Decomposition
Consider an unconstrained problem of the form
minimise f(x) = f1(x1,y) + f2(x2,y), (2.38)
where x = (x1,x2,y) is a vector containing the optimisation variables. Note that the
objective of (2.38) will become separable in x1 and x2 if y is fixed. This will yield two
separate subproblems that can be solved independently. Since y couples the subprob-
lems, it is called the complicating variable. The variables x1 and x2 are known as the
private or local variables. Let φ1(y) and φ2(y) be the optimal values of P
pri
1 and P
pri
2 ,
respectively, where
Ppri1 : minimisex1
f1(x1,y), and P
pri
2 : minimisex2
f2(x2,y), (2.39)
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are known as subproblems. Now, (2.38) can equivalently be written as
minimise
y
φ1(y) + φ2(y). (2.40)
The problem (2.40) is called the master problem [31, 32]. Note that if (2.38) is convex,
so is (2.40). In order to solve (2.38) via the decomposition method, (2.40) is solved
using a subgradient method [12]. In each iteration, φ1(y) and φ2(y) are evaluated (in
parallel/sequentially) using Ppri1 and P
pri
2 .
2.3.2 Dual Decomposition
Another way to solve (2.38) is through dual decomposition. By introducing new
variables y1 and y2, (2.38) can be expressed as
minimise f(x) = f1(x1,y1) + f2(x2,y2), subject toy1 = y2. (2.41)
The new variables provide a local copy of the complicating variable and a consistency
constraint y1 = y2 [31]. The objective of (2.41) is now separable in (x1,y1) and (x2,y2).
The Lagrangian of (2.41) is
L(x1,x2,y1,y2,λ) = f1(x1,y1) + f2(x2,y2) + λT(y1 − y2), (2.42)
which is separable. This yields a dual problem
maximise g(λ) = g1(λ) + g2(λ), (2.43)
where
g1(λ) = inf
x1,y1
f1(x1,y1) + λ
Ty1, and g2(λ) = inf
x2,y2
f2(x2,y2) + λ
Ty2. (2.44)
Now, g1 and g2 can be solved independently. The master problem in (2.43) can be solved
via subgradient, cutting-plane, any other method.
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2.3.3 Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is an algorithm used in dis-
tributed convex optimisation [33], especially for large systems. It combines the benefits
of dual decomposition and the augmented Lagrangian methods, when the problems are
constrained. The ADMM considers an optimisation problem of the form
minimise
x, z
f(x) + g(z), subject to Ax + Bz = c, (2.45)
where x ∈ Rn and z ∈ Rm are variables, A ∈ Rp×n, B ∈ Rp×m, and c ∈ Rp. It is
assumed that f and g are convex. The augmented Lagrangian of (2.55) is
Lρ(x, z,λ) = f(x) + g(z) + λT(Ax + Bz− c) + (ρ/2) ‖ Ax + Bz− c ‖22, (2.46)
where λ is the dual variable or the Lagrange multiplier, and ρ > 0 is the penalty
parameter. The ADMM consists of the following successive iterations:
xt+1 := argmin
x
Lρ
(
x, zt,λt
)
, (2.47)
zt+1 := argmin
z
Lρ
(
xt+1, zt+1,κt
)
, (2.48)
λt+1 := λt + ρ
(
Axt+1 + Bzt+1 − c) , (2.49)
where t is the time index. The variables x and z are updated in a sequential or alter-
nating manner. By separating the minimisation over x and z into two steps, allows the
decomposition of f and g. One of the setbacks in ADMM is that it can be very slow to
converge to high accuracy [33,34]. Another setback in ADMM is that, even though the
convergence of ADMM for a convex optimisation problem with two blocks of variables
and functions has been proved in [33, 35], convergence is not guaranteed when there
are more than two block of variables and functions [36]. Nevertheless, ADMM often
converges to moderate accuracy within a few tens of iterations. The performance of the
ADMM is discussed in Example 2.4.
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Figure 2.3: Network example for general form consensus optimisation. Each edge
represent a consistency constraint.
2.3.4 Consensus Optimisation
The ADMM can be used to solve a consensus problem [33, 35], wherein agents have
to agree on a single data value. Consider a general consensus problem of the form
minimise
{xi},{z˜i},∀i
fi(xi), subject to xi − z˜ = 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (2.50)
where xi ∈ Rni and zi ∈ Rni are local and global variables, respectively. Figure 2.3,
shows a network of N = 3 subsystems, global variable dimension of n = 4, and local
variable dimensions of n1 = 4, n2 = 2, and n3 = 3. As illustrated, the objective terms
and the global variables can be represented as a bipartite graph [33]. The ADMM for
(2.50) is
xt+1i := argmin
xi
(
fi(xi) + λ
(t)T
i (xi − zt) +
ρ
2
‖ xi − zt ‖22
)
, (2.51)
zt+1 := argmin
z
(
g(z) +
N∑
i=1
(
−λ(t)Ti z +
ρ
2
‖ xt+1i − zt ‖22
))
, (2.52)
λt+1i := λ
t
i + ρ
(
xt+1i − zt+1
)
, (2.53)
where λi ∈ Rni is the dual variable. Steps (2.51) and (2.53) can be evaluated indepen-
dently.
In order to understand the application and performance of the ADMM in distributed
algorithm design, a general network problem discussed in [34] is elaborated in the fol-
lowing example.
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Figure 2.4: Network layout for a system model in Example 2.4
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Example 2.4 (Application of ADMM in Networks)
Consider a network in Figure 2.4, with a set J := {1, 2, . . . , J} of fully interconnected
nodes and a central node. The central node broadcasts message s ∈ Rn to all nodes.
Assume that the nodes are able to exchange information over inter-nodes, which are
assumed to be ideal and time invariant. Each node will receive a modified xj ∈ Rm×1
given by
xj = Hjs + ηj , (2.54)
where Hj ∈ Cm×n is the disturbance matrix and ηj ∈ CN (0, σ2n) is additive Gaussian
noise with zero mean and variance σ2n. Since estimating s locally at every node will
result in different estimates, the authors in [34] formulated the problem of estimating
s at each node as a consensus problem, with the objective as the sum of the estimation
errors. Each node solves
minimise
1
2
∑
j∈J
‖ xj −Hjsj ‖2, subject to sj − si = 0, (i, j) ∈ J , (2.55)
where sj ∈ Rn are the variables, Hj ∈ Cm×n, and xj ∈ Cm are the problem data.
The consensus constraints sj − si, ensure that the estimated sj at any node is in
agreement with all other nodes. In essence, s will be estimated at each node, but
iteratively. Thus, at the end of the optimisation, each node will have the same s. To
decouple (2.55), a new variable zj ∈ Rn, ∀j is introduced. The problem (2.55) can
now be cast as
minimise
1
2
∑
j∈J
‖ xj −Hjsj ‖2
subject to sj − zi = 0, (i, j) ∈ J ,
si − zi = 0, (i, j) ∈ J .
(2.56)
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Problem (2.56) is separable in j ∈ J . Its augmented Lagrangian is written as
Lρ(s, z,λ) =
∑
j∈J
(
1
2
‖ xj −Hjsj ‖2 −
∑
i∈J
λTij(sj − zi) +
∑
i∈J
ρij
2
‖ sj − si ‖2
)
,
(2.57)
where λij ∈ Rn×1 are the Lagrangian multipliers, and ρij ∈ R are the penalty
parameters. This yields an ADMM algorithm with the following successive iterations,
st+1j :=
(
HHj Hj +
∑
i∈J
ρijI
)−1(
HHj xj +
∑
i∈J
(
λtij + ρijz
t
i
))
, (2.58)
zt+1j :=
1
J
∑
i∈J
(
sti −
1
ρ ij
λt
)
, (2.59)
λt+1 := λt + ρij
(
st+1 − zt+1j
)
. (2.60)
Let sˆj be the estimate of s at node j. The Least Squares (LS) and the Minimum
Mean Square Error (MMSE) estimates of s are given by
sˆLSj = (H
H
j Hj)
−1HHj xj , and, (2.61)
sˆMMSEj = (H
H
j Hj + σ
2
j IM )
−1HHj xj . (2.62)
Figure 2.5 shows the performance of the ADMM solution against the LS and MMSE
estimations. Note that in Figure 2.5a, even though ADMM takes long to reach
high accuracy, it reaches moderate accuracy within 20 iterations. Figure 2.5b shows
that, when the size of the received message is small, the system overheads are worse
than in the case of a centralised solution. But once the message m is increased, the
ADMM experience a significant decrease in the overheads. This is why the ADMM
is well suited for large systems such as in 5G. Involvement of hyper-dense small cell
deployment, massive MIMO, and influx of mobile users in 5G, will require distributed
algorithms [13,14] such as the ADMM.
2.4 Game Theory
Another approach for developing distributed algorithm is game theory. Invented by
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 [37] and advanced by John Nash
[38, 39], game theory is a branch of mathematics that enables modelling and analysis
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of the ADMM algorithm and the centralized solutions
of the interaction between self-interested agents (id est players) [1, 37]. This section
introduces game theory models, particularly non-cooperative and cooperative models.
The discussions of this section are based on the structure of general game theory shown
in Figure 2.6.
GAME THEORY
Strategic Form
Nash 
Equilibrium
Nash 
Bargain
CooperativeNon-cooperative
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Figure 2.6: A partial structure of game theory. Adapted from [1].
2.4.1 Non-cooperative Games
Non-cooperative games can be represented in two ways, the normal form or the ex-
tensive form [40–42]. The normal form is sometimes referred to as the matrix form or
the strategic form, and it is in this form, whereby a game is defined by listing payoffs
against their corresponding strategies. It is usually assumed that the players move si-
multaneously. In the extensive form, players can be deemed to move in a sequential
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manner (exempli gratia, include timing), and as a result the game can easily be repre-
sented as a tree diagram. Moreover, in extensive form, players are capable of keeping
track of moves other players made when they make decisions [40]. It can therefore be
assumed that the normal form is a special case of the extensive form when no player is
able to observe other players’ moves.
Definition 2.4 (Non-cooperative Game)
An N-person normal form game is a modelled as
G = {N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N }, (2.63)
where:
1. N is a finite set of players indexed by N = {1, . . . , N},
2. Si is a set of available strategies (actions) for player i,
3. ui : Si 7→ R is the utility (payoff) function of player i.
In a non-cooperative game, the players compete with each other, and therefore, each
player makes independent decision, given the possible actions taken by other players.
This is a different case with a cooperative game, where the players coordinate in making
decisions. Authors in [40] highlighted that the term non-cooperative does not necessary
mean players do not cooperate, but rather it implies that any cooperation that suffices
should be self-enforcing, without coordination between players. A distinguish between
an action and a strategy is also very important in dynamic games, whereby choices of
each player are dictated by the available information [40]. The games considered in
this thesis are static games, (id est decisions are taken simultaneously), and therefore,
strategy and action will mean the same thing, unless stated otherwise. A mixed strategy
is the mapping from information available to player i to the action set Ai available to
this player [40,41,43], and it can be defined as
Si =
{
si : Ai 7→ R+,
∑
ai∈Ai
si(ai) = 1
}
. (2.64)
Players select strategies that will optimise5 their utilities. It follows that if a player
5Depending on the system objective function, players select strategies to maximise their payoffs or
minimise their utilities.
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selects a strategy from the probability distribution in (2.64), with probability of 1, that
strategy is called pure strategy. A useful approach to solve non-cooperative games is by
utilising dominating strategies, which reduce or simplify the game, by eliminating some
dominated strategies [40].
Definition 2.5 (Dominant Strategy)
A strategy si strictly dominates s
′
i for player i if
ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i), ∀si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i. (2.65)
A strategy si weakly dominates s
′
i for player i if
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i), ∀si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i, (2.66)
where S−i =
∏
j 6=i
Sj is a set of all strategy profiles for all players other than player i.
A game in Definition 2.4 is a finite game, as it is characterized by a finite set of
strategies Si for all i ∈ N , finite set of players and finite set of utilities. According to
[38], for any finite non-cooperative game, an equilibrium point will be attainable, in this
case, it is the Nash equilibrium (NE). At NE, none of the players has any incentive to
deviate.
Theorem 2.1 (Nash Theorem)
Every (finite) normal form game has at least one NE [38,44].
Definition 2.6 (Nash Equilibrium)
An equilibrium is a state where no player can benefit by changing its current strategy
if the other players maintain their NE strategies [40,43].
ui(s
NE
i , s
NE
−i ) ≥ ui(si, sNEi ) ∀si ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ N . (2.67)
The mathematical description of the NE in (2.67), shows that the NE set contains all the
best response (BR) strategies of all players, given that some players resort to NE strategy.
It is therefore reasonable to say that, the NE is the solution to a non-cooperative game.
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Definition 2.7 (Best Response)
The BR for player i to the strategies s−i of other players is the set valued function
BRi(s−i) = argmax
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i). (2.68)
From Definition 2.7, the strategy profile sNE is an NE if and only if sNE ∈ BR(sNE).
Unfortunately, the NE solution has two major defects [45], and this makes it unattractive
in certain problems.
1. More than one NE may exist in a game, which makes it difficult to judge the
outcome of a game.
2. NE is often inefficient [45–47]. In [47], it was shown that the NE is bounded
by a constant irrespective of the available transmission power. Hence, the NE
inefficiently allocates the resources which results in low system performance.
2.4.2 Cooperative Games
In order to achieve more efficient payoffs, cooperation may be necessary between
players. In this manner, players are able to share relevant information in order to
facilitate the process of achieving better payoffs than the NE. As depicted in Figure 2.6,
a cooperative game is represented in a coalition form or through the bargain theory.
The interest of this thesis is mainly on bargain theory. In particular, Nash bargain (NB)
process, which is an axiomatic [39] (id est characterized by the process of checking if the
outcome satisfies a set of predefined axioms) bargain process, is considered. For brevity,
the NB problem is defined by a tuple {S,d}, where the disagreement/threat point d ∈ S,
is an outcome when the players cannot reach an agreement [48]. The Nash axiomatic
bargain theory requires the utility set to be a convex set, in order to guarantee a unique
solution that satisfies the four axioms discussed in [48]. The NB aims to maximise
NB =
N∏
i
(si − di) , (2.69)
where di is the disagreement point. Maximising the NB function (2.69) maximises the
volume of the box between the NE and the Pareto boundary. Solution to (2.69) can be
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found graphically, by choosing a constant c on the Pareto boundary where Nash curve
and the Pareto boundary intersect. The Nash curve therefore satisfies
c = (s1 − d1), . . . , (sN − dN ). (2.70)
From (2.69) and (2.70), it is observed that the NB solution will achieve higher utility
than the NE for all players. These solutions give Pareto optimal utilities. The main
interest in this work, is to investigate both the NE and the Pareto optimal solutions.
Definition 2.8 (Pareto Optimal)
A strategy sPO is deemed Pareto optimal [1,40,43,48] if for any strategy s, it is such
that
ui(s
PO) ≥ ui(s), ∀i ∈ N . (2.71)
When operating at Pareto optimal profile, it it not possible to increase the payoff of one
player without decreasing utilities of other players.
2.5 Resource Allocation via Auction Theory
The resource management aspects discussed earlier, show how wireless communica-
tions need appraisal via economic considerations in order to deem them viable. Economic
models have a root in the area of wireless communications network. The authors in [49]
emphasise that wireless communications and networking systems are tightly coupled
with economics such, that it becomes vital to consider the economic implication when
making a technology choice. Ideally, service providers6 should aim to maximise the so-
cial welfare of the network. Unfortunately, the wireless resources such as the spectrum
license and equipments are procured at very high costs. In addition, the maintenance
of the wireless systems and personnel recruitment dictate the objectives of the service
providers. Due to these costs, service providers are propelled to maximise their profits.
The tension between the supply and demand, the competition for users and spectrum
acquisition by service providers, can be analysed by studying the economics of the net-
work. Economic models can be used to improve the overall performance of the wireless
networks and satisfaction levels for the users and the service providers [49].
6The term service providers is used to refer to mobile network operators (MNOs) and third party
network operators, id est customers.
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The scarcity of the spectrum has instigated new resource allocation techniques via
auctioning. Auction theory is a subfield of economics and management, which deals
with how agents behave in auction markets [50, 51]. Auction is a process of selling
or buying goods or services. Spectrum auctioning, for example, has been successfully
implemented, and it has shown improvement to the overall wireless system. Examples of
spectrum actioning by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) can be viewed
at (https://www.fcc.gov). Unlike in the past, where spectrum was solely owned by
government entities and commercial operators under static licensing, new technologies
and services allow customers to own or rent part of the spectrum. Allowing diverse
spectrum ownership can improve the network performance, but at the same time, it can
elevate the scarcity of the spectrum, especially when static licensing is used. Through
dynamic spectrum licensing, unlicensed users can opportunistically share the spectrum
with licensed users. In order to encourage the license holders to release their spectrum for
sharing, dynamic spectrum management should provide satisfactory economic incentives.
This work proposes auction based mechanisms to reward the license holders, for allowing
unlicensed users access to their spectrum.
2.5.1 Types of Auctions
Many kinds of auctions are found in the literature [50, 52]. To aid the explanations
of auctions discussed here, some basic terminologies in auction theory are provided.
Definition 2.9 (Terminologies in Auction Theory)
• Commodity: A commodity/good/item7 is an object being offered by a seller.
• Seller: A seller8 is the owner of the items, and he is interested in selling his
items.
• Bidder: A buyer/bidder9 is someone who wants to buy items in an auction.
• Auctioneer: An agent10, usually appointed by the seller, who is responsible for
conducting the auction proceedings.
• Valuation: It is the monetary values as perceived by the bidders/sellers on the
items on auctions, or a function that maps the values to the items. Both the
bidder and the seller have a reserved valuation on the items. The valuations
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Figure 2.7: Classification of auctions. The arrows denote the transactions of com-
modities and money among participants.
can be private or public11. A valuation for item g by bidder s is denoted by
vsg.
• Bid/Ask: It is the proposal made by the bidder/seller to the seller/bidder. A
bid can be the valuation of the item, but it needs not to be true. A bid from
bidder s, for item g is denoted by bsg.
• Price: This is a value asked by the auctioneer/seller during an auction. It also
refers to the payment12 that has to made by a bidder for acquisition of an item.
The price or payment for item g is denoted as qg or pg.
• Utility: The residual value after subtracting the price or payment from the
valuation. The utility of bidder s from item g is of the form usg = vsg − psg,
while seller i utility is uig = pig − vig.
Auctions can be classified in terms of who is initiating the proposal (id est bid/ask),
number of items in the market, or mode of expressing bids. Figure 2.7 shows auction
types, depending on who is exhibiting a bid/ask.
7The term item is used henceforth. In this thesis, guest users (GUs) are treated as items.
8In this work, the MNO assumes the position of a seller.
9The rest of the document use the term bidder. In this thesis, the SCA is assigned the role of a
bidder.
10This work considers the MBS as an auctioneer. Since the auctioneer and the seller belong to the
same entity, these terms are used as synonyms.
11In this thesis, the seller’s valuation is public while the bidders’ valuations are private.
12The terms price and payments are used as synonyms.
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• Forward Auction: In this auction, bidders bid for items from sellers as shown in
Figure 2.7a.
• Reverse Auction: Under this auction, sellers compete for bidders by taking ask
actions as shown Figure 2.7b.
• Double-sided Auction: For this auction type, both the bidders and the sellers make
bids/asks as shown in Figure 2.7c.
Additionally, auctions can be classified as open-cry or sealed-bid. In open-cry auctions,
bidders bids are publicised, while in sealed-bid auctions, bids are confidentially submitted
to the auctioneer(s). This thesis is concerned with sealed-bid auctions; and hence,
examples of sealed-auctions are discussed below.
2.5.2 k-th Price Auctions
First-price and second-price sealed auctions are the most common auctions. In first-
price auction, the winner is nominated as the bidder who proposed the highest bid. The
payment is the winner’s bid. In a second-price auction, id est, the Vickery auction [53],
the winner is the highest bidder with the second highest bid as the payment. That is, if
bidder s is the highest bidder on item g with bid bsg, the payment is determined as psg =
maxj 6=spjg. The Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [43,50,53–57] generalises the
Vickery auction. The VCG has the following setup: Assume there are S = |S| bidders,
and a feasible allocation set A. Player s has a valuation function vs ∈ Vs : A 7→ R,
where Vs ⊆ R|A| is a commonly known set of the possible valuation functions for bidder
s. With the assumption that all bidders have quasilinear utilities, the utility of bidder
s of alternative a ∈ A, with payment ps is us = vs(a) − ps. Let V = V1 × · · · × VS ,
p = [p1, . . . , pS ], and v = [v1, . . . , vS ].
Definition 2.10 (Direct Revelation Mechanism)
A direct revelation mechanism is a social choice (f,p), f : V 7→ A that gets a
vector v of valuation functions, selects some alternative a ∈ A, and payments p(v)
[43, 50, 56]. If the mechanism is a truthful mechanism it has the property that, for
vs, v
′
s,v−s it is the case
vs(f(v))− ps(v) ≥ vs(f(v′s,v−s))− ps((v′s,v−s)), (2.72)
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when vs is the true valuation. This latter property can be interpreted via an incentive
compatible mechanism wherein bidders are incentivised for bidding truthfully and do
not need to guess how other bidders are bidding.
Definition 2.11 (Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism)
A mechanism (f,p) is a VCG mechanism if
• f maximises the social welfare (id est surplus) such that
f(v) ∈ argmax
a∈A
∑
s∈S
vs(a), (2.73)
• and for some functions h1, . . . , hS , where hs : V−s 7→ R (id est hs does not
depend on vs), it is a case that for all v1 ∈ V1, . . . , vS ∈ VS :
ps(v) = hs(v−s)−
∑
j 6=s
vj(f(v)), (2.74)
where V−s = V1× · · · × Vs−1×Vs+1× · · · × VS , and v−s = [v1, . . . , vs−1, vs+1, . . . , vS ]
[53, 58].
Theorem 2.2 (Vickery-Clarke-Grove)
Every VCG mechanism is incentive-compatible [43, 50].
Proof 1 Fix bidder s, v−s, vs, vs, and v′s. Suppose bidder s has valuation vs and is
contemplating on bidding v′s. Let a = f(vs,v−s) and a′ = f(v′s,v−s). The utilities of
bidder s for declaring vs and v
′
s are
u(a) = vs(a) +
∑
j 6=s
vj(a)− hs(v−s), and u(a′) = vs(a′) +
∑
j 6=s
vj(a
′)− hs(v−s), (2.75)
respectively. Since a = f(vs,v−s) maximises social welfare over all alternatives, then
u(a) ≥ u(a′), ⇐⇒ vs(a) +
∑
j 6=s
vj(a) ≥ vs(a′) +
∑
j 6=s
vj(a
′). (2.76)

According to the Clarke pivot rule [59, 60], the winning bidder is charged its exter-
nalities by setting hs(v−s) = maxb∈A
∑
j 6=s vj(b) in (2.74). This yields a payment of the
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form
ps(v) = max
b
∑
j 6=s
vj(b)−
∑
j 6=s
vj(a), (2.77)
where a = f(v). Essentially, the Clarke pivot rule sets hs(v−s) to the social welfare of
every bidder if bidder s is not present. Hence, the payment ps(v) is the maximum social
welfare in the absence of bidder s, which defines the externality of bidder s. Coupling the
VCG mechanism with the Clarke pivot, yields a mechanism that is incentive compatible,
maximises the social welfare, makes no payments to bidder, and is individually rational
(if the valuation are positive).
2.5.3 Combinatorial Auctions
Often, auctions are classified as single-object or multi-object auctions. As it is the
case in this thesis, bidders usually participate in multiple auctions which leads to a
more sophisticated market. The bidders may need to buy a structured combination of
heterogeneous items. Combinatorial auctions allows items to be auctioned concurrently
and bidders can express preferences on bundles of items. These types of auctions are
preferable when the items in auction are dependent [43,51,58,61,62]. Combinatorial auc-
tion mechanisms have impediments such as communication overheads, market clearing
complexity and exposure problem [51].
To elaborate on some of these drawbacks, consider a combinatorial auction with S =
|S| bidders, and G = |G| non-identical items. Let A denote the outcome set of S-vectors
(G′1, . . . ,G′S) with G′s denoting the items allocated to bidder s. Each bidder will have a
private valuation vs(G′s) for every possible bundle G′s ⊆ G it might get. This yields 2G
private values. For an auctioneer to gather such huge information from all bidders, and
compute the optimal allocations will consequently lead to high communication overheads
and computational complexity, especially when the number of items is large [43, 50,
62]. Further to this, a bidder will incur valuation overheads for computing all the
possible values. These disadvantages lead to the development of indirect mechanisms,
wherein information about bidders’ preferences is gathered on the ”need-to-know” basis.
One classic auction using the indirect mechanism is the simultaneous multiple-round
ascending auction (SMRA) (id est simultaneous ascending auction (SAA)) [43,50].
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Bidders Items
Figure 2.8: An bipartite for economy with two bidders and two items. Edges are
labelled with bidders valuations.
2.5.4 Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auctions
SMRA is a collection of concurrent single-item English auctions. In an English auc-
tion, the auctioneer iteratively increments the price of an item by a known value. In
each iteration the bidders who are interested will respond to the price by indicating their
demand. The auction will continue until the supply matches the demand (id est market
clears). While SMRA is widely used in spectrum auctioning [51, 62], it has drawbacks
such as collusion, demand reduction, and exposure problem [43, 50].
Example 2.5 (Demand Reduction)
Consider an economy with two bidders and two identical items as shown in Figure 2.8.
Bidder 1 has valuation 10 for each of the items and valuation of 20 for both items.
Bidder 2 has valuation of 8 for only one of the item and is interested in only one
item (id est its valuation is 8 for both items). The maximum surplus of this auction
is 20, which is attained by allocating both items to bidder 1. Supposing the auction
is an SMRA auction. Note that bidder 2 will be glad to acquire any of the items
at any price less than 8. Therefore bidder 2 will drop out of the auction when both
items have price at least 8. If bidder 1 insists in winning both items, its utility will
be u1 = 20 − 16 = 4. Now suppose, bidder 1 reduces its demand by targeting only
one item, then each bidder will win one of the items with prices close to zero. This
will yields utilities of u1 ≈ 10 for bidder 1 and u2 ≈ 8 for bidder 2. Ultimately, this
will lead to reduced welfare and revenue.
Example 2.6 (Exposure Problem)
Consider the same model in Figure 2.8, but assume the items are non-identical. Fur-
ther assume bidder 1 has valuation 100 for both items (the items are complementary)
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Bidder 2
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
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Figure 2.9: An example of an model with S bidders, G items and N sellers.
and valuation of 0 otherwise. Bidder 2 has valuation of 75 for only one of the item,
and is interested in only one item (id est its valuation is 75 for both items). The
maximum surplus is attained by allocating all the items to bidder 1, with surplus of
100 and revenue of 75. In SMRA, bidder 2 will not drop out of the auction until the
price of each item reach 75. Bidder 1 will have to pay 150 for both items if he insists
in winning both items. This will result in a negative utility for bidder 1.
2.5.5 General Equilibrium Theory
Usually markets comprise of sellers and bidders as depicted in Figure 2.9. This the-
sis considers only an exchange model, wherein there is no production. The items flow
between the sellers and bidders as the prices are varied. The prices dictate how the
items should be allocated. Price systems are useful for coordinating and equilibrating
the markets. In most cases, bidders have monetary budgets that cannot be exceeded.
It is therefore vital for bidders to derive their demands according to their budgets and
preferences. The two main theories used in determining the equilibrium of an economy
are the partial equilibrium theory and the general equilibrium theory. In partial equilib-
rium theory, the markets are independent, such that the changes in one market do not
influence the price in another market. On the other hand, general equilibrium theory
deals with markets that are coupled, such that the change of prices in one market lead
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to a change in the prices of other markets. Since the structure of problems considered
in this thesis can be analysed via the general equilibrium theory, it is discussed below.
Consider a set of competitive markets with a set S := {1, 2, . . . , S} of bidders, and
a set G := {1, 2, . . . , G} of items. Bidder s has RG as the consumption set, and utility
function us : RG+ 7→ R+. Usually, bidder s is endowed with a budget bs that constrains
the number of items he can buy. By using the Arrow-Debreu market model, it can be
assumed that bidder s is initially endowed with the amount of items instead of monetary
budgets. Let the endowment for bidder s be es ∈ RG+ and q = [q1, q2, . . . , qG] be the price
profile of the items, where qg denotes the price for item g. This simulates an exchange
economy E((us, es)s∈S)) wherein each bidder has a budgets set
Bs = {x ∈ RG+ : qTx ≤ qTes}. (2.78)
Each bidder is faced with a problem of the form
maximise
x∈RG+
us(x), subject to q
Tx = qTes. (2.79)
Note that each bidder makes the decision on the amount of goods to buy independent of
other bidders actions. This distributed decision-making yields a distributed algorithm.
The solution to the exchange economy E((us, es)s∈S)) is usually characterised as the
Walrasian equilibrium (WE) [43,50].
Definition 2.12 (Walrasian Equilibrium)
A WE for economy E((us, es)s∈S)) is a price vector and allocation (q, (xs)s∈S) such
that [43,50]:
• Bidders are maximising their utilities:
xs ∈ argmaxus(x), ∀s ∈ S. (2.80)
• The market clears: ∑
s∈S
xsg =
∑
s∈S
esg. (2.81)
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has laid the fundamentals required for the rest of the thesis. In par-
ticular, it covered beamforming techniques, convex optimisation, dual decomposition
methods, game theory and auction theory. All these techniques will be applied to derive
distributed algorithms for wireless networks. In Chapters 3 and 4, beamforming tech-
niques, convex optimisation, dual decomposition methods, and game theory are used for
the development and analysis of the mixed QoS strategic non-cooperative game (SNG)
and mixed QoS cooperative game. In Chapters 5 and 6, beamforming techniques, convex
optimisation, dual decomposition methods, and auction theory are employed to derive
and analyse novel distributed algorithms for traffic offloading and beamformer design in
HetNets. Related and parallel works for every chapter are discussed therein.
Chapter 3
Resource Allocation via
Game-Theoretic and Convex
Optimisation Techniques
This chapter demonstrates how mixed QoS optimisation can be solved via game-
theoretic models and convex optimisation. Firstly, a two-user game is constructed to
demonstrate how the bargain region can be extended by using mixed QoS criterion. Sec-
ondly, the two-user network is extended to a multicell multiuser network. A beamformer
design problem under mixed QoS criterion is solved by formulating a mixed QoS SNG
and mixed QoS cooperative game. The mixed QoS criterion is one way to present a
multi-objective optimisation (MOP) problem, wherein agents have more than one ob-
jective. Later in Chapter 4, the two methods will be combined to form the Egalitarian
and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain games. The work discussed here has been published in
[63,64] (also see copyrights clearance in Appendix A).
3.1 Introduction
In multicell coordinated beamforming (MCBF), multiple BSs select transmit strate-
gies jointly in order to mitigate intercell interference. In most cases, MCBF algorithms
assume full and perfect knowledge of the CSI [65, 66] at the transmitters and the re-
ceivers. Global CSI is sent to a central processor where all the computation takes place.
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Even though this approach provides an improved spectrum utilisation as compared to
the traditional interference avoidance transmit strategies, it is evident that the heavy
CSI and data sharing will be a burden to the backhaul links. Consequently, the com-
plexity will significantly increase [67].
3.1.1 Related and Parallel Works
Game theoretic techniques offer a structure that readily allows for decentralised im-
plementation. In some of the early works in [46,68,69], an SNG was applied to a power
control problem for a single-input single-output (SISO) model. These works demon-
strated the inefficiency of the NE point with respect to Pareto optimality; hence, pricing
mechanism was proposed to obtain efficient solutions which required cooperation among
the players.
Non-cooperative and cooperative games were used in [47,70–79] to develop distributed
algorithms for SISO and MISO-IFC systems. Works in [70, 71, 73] considered a SISO
model. A MIMO-IFC setup was addressed in [72, 74] but [74] considered both non-
cooperative and cooperative games.
In [47,75–79], cooperative games were used to develop distributed optimisation algo-
rithms. In [75, 76], a SISO model was considered and bargain theory was employed to
derive decentralised solutions for spectrum sharing. Authors in [47, 77] used a MISO-
IFC setup to investigate non-cooperative and cooperative games. Furthermore, works
in [47,77] proved that solutions of linear combination of selfishness and altruism lead to
Pareto optimal solutions.
Earlier works on beamformer design for wireless communications can be found in
[23, 28, 80, 81]. In [23], the problem was reformulated into virtual uplink problem, and
the Perron Frobenius theorem was used to derive an iterative solution. Authors in [80]
reformulated the problem into a convex semi-definite optimisation problem, while in
[81], linear programming duality was used. The same problem with per-antenna power
constraints was solved in [28] using Lagrangian duality. The SINR balancing problem
was solved in [22, 82–84] by using various approaches including the Perron Frobenius,
second order cone programming (SOCP), and the bisection methods [12]. Some of the
cited works considered centralised solution, which have practical difficulties due to the
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reasons mentioned earlier. To overcome this, some distributed algorithms have been
proposed in the literature. In distributed algorithms, the computational complexity is
distributed among the access points (APs) and only relevant information is exchanged
for coordination.
Authors in [30, 85–87] proposed distributed power minimisation algorithms using
uplink-downlink duality, dual decomposition, and primal decomposition methods. The
dual decomposition and primal decomposition methods are used in conjunction with
the subgradient method, which is highly sensitive on the step size [33], and has slow
convergence as studied in [88]. A distributed SINR balancing solution is proposed in [89]
by combining uplink-downlink duality with bisection method [12]. In one of the recent
works [88], the ADMM algorithm [33] was adopted to solve both the power minimisation
and SINR balancing problems. To solve the quasi-convex SINR balancing problem [12],
the work in [88] combined golden search ratio algorithm with the ADMM algorithm.
3.1.2 Contributions
This chapter proposes game theoretic and dual decomposition frameworks for a wire-
less network with users having different classes of QoS [90]. The mixed QoS criterion
is attractive for energy efficient wireless communication as suggested in [91]. The work
in [91] argued that; consideration of differentiated QoS by exploiting delay tolerant
and delay intolerant applications is one of the key energy-efficient resource management
methods in 5G. All the past works addressed a situation whereby all players or APs have
similar intentions; that is, either to maximise their utilities or to minimise their costs.
The contributions of this work addresses situations where APs can simultaneously be
confronted by both power minimisation (PPMP in (2.4)), and SINR balancing (PSB in
(2.5)) problems. This MOP is captured by the mixed QoS criterion. In the mixed QoS
problem, it is required to achieve a specific SINR target for a certain group of users
while the SINRs of the other group of users should be balanced and maximised [90].
The mixed QoS based beamformer design for delay tolerant and delay intolerant services
was proposed in [90] using a centralised optimisation method. However, in this thesis,
decentralised algorithms design is considered.
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3.2 System Model for Two-user Game
Consider a MISO-IFC system shown in Figure 3.1 with N = 2 APs and K = 2 mobile
stations (MSs), where each user is assigned to one AP at any given time. It is assumed
that both APs share the same frequency band, and that each of them is equipped with
M = 2 transmit antennas. This setup can be encountered when the two APs belong to
different operators. Moreover, due to the scarcity of the spectrum, aggressive frequency
reuse like in HetNets may result in the same setup. In the downlink, the transmitted
signal for k-th user from AP n can be written as
xk(t) = wksk(t), (3.1)
where sk(t) ∈ C represents the information symbol at time t, and wk ∈ CM is the unnor-
malised transmit beamforming vector for user k. Without loss of generality, assume that
sk(t) is normalised such that E{|sk(t)|2} = 1, and that all data streams are independent
such that, E{sk(t)si(t)∗} = 0, if k 6= i. The subscripts k = 1 and k = 2 are used to refer
to RTU (MS1) and NRTU (MS2), respectively. Similarly the indices n = 1 and n = 2 are
used to refer to AP1 and AP2, respectively. Assume that AP1 is serving a real-time user
(RTU), whereas AP2 is serving a non-real-time user (NRTU). In this setting, MS1 will
need to attain a specific SINR target while MS2 will want to attain maximum possible
rate. The received signals at MS1 and MS2 are respectively given by:
y1(t) = h
H
11w1s1(t) + h
H
21w2s2(t) + η1(t), (3.2)
y2(t) = h
H
22w2s2(t) + h
H
12w1s1(t) + η2(t), (3.3)
where hnk ∈ CM is the channel vector from AP n to the k-th user, and ηk(t) ∈ CN (0, σ2)
is the circular symmetric zero mean complex Gaussian noise with variance σ2. Assume
the maximum transmit power at each AP is ϕmaxn = 1; hence, the power constraints
need to satisfy ‖wk‖2 ≤ 1, k = 1, 2.
3.2.1 Problem Formulation
The game environment has the following description: The APs are set to be the
players and the transmit beamformers are set to be the strategies. Since the APs have
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RTU
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Data link
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Figure 3.1: A scaled down model of Figure 1.5 to a two-user MISO IFC. AP1 serves
a RTU and AP2 serves a NRTU.
different objectives, the utilities for AP1 and AP2 are transmit power and information
rate, respectively. The target rate for the RTU is denoted as ψ1. Now the mixed QoS
SNG is formulated as
G = {N := {1, 2}, {wk | ‖wk‖2 ≤ 1}k=1,2, {‖w1‖2,R2}}, (3.4)
where N is the set of all players, wk denotes the strategy for the n-th player, and Rk is
the utility function which denotes the rate achieved by the k-th user. The rate for the
k-th user is defined by
Rk = log2 (1 + SINRk) = log2
(
1 +
|wHkhkk|2
|wHj hjk|2 + σ2
)
, j 6= k. (3.5)
The optimisation problems at AP1 and AP2 are formulated as
PPMP : minimise
w1
‖w1‖2, subject to R1 ≥ ψ1, (3.6)
PSB : maximise
w2
(R2), subject to ‖w2‖2 ≤ ϕmax2 . (3.7)
3.3 Mixed QoS SNG
The unique Nash equilibrium-mixed QoS (NE-mixed QoS) operating point, that cor-
responds to the scaled maximum ratio transmission (MRT) [47], is given by the dominant
Chapter 3. Resource Allocation via Game-Theoretic and Convex Optimisation
Techniques 52
strategy of the form
wNE-mixed QoSk = χk
h∗kk
‖hkk‖ , (3.8)
where (·)∗ is the complex conjugate, and χk is a scaling factor that accounts for trans-
mission power. Since AP1 only wants to achieve a specific target rate, it should be the
case 0 ≤ χ1 ≤ 1. On the other hand, AP2 is interested in maximising its utility; there-
fore, it will use all its maximum allowable power, giving χ2 = 1. If both players consider
altruism; then, they will choose zero forcing (ZF) strategies such that a null is always
placed on the direction of the other player. The mixed QoS strategy corresponding to
the ZF beamforming direction (ZF-mixed QoS) is given by
wZF-mixed QoSk = χk
∏⊥
h∗jk
h∗kk∥∥∥∏⊥h∗jk h∗kk∥∥∥ , (3.9)
where Π⊥X = I − X(XHX)−1XH is the the orthogonal projection onto the orthogonal
complement of the column space of X. If mixed QoS criterion is not considered, the NE-
mixed QoS will transform to conventional NE (id est NE), with χk = 1, k = 1, 2. Both
the NE and NE-mixed QoS are generally inefficient as discussed in [46,47,68,69,74–79].
Thus, there is a need to study cooperative games and other transmission strategies.
Nevertheless, it will be shown via numerical simulations that operating at NE-mixed
QoS is more power efficient than operating at NE.
3.3.1 Calculation of the NE-mixed QoS
There are two possible approaches to reach the NE-mixed QoS. Each approach has
its own merits and demerits. First, the bargain region is defined as the sub-region that
contains all points that satisfy Rk ≥ RNEk , k = 1, 2. The two approaches for calculating
the NE-mixed QoS are:
1. During the first iteration, AP1 computes its beamformers by setting the RTU
target rate, while AP2 uses its maximum power to maximise the rate R2. It is
most probable that at the end of iteration 1, the RTU would not achieve its target
rate due to interference from AP2. On the second iteration, AP1’s BR will be
to set the RTU target, while considering the interference caused by AP2. Since
AP2 has used all its resources, it cannot improve its beamformers, and its final
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rate depends entirely on the interference from AP1. AP1 can either achieve its
target rate, if the target rate is lower than the NE rate, or achieve the NE rate,
if otherwise. This means the NE-mixed QoS can be outside the bargain region or
coincide with the usual NE point.
2. During the first iteration, both APs implement their unscaled MRT beamformers
(id est, χk = 1, ∀k), which will result in the NE point [47]. This is achieved by
letting the utility of AP1 to be R1 in the first iteration, and by solving a problem
similar to (3.7) with user subscript as 1. In the second iteration, AP1 can then
determine if the target rate required by MS1 is lower or higher than its NE value.
If the required target is less, AP1 will reduce its transmission power by using
(3.8), which will reduce interference imposed on MS2. At the NE-mixed QoS, the
MS1 will achieve its target rate, while MS2 will get NE-mixed QoS rate, where
RNE-mixed QoS2 ≥ RNE2 . This suggests that at the NE-mixed QoS, AP1 may use less
or all its power. If ψ1 > RNE1 , the NE-mixed QoS will coincide with the NE point.
It is therefore reasonable to use the second approach since the NE-mixed QoS may be
reached in one iteration (id est, when the target rate is higher than the NE rate). Once
more, if the target rate is less than the NE rate, implementing the unscaled MRT in the
first iteration by AP1 will protect the RTU, as it will get a rate greater or equal to the
target rate (id est, R1 ≥ ψ1) during both iterations.
3.4 Mixed QoS Cooperative Game
In this section, bargain theory is employed to devise a solution that will address the
inefficiency of the NE-mixed QoS. Bargain theory requires the utility space to be convex,
but interference in the denominator of (3.5) renders the convexity of the rate region.
In [47], a convex hull [12] is used to convexify the original rate region by enlarging
it. Assuming that the receiver treats interference as noise, the achievable rate region
R is the union of the rate tuple R1 and R2. This feasible rate region has an upper-
right boundary called the Pareto boundary R?, where it is impossible to improve the
performance of one user without affecting the performance of at least one other user
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[12]. The convex hull is computed by performing time sharing over R, giving
R˜ =
⋃
0≤β≤1,
(R11,R
1
2)∈R,
(R21,R
2
2)∈R.
(
βR11 + (1− β)R21, βR12 + (1− β)R22
)
, (3.10)
where β is the time sharing coefficient, (R11,R
1
2) and (R
2
1,R
2
2) are two points in the rate
region R. The convex hull R˜, gives a set of achievable outcomes when the players are
allowed to partition degrees of freedom (DoF) (exempli gratia, time or bandwidth) into
two parts [47]. For example, in the first portion of time, β, both players choose strate-
gies w1k, ∀k with outcomes βR11, βR12, and for the remaining part, both players choose
strategies w2k, ∀k with outcomes (1 − β)R21 and (1 − β)R22. The benefit of partitioning
the degrees of freedom in this manner enlarges the original utility space by generating
a convex hull [45].
3.4.1 Mixed QoS Solution via Bargaining
If the players cooperate, they are able to achieve an operating point on the Pareto
boundary R˜. A Nash bargain (NB) problem aims to maximise the Nash function as
maximise
wk,β
∑
k
log2
(
R˜k − RNEk
)
subject to ‖wk‖2 ≤ ϕmaxn , ∀k,∀n,
R˜k > RNEk , ∀k,
0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
(3.11)
where RNEk is the NE rate of the k-th user, which is referred to as the disagreement point.
Setting the disagreement point to the NE in Problem (3.11) reduces the search space to
the sub region R˜+ [47] (id est, the bargain region). If any of the players deviates, the
NE will become the default outcome. By using the weighted Nash function
NB =
∏
k
(
R˜k − RNEk
)αk
, (3.12)
any point in the bargain region can be achieved. The exponent αk should satisfy αk ≥
0, ∀k. The mixed QoS criterion is able to attain any point in the bargain region without
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explicitly defining αk. Again, the mixed QoS BG will allow APs to reach the Pareto
boundary outside the bargain region.
3.4.2 Exchange Model
In [77], beamforming parameterisation model for a two-user game was used to obtain
the scalar parameters required to be exchanged between users during cooperation. The
beamforming parameterisation is given by
wk(λk) =
λkw
NE
k + (1− λk)wZFk∥∥λkwNEk + (1− λk)wZFk ∥∥ , (3.13)
which has been proven to attain any point on the Pareto boundary. The λk should
satisfy 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1. The exchange model in (3.13) means that, in order to achieve Pareto
boundary, each player has to combine both its utilities and other players’ utilities in the
optimisation cost function. By using (3.13), a parameterisation of (3.5) can be achieved
by expressing the achievable rate as a function of λk as
Rk(λk, λj) = log2
(
1 +
|wk(λk)Hhkk|2
|wj(λj)Hhjk|2 + σ2
)
, j 6= k. (3.14)
This real-valued parametrisation is used to design distributed algorithms. Problem in
(3.11) can now be redefined as
maximise
0≤λ1,λ2≥1
(R1(λ1, λ2)− RNE1 )(R2(λ1, λ2)− RNE2 ). (3.15)
3.5 Conditions for Mixed QoS BG Operating Point
For the mixed QoS BG, the NE point is chosen as the disagreement point instead
of the NE-mixed QoS. This is based on the point made in the second condition under
Section 3.3.1, which suggests that the NE point is a strong disagreement to MS2. Mixed
QoS BG solution exists if and only if the rate constraint of MS1 guarantees the following
condition:
R?2 ≥ RNE2 , (3.16)
where R?2 is the optimal rate for MS2. Therefore, the maximum acceptable target rate
Rmax1 for MS1 under mixed QoS, is when MS2 is able to transmit at R2 = R
NE
2 . Thus,
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Channels for Scenario 1
h11 1.051660+0.377669i 1.620710+0.343706i
h22 -0.239492+0.022606i 1.612110+0.005823i
h12 -0.121799+0.104716i 0.602630-0.828884i
h21 -0.331985-0.123566i -0.129720-0.258555i
Table 3.1: Channels used for producing results in Figure 3.2.
the mixed QoS BG solution is achievable if the target rate is ψ1 ≤ Rmax1 . If the condition
in (3.16) is not satisfied, MS2 will defect.
Now, assume the aim is to always guarantee the maximum possible rate to MS1.
Condition (3.16) is invoked to recast the bargain problem as
maximise
0≤λ1,λ2≥0
R1(λ1, λ2)− RNE1
subject to R2(λ1, λ2) ≥ RNE2 .
(3.17)
The benefit of using (3.17) is that there is no predefined target rate for the RTU, but
this may not be power efficient. In the mixed QoS BG, the following cases are possible:
• Case 1: The target rate for MS1 is less than its NE rate, ψ1 < RNE1 . In this case,
instead of using the NB problem in (3.11), the area of the triangle enclosed between
the ψ1, RNE1 , and the Pareto boundary is maximised as shown in Figure 3.2. Under
this condition, the bargain region is extended. The new bargain region is referred
herein as the mixed QoS bargain region. Problem in (3.11) will now be defined as:
maximise
0≤λ1,λ2≥1
1
2
(RNE1 − R1(λ1, λ2))(R2(λ1, λ2)− RNE2 )
subject to R1(λ1, λ2) ≥ γ1,
R2(λ1, λ2) ≥ RNE2 .
(3.18)
• Case 2: The target rate for MS1 is more than its NE rate, ψ1 > RNE1 . In this
case, NB problem in (3.18) is used to maximise the area of the rectangle between
the ψ1, RNE1 , and the Pareto boundary by setting the objective to (R1(λ1, λ2) −
RNE1 )(R2(λ1, λ2)− RNE2 ).
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Channels for Scenario 2
h11 0.349731+0.220651i -0.085718-1.634090i
h22 0.053835+0.267813i 2.287930+0.139450i
h12 -0.015381-0.671806i -0.148975+0.422753i
h21 0.450793-0.327430i -0.252294-0.118805i
Table 3.2: Channels used for producing results in Figure 3.3.
3.6 Numerical Examples and Discussions
In order to validate the performance of the proposed mixed QoS SNG and mixed
QOS BG, the following numerical simulations were carried out. The rate region R was
determined as in [47], for a given set of random channels. An alternative is to use the
ergodic rate region. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give the channels used for producing results in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the rate regions for
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at 0 dB and 10 dB respectively, where SNR = ϕmaxn /σ2.
3.6.1 Case 1
Results in Figure 3.2 show a case whereby the target rate of MS1 is less than RNE1 ,
id est, ψ1 = 2 < RNE1 = 2.2523. For this case, the mixed QoS BG operating point
was determined by solving (3.18). The mixed QoS operating point in the figure is at
R1 = 2.0288 and R2 = 1.7293. The plot shows that even though there is bargaining, this
operating point is outside the conventional bargain region. Thus, the bargain region has
been extended.
3.6.2 Case 2
A case where the target rate of MS1 is more than its NE rate, id est, ψ1 = 4.6 >
RNE1 = 3.8808, was studied by solving (3.18) with (R1(λ1, λ2)−RNE1 )(R2(λ1, λ2)−RNE2 )
as the objective, and the results are shown in Figure 3.3. The mixed QoS BG operating
point is at R1 = 4.6164 and R2 = 4.4847. This point is in the conventional bargain
region and it corresponds to the weighted NB, which can be achieved by maximising
(3.12). In both cases, it is vital to abide by the condition in (3.16) for a Pareto optimal
solution.
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Figure 3.2: Rate region with SNR = 0 dB. Results for case 1.
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Figure 3.3: Rate region with SNR = 10 dB. Results for case 2.
3.6.3 Average Performance of Mixed QoS SNG
The performance of the conventional SNG, wherein both players would want to max-
imise their utilities, and the mixed QoS SNG, were studied in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5.
The results in Figure 3.4 show average sum rates (ASRs) achieved over 10 random chan-
nel realisations, for a range of average SNRs. The target rate of the RTU was set to
ψ1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. If the target rate of the RTU is infeasible, the information rates of
both users were maximised. Figure 3.4 shows that at low SNRs, the target rate of the
RTU is infeasible at AP1 and therefore the ASRs of both systems will be equal. Between
an average SNR of -4 dB and 10 dB, all the target rates become feasible. For all target
rates, the NE-mixed QoS ASRs start off below the NE ASRs, but from SNR of 12.5
dB onwards, the NE-mixed QoS ASRs begin to surpass NE ASRs. At 30 dB SNR, an
average difference of about 2 bits/symbol use between the NE-mixed QoS ASR and NE
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Figure 3.4: Average sum rate over 10 random channel realisations using unscaled
MRT and scaled MRT, in a network topology described in Section 3.2.
ASR, for target rates greater than one, is observed. This achievement comes with a
positive benefit on power saving as shown in Figure 3.5.
Results in Figure 3.5 illustrates the difference between the total power consumed
between the two systems. From (3.8), it is suggested that by using the conventional MRT
beamformers, both APs will always use their maximum available power to maximise their
utilities. This is not always the case with NE-mixed QoS beamformers. The AP serving
the RTU may not necessarily use its maximum power. Since at low SNRs both systems
will use their maximum power (id est, NE-mixed QoS coincides with NE), the difference
of the two system will be zero. It is observed that low targets rates will save more power
at low SNRs and save the least power at high SNRs. Figure 3.5 shows that under
mixed QoS SNG, there is potential of saving power between 1.7569 dB to 2.6949 dB at
an average SNR of 30 dB, for target rates between 1 and 5 respectively. This highlights
the advantage of mixed QoS beamforming criterion, and shows that mixed QoS criterion
can achieve more NE-mixed QoS ASRs than the NE ASRs, while conserving some power.
3.7 System Model for Multi-cell Multiuser Network
In this section, decomposition methods are used for designing a distributed algorithm
for the model in Figure 3.6. Consider a multicell MISO downlink system of N BSs. There
are K MSs, where each user is assigned to only one BS at any given time. Denote the
n-th serving BS to the k-th user by nk, a set of BSs by N , a set of all users by U , and
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Figure 3.5: Average total power over 10 channel realisation using MRT and mixed
QoS criteria, in a network topology described in Section 3.2.
a subset Un ⊆ U , which to includes all users allocated to BS n. Sets URn ⊂ Un and
UNn ⊂ Un respectively denote all RTUs and NRTUs at the n-th BS. The cardinality of
sets Un, URn and UNn are Kn, K1n, and Kn −K1n, respectively. It is assumed that all
BSs share the same frequency band. Each BS is equipped with M transmit antennas,
and it has the maximum possible transmission power ϕmaxn . Each user is equipped with
single antenna. In the downlink, the transmitted signal for user k from BS nk can be
written as
xk(t) = wksk(t), (3.19)
where sk(t) ∈ C represents the information symbol at time t, and wk ∈ CM is the unnor-
malised transmit beamforming vector for user k. Without loss of generality, assume that
sk(t) is normalised, such that E{|sk(t)|2} = 1, and that all data streams are independent
such that E{sk(t)si(t)∗} = 0 if k 6= i. The received signal at the k-th user can be written
as
yk(t) = h
H
nk,k
xk(t) +
∑
i∈U\k
hHni,kxi(t) + ηk(t), (3.20)
where hnk,k ∈ CM is the channel vector from the BS nk to user k, and ηk(t) ∈ CN (0, σ2)
is the circular symmetric zero mean complex Gaussian noise with variance σ2.
Chapter 3. Resource Allocation via Game-Theoretic and Convex Optimisation
Techniques 61
BS1
BS2
Backhaul 
Link
NRTU
NRTU
RTU
Data link
1
2
3
4
Interference link
RTU
Figure 3.6: Network Topology consisting of two BSs, two RTUs and two NRTUs.
3.7.1 Problem Formulation
The instantaneous downlink SINR of the k-th is
SINRk =
|hHnk,kwk|2∑
i∈Un\k
|hHnk,kwi|2 +
N∑
n=1
n6=nk
∑
i∈Un
|hHn,kwi|2 + σ2
. (3.21)
The aim is to maximise the minimum SINR of the NRTUs, while ensuring a certain
level of QoS for the RTUs, in a distributed manner. Define the SINR targets of the
RTUs at BS n as ΞnRTU = [ξ1, . . . , ξK1n ], which are predefined values, and the preferred
intermediary SINR targets of the NRTUs as ∆nNRTU = [δK1n+1, . . . , δKn ]. By combining
the power minimisation (PPMP in (2.4)) and SINR balancing (PSB in (2.5)) problems,
the mixed QoS problem can be stated as
maximise
{wk}k∈Un ,∀n
min
k
SINRk
δk
, k = K1n + 1, . . . ,Kn
subject to SINRk ≥ ξk, k = 1, . . . ,K1n,∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖2 ≤ ϕmaxn , n ∈ N .
(3.22)
Problem in (3.22) shows that the mixed QoS problem feasibility depends heavily on the
feasibility of the SINRs targets of the RTUs than those of the NRTUs. By using the same
argument in [22], it is concluded that the mixed QoS problem is a quasi-convex. Hence,
solving (3.22) involves performing line search in a quasi-convex curve using a bisection
method [12]. Thus, problem in (3.22) will be solved in two main steps. The first step
involves running a feasibility check for given SINR targets, and the second step involves
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allocating excess resources to NRTUs, while ensuring the required user performance of
RTUs. Problem in (3.22) is not convex due to the SINR terms in the objective and the
constraints. Nevertheless, the SINRs can be written in their equivalent second order
cone (SOC) as
SINRk ≥ ξk =⇒
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
hHnk,kw1
...
hHnk,kwKn
σk
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
√
1 + ξk
ξk
<(hHnk,kwk), (3.23)
=(hHnk,kwk) = 0, ∀k, (3.24)
For brevity, all the SINR targets of the all users at the n-th BS are denoted as
Γn = {γ1, . . . , γKn}, and the beamforming matrix of BS n as Wn = [wk]k∈Un . The
feasible set of beamformers at BS n is given as
Wn =
{
Wn :
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22 ≤ ϕmaxn , SINRk ≥ γk ∀k ∈ Un
}
. (3.25)
The feasibility problem is defined as
minimise
Wn∈Wn,∀n
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22, subject to SINRk ≥ γk ∀k ∈ Un. (3.26)
If the SINR targets of the RTUs are not feasible, then the mixed QoS problem in (3.22) is
not feasible. From (3.21), it can be understood that the user performance for all users are
coupled by both the interference and the transmission powers. This interdependency
requires more information to be shared between the BSs, while jointly optimising all
links. To reduce the information shared between the BSs, the overall feasibility problem
is presented as a global consensus problem [33].
3.8 Mixed QoS Distributed Algorithm
First, introduce auxiliary variables κn,k, and κ˜n,k to represent the actual inter-cell
interference from the n-th BS to the k-th user, and its local copy, respectively. This adds
a new set of constraints that enforce consistency between the global and local copies to
ensure that they are in consensus. The overall feasibility problem which includes all
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RTUs and NRTUs can be written as
minimise
{wk}k∈Un ,{κ˜n}u∈N
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22
subject to
|hHnk,kwk|2∑
i∈Un\k
|hHnk,kwi|2 +
N∑
n=1
n 6=nk
κ˜2n,k + σ
2
≥ γk ∀k ∈ U ,
κ2n,k ≥
∑
i∈Un
|hHn,kwi|2 k ∈ Un, n ∈ N , n 6= nk,
κ˜n,k ≥ κn,k ∀k, n, n 6= nk.
(3.27)
The intercell interference is estimated as follows: Initially, the local and global copies
are set to 0. In the subsequent iterations, the actual interference generated at the k-th
user κ˜2n,k is sent to the serving BS. The believed interference κ
2
n,k is then updated while
fixing the global copy κ˜2n,k.
Problem (3.27) can be transformed into a convex SOCP [12] problem as
minimise
{wk}k∈Un ,{κ˜n}u∈N
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22
subject to

√
1 + 1γkh
H
nk,k
wk
hHnk,kWn
κ˜k
σ
 SOC 0, ∀k ∈ Un, ∀n ∈ N ,
 κn,k
hHn,kWn
 SOC 0, ∀k ∈ Un, ∀n ∈ N , n 6= nk,
κ˜n,k ≥ κn,k, ∀k ∈ Un,∀n ∈ N , n 6= nk,
(3.28)
where κ˜k = {κ˜n,k}n∈N\nk and the notation SOC refers to the generalised inequalities
with respect to the second-order cone [12]. The problem in (3.28) is convex and separable
in n ∈ N . This allows (3.28) to be solved with a distributed algorithm. With reference
to the third constraint in (3.28), define column vectors κ˜n by concatenating all local
variables associated with BS n, and κn by concatenating all global variables associated
with elements of κ˜n. Thus, for fixed global variables κn, the set of beamformers at
BS n, given in (3.25), depends on the local variables κ˜n. Taking this into account, the
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feasibility indicator function fn (Wn, κ˜n), at each BS n is formed as
fn (Wn, κ˜n) =

∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22, (Wn, κ˜n) ∈ Wn,
∞, otherwise.
(3.29)
This leads to a compact model of problem in (3.28) defined by
minimise
{wk}k∈Un ,κ˜n
∑
n∈N
fn (Wn, κ˜n)
subject to κ˜n ≥ κn,∀n ∈ N .
(3.30)
The augmented Lagrangian of (3.30) is given by
Lρ ({Wn, κ˜n}n∈N , {κn}n∈N , {y}n∈N ) =∑
n∈N
(
fn (Wn, κ˜n) + y
T(κ˜n − κn) + ρ
2
‖κn − κ˜n‖22
)
=
∑
n∈N
(
fn (Wn, κ˜n) +
ρ
2
‖κ˜n − κn + un‖22 + c
)
,
(3.31)
where {y}n∈N are Lagrange multipliers for the interference constraints, ρ > 0 is a
penalty parameter, un = (1/ρ)yn is the scaled dual variable, and c = −ρ/2‖un‖22 is a
constant vector that can dropped during minimisation [33]. The ADMM algorithm for
solving (3.31) involves a single Gauss-Seidel pass [33] over κn and κ˜n, and therefore
consists of three successive iterations as
Wt+1n , κ˜
t+1
n := argmin
Wn,κ˜n
Lρ
(
Wn, κ˜n,κ
t
n,u
t
n
)
, n ∈ N , (3.32)
{κt+1n }n∈N := argmin
κn
Lρ
(
Wt+1n , κ˜
t+1
n ,κn,u
t
n
)
, (3.33)
ut+1n := u
t
n + κ˜
t+1
n − κt+1n n ∈ N , (3.34)
where t is the iteration index.
These steps for solving (3.32) to (3.34) are explained with the aid of Algorithm 2. For
a fixed global variable κ, iteration in (3.32) is solved at each BS by solving the following
problem.
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Algorithm 2: Mixed QoS distributed algorithm
Data: ϕmaxn , penalty ρ > 0, stopping criterion, δ > 0, SINRk ≥ γ?k ,∀k, Γlower,
Γupper
Data: Initialisation: set {κn}n∈N = 0,{κ˜n}n∈N = 0,{yn}n∈N = 0
Result: Optimal beamforming vectors {Wn}n∈N
1 while Γupper − Γlower > δ do
2 Set Γcandidate = Γ
upper+Γlower
2
3 Set γ?k = ak + αΓ
candidate,∀k;
4 while stopping criterion not satisfied do
5 Set t = t+ 1;
6 Solve 3.35 at each BS to update Wt+1n ,κ˜
t+1
n
7 Exchange relevant local copies κt+1n between BSs coupled by
consistency constraints
8 Update global variable κt+1n , using ((3.36))
9 Update dual variable yt+1n , using ((3.34))
10 if stopping criterion is not satisfied then
11 set Γupper = Γcandidate;
12 if stopping criterion is satisfied and current Wn is feasible then
13 Set {Wlowern } as the solution;
14 Set Γlower = Γcandidate
15 Set Γlowerfinal = Γ
lower and Γupperfinal = Γ
upper
minimise
{wk}k∈Un ,κ˜n
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22 +
ρ
2
‖κ˜n − κtn + utn‖22
subject to

√
1 + 1γkh
H
nk,k
wk
hHnk,kWn
κ˜k
σ
 SOC 0, ∀k ∈ Un, ∀n ∈ N ,
 κn,k
hHn,kWn
 SOC 0, ∀k ∈ Un, ∀n ∈ N , n 6= nk,
κ˜n,k ≥ κn,k, ∀k ∈ Un, ∀n ∈ N , n 6= nk.
(3.35)
In (3.33), BSs gather κ˜t+1 from their neighbours to form the averages. In essence, since
the each element of the global variable couples two local variables of the neighbouring
BSs, its solution is simply the average of its local variables [33,88] given by
κt+1n,k =
(
κ˜t+1nk,k + κ˜
t+1
n,k
)
/2. (3.36)
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Figure 3.7: Suboptimality of the ADMM distributed algorithm versus iteration.
3.9 Numerical Example and Discussion
The performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated using the network topology
shown in Figure 3.6. The network consists of 2 BSs, 2 RTUs and 2 NRTUs. BS 1 serves
MSs 1 and 2, and BS 2 serves MSs 3 and 4. Both MSs 1 and 3 are RTUs, while the
rest are NRTUs. Each BS is equipped with M = 5 antennas and all MSs have single
antennas. The SINR targets for RTU 1 and RTU 3 are 13 dB and 9 dB, respectively.
The maximum transmit power was set to ϕmaxn = 10 dB at both BSs, Γ
lower = 0 and
Γupper = 40 dB. The line search accuracy is δ = 10−6 and ρ = β [88] where
β = max
n∈N
{∑
n∈N
(100.1×γk)/‖hnk,k‖22
}
. (3.37)
All channel vectors hnk,k were modelled as independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), Gaussian random variables. The noise variance was set to σ2 = 1 for all users.
It should be noted that, the while loop from step 4 of Algorithm 2 involves solving
a feasibility problem, which require solving (3.32) to (3.34), until a required accuracy
is achieved. Authors in [33] recommend 15 iterations. Power evolution of this part is
illustrated in Figure 3.7, and it demonstrates that normalised power accuracy of 10−8 is
achieved in 15 iterations. The rate of convergence can be altered by varying the penalty
parameter ρ [33].
The convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is shown in Figure 3.8, which com-
pares the proposed distributed algorithm with the centralised solution. In the centralised
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Figure 3.8: Achieved feasible SINR versus iteration.
system, it is assumed that the CSI at both BSs are sent to a central processing unit
where the optimisation is performed. One benefit of the proposed algorithm is that,
during the evolution of the NRTUs SINRs, the user performance of the RTUs remain
fixed, as depicted in Figure 3.8. The normalised accuracy of the feasible SINRs is il-
lustrated in Figure 3.9. This plot shows the normalised SINR accuracy, computed as
| γ(i)admm − γ?cent | /γ?cent, against iteration i, where γ?cent is the optimal SINR achieved
by using a centralised algorithm, and γ
(i)
admm is the achievable SINR at the i-th itera-
tion. Figure 3.9 shows that the proposed algorithm achieves 10−2 normalised accuracy
on the NRTUs SINRs in less than 10 iterations. Moreover, the accuracy of the RTUs
SINRs is always below 10−2, and they achieve higher average accuracy as compared to
the NRTUs. The abrupt increase of the normalised SINR accuracy of RTUs around
iteration 10, is due to the significant interference introduced by NRTUs, as the BSs try
to maximise their SINRs. The accuracy measure in Figure 3.9 highly depends on the
accuracy of power evolution in Figure 3.7, and therefore, it can be improved by setting
higher accuracy on the normalised power accuracy.
3.10 Conclusion
Game theory application under a mixed QoS BG in a two-user game has shown that,
a Pareto optimal solution outside the bargain region can be reached by navigating the ex-
tended region of the bargain region. The mixed QoS criterion achieves a new equilibrium
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Figure 3.9: Suboptimality of the feasible SINR versus iteration.
point, NE-mixed QoS, which in general enables NRTUs to achieve a better information
rate at high SNRs as compared to the unscaled MRT beamforming. The mixed QoS
beamforming criterion is capable of achieving higher average sum rate, with less power
consumption, as compared to unscaled MRT beamforming. A distributed algorithm for
jointly solving SINR balancing and SINR target problem in multicell MISO has been
proposed. The simulation results proved that the algorithm converges to optimal cen-
tralised solution. The algorithm uses alternating direction method of multipliers, which
guarantees a fast solution. In Chapter 4, a mixed QoS problem will be solved using
game-theoretic approach for a multi-cell mutliuser network.
Chapter 4
Game-Theoretic Beamforming
Techniques for a Multicell
Multiuser Network Under Mixed
QoS Constraints
In the previous chapter, game theory and dual decomposition techniques were used
to develop distributed algorithms for a two-user game, and a multicell multiuser wireless
network, respectively. In this chapter, game-theoretic techniques for beamformer design
are proposed for a multicell multiuser network. In particular, the solution structure
for a mixed QoS SNG achieved using game theory is investigated, and a distributed
algorithm is developed. Both non-cooperative and cooperative game-theoretic methods
are studied. Bargain theory is used to derive a Pareto optimal solution. In particular,
the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining solutions are proposed.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, a wide range of game-theoretic studies have been conducted, for mul-
tiuser systems. Game theory is a discipline in economics which is used to model and
analyse situations where decision makers may have conflicting interests [48, 92]. The
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factors that usually inhibits distributed implementations are caused by the interdepen-
dencies between resources such as storage, computational, and spectral resources [1].
The conflicting nature of transmitters in a multiuser wireless network makes it relevant
to represent the optimisation problem from a game-theoretic perspective.
4.1.1 Related Works
In addition to the works discussed in Section 3.1.1, distributed algorithms for down-
link beamformer design in multicell multiuser networks have been proposed in [93–103].
Works in [93] and [102] considered optimisation problem that maximises the minimum
SINR of the users. In order to eliminate partial interference, authors in [102] applied
the Tomlinson-Harashima precoding technique before deriving a closed form solution
to the max-min problem. A power minimisation problem was studied in [95, 100, 101].
An SINR pricing term that allows decentralised implementation is introduced in [95].
A second-order Taylor approximation method is used to approximate the pricing term
with reduced information exchange between BSs.
Considered in [98,99] is an optimisation problem that maximises the weighted max-min
fairness rate. The constraints considered therein include individual probability of rate
outage and power budget. The authors in [98, 99] utilised the block successive upper
minimisation (BSUM) method to propose a distributed BSUM algorithm. In addition,
the distributed weighted minimum mean-square error (WMMSE) algorithm was pro-
posed to optimise the weighted sum rate in parallel. The distributed zero forcing (DZF)
and distributed virtual SINR (DVSINR) linear precoding schemes were deployed in [103]
to select users that can potentially maximise the sum rate. With the utilisation of block-
diagonalisation precoding scheme, an SNG was studied in [97] to maximise the network
sum rate distributively. The authors used the game-theoretic framework to confirm the
existence and uniqueness of the NE in the SNG.
In [104], dual decomposition technique was used to derive a distributed algorithm
for energy-efficient resource allocation in device-to-device (D2D) networks. The opti-
misation problem aims to maximise the minimum weighted energy-efficiency of D2D
links, while guaranteeing QoS requirements to the users. Han et alii [105] studied a
non-cooperative game to perform sub-channel assignment. The objectives of the players
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is to minimise the transmission power under QoS constraints of the users. By observ-
ing that the non-cooperative game can potential result in non-convergence, or some
undesirable NE, Han et alii introduced a virtual referee, to monitor and improve the
outcome of the non-cooperative game. The improvement is acquired by either reducing
the transmission rates or shedding off some of the users.
In order to achieve Pareto optimal solutions, works in [47, 64, 77–79] proposed coop-
erative game theory based distributed algorithms. In [47] and [77], bargain theory is
used to develop a distributed algorithm using two-user game model, which was extended
to an arbitrary number of users in [78]. Bargain theory was employed to derive Kalai-
Smorodinsky (KS) solution to maximise users’ rate, while ensuring allocation of same
fraction of the rate that a user will get in the absence of interference. Authors in [79]
compared Nash bargain (NB) solution to both the KS and the Egalitarian solutions.
They concluded that the NB solution achieves a better trade-off between fairness and
efficiency.
Competitive and coordinated beamformer design methods for a multicell downlink
network were proposed in [87]. A pricing mechanism was devised to achieve the Pareto
optimal solutions. Another related work in [106] considered SINR balancing for a down-
link cognitive radio network, using an underlaying approach. This work proposed a
beamforming technique that maximises the worst case secondary user SINR, while en-
suring that the interference leakage to the primary user is kept below specific thresholds.
Game theory was applied to solve a SINR balancing problem for multiuser multicell net-
work in [107].
4.1.2 Contributions
Further to the works discussed above, this chapter proposes beamformer design based
on mixed QoS beamformer criterion using both non-cooperative (competitive) game and
the cooperative (bargain) game. The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• A novel mixed QoS SNG is proposed and analysed to develop a fully distributed
algorithm for a multicell multiuser network with RTUs and NRTUs.
• The existence of the NE for the proposed mixed QoS SNG is studied.
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• In order to take care of the possibility of non-convergence of the mixed QoS SNG,
or some undesirable NE, a fall back mechanism and some necessary assumptions
are proposed.
• The Egalitarian and KS bargain solutions are proposed to improve the NE oper-
ating point.
• Extensive numerical analysis and comparative evaluations of the proposed algo-
rithms, and the optimal solutions are conducted.
4.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider a similar system model and problem formulation described in Section 3.7.
The mixed QoS problem in (3.22) is restated as
maximise
{wk}k∈Un ,∀n
min
k
SINRk
δk
, k ∈ UNn , n ∈ N ,
subject to SINRk ≥ ξk, k ∈ URn , n ∈ N ,∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖2 ≤ ϕmaxn , n ∈ N .
(4.1)
The feasible set of beamformers of the n-th BS is given by
Wn :=
{
Wn :
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22 ≤ ϕmaxn : SINRk ≥ ξk, k ∈ URn
}
, (4.2)
The QoS feasible region Q ⊂ RNK+ is
Q := {SINR1, . . . ,SINRK : Wn ∈ Wn, ∀n}. (4.3)
Thus, the overall system performance is measured by the function f : Q 7→ R as it
attains points in the feasible region. Now, each BS has a QoS feasible region Qn ⊂ RKn+ ,
defined as a subset of Q, given by
Qn := {SINR1, . . . ,SINRKn : Wn ∈ Wn}. (4.4)
The aim is to form a mixed QoS SNG where each BS is only aware of its QoS feasible
region Qn. The utility function is defined as the worst case SINR of the NRTUs. For a
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given QoS requirement, the overall system indicator function or the system cost function
is defined as
f(SINRk) =

0, min
{k:ξ∗k>0}
SINRk
ξ?k
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ URn ,∀n,
1, otherwise,
(4.5)
where ξ?k is the feasible SINR target. The indicator function will attain a zero if the QoS
requirements are feasible and returns an empty set if otherwise.
4.3 Strategic Non-Cooperative Game (SNG)
In an SNG, each player is aware of only its local CSI. The local CSI is assumed to be
private. Denote the inter-cell interference (ICI) plus the noise power at the k-th MS as
r−nk(W−n) =
N∑
n=1
n6=nk
∑
j∈Un
|hHn,kwj |2 + σ2, (4.6)
where W−n is the beamforming vectors of all other BSs except that of the n-th BS. At
each BS, the ICI plus the noise power vector is denoted as r−n = [r−n1 , . . . , r−nKn ]
T.
The main motivation of representing the ICI plus noise by r−n, is to enable BSs to
perform distributed optimisation, since it decouples the strategy sets. Initially, each BS
approximate r−nk to σ
2. Then, after implementing the optimal beamformers, each user
will feedback r−nk to their serving BSs. The users can estimate their SINRs by using
the downlink pilot signal. The BSs are players, the beamformers are the strategies, and
the SINRs of the NRTUs are the utilities. The intention is to balance and maximise the
SINRs of the NRTUs of each BS, while satisfying the SINR targets for the RTUs. It can
be proven that all NRTUs will attain the same SINR [90]; hence, all the intermediary
SINR targets of the NRTUs are denoted with an identical value ∆nNRTU . The overall
mixed QoS SNG is described as
G =
{
N , {Wn : n ∈ N}, {∆nNRTU(Wn,W−n) : n ∈ N}
}
, (4.7)
Since (4.1) is quasi-convex [22], it is solved using a bisection search [12]. Each play
round of the proposed game consists of two stages namely; the qualification stage and
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the learning stage (please see Figure 4.1a). In the qualification stage, each player sepa-
rately performs a bisection search on the feasible region Qn, to determine the optimal
beamformer Wn that solves (4.1) distributively, for a given r−n. The learning stage
follows implementation of these beamformers, and learning r−n. In the qualification
stage, each player performs a bisection search on ∆nNRTU by solving
minimise
Wn∈Wn
∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22
subject to SINRk ≥ ξk, ∀k ∈ URn ,
SINRk ≥ ∆nNRTU , ∀k ∈ UNn .
(4.8)
The optimal solution of (4.1) is obtained by performing bisection search over (4.8) for a
given ∆nNRTU , until the maximum possible ∆nNRTU is obtained. It should be noted that
for a fixed r−n, this stage requires only the knowledge of the feasible region Qn. The
steps for the mixed QoS SNG are summarised in Algorithm 3.
4.3.1 Existence of NE of the Sub-game
The background noise vector r−n decouples the strategy set of the game. Thus, the
following theorem is used to prove the existence of the NE:
Theorem 4.1 (Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg)
Consider an SNG given by G, whose strategy spaces Si are non-empty, compact
and convex sets. If the utility function ui(s) is a continuous function in the profile
of strategy s and quasi-concave in si, then the game G has at least one pure NE
[44,108].
Proof 2 The problem in consideration admits at least one NE for the following reasons.
The strategy profile ofWn, is a convex set as shown in (4.2). Since constraint on SINRk
is a SOC, and is quasi-convex on the set Wn, the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg is satisfied.
Therefore, game G is quasi-concave and it has at least one pure NE. 
4.3.2 Determining the Pure NE of the Sub-game
For brevity, denote the SINR targets of all RTUs and the intermediary SINR targets
of all the NRTUs at the n-th BS as Γn = [γ1, . . . , γKn ]. By assuming that the maximum
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Algorithm 3: Mixed QoS SNG algorithm
Data: ϕmaxn , noise power, stopping criterion (exempli gratia iterations), δ > 0,
SINRk ≥ γ?k , ∀k, ΓLn, ΓUn , αk = 1, ∀k ∈ UNn ,∀n ∈ N ,
αk = 0, ∀k ∈ URn ,∀n ∈ N
Data: Initialisation: Interference rnk = σ
2,
Result: Optimal beamforming vectors {Wn}n∈N
1 Set i = 0;, fall back indicator fn = 0,∀n
2 while stopping criterion is not satisfied do
3 Set i = i+ 1;
4 BS n = 1 . . . N update local variables ({Wt+1n }):
5 while ΓUn − ΓLn > δ do
6 Set Γcandidaten =
ΓUn+Γ
L
n
2
7 if fn = 1 then
8 αk = 1,∀k ∈ URn
9 Set γ?k = Γ
NE
k + αkΓ
candidate
n (k), ∀k;
10 if Problem (4.8) is feasible then
11 Set {WLn} as the solution;
12 Set ΓLn = Γ
candidate
n
13 else
14 Set ΓUn = Γ
candidate
n
15 Optional : if Problem (4.8) is infeasible and i = 1 then
16 fn = 1 at the affected BSn;
17 Compute SINRk and update local variable rnk
18 if stopping criterion is satisfied and current Wn is feasible then
19 Set {WLn} as the solution;
20 Set ΓLn = Γ
candidate
n
21 Set ΓLn-final = Γ
L
n and Γ
U
n-final = Γ
U
n
SINR ∆?nNRTU is known at every game round, the optimal beamformer vector w
?
k, k ∈ Un
[30, 87] will be given by
w?k =
√
ϕkw˜
?
k =
√
ϕk
(
IM +
∑
i∈Un\k
λi
r−nk
hnk,ih
H
nk,i
)−1
hnk,k∥∥∥∥∥∥
(
IM +
∑
i∈Un\k
λi
r−nk
hnk,ih
H
nk,i
)−1
hnk,k
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
, (4.9)
where ϕk is the beamforming power, w˜
?
k is the unit-norm beamforming direction for the
k-th user, and λk ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. With this assumption, problem in
(4.8) can be cast as
minimise
ϕk
∑
k∈Un
ϕk, subject to
ϕk|hHnk,kw˜k|2∑
i∈Un\k
ϕi|hHnk,kw˜i|2 + r−nk
≥ γk ∀k ∈ Un. (4.10)
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The transmission power to the users at the n-th BS are stacked in a power allocation
vector ϕn = [ϕ1, . . . , ϕKn ]
T ∈ RKn . An extended power allocation vector at each user is
formed as ϕ
n
= [ϕn, r−nk ]
T ∈ RKn+1. For the analysis, the SINR is defined in terms of
ϕ
n
and the interference function Ik : RKn+1+ 7→ R+ [109] as
SINRk(ϕn) =
ϕk
Ik(ϕn)
, (4.11)
where
Ik(ϕn) = min‖w˜k‖=1[Ψn(w˜k)ϕn]k +
r−nk
|hHnk,kw˜k|2
. (4.12)
The constant link gain matrix (id est, a coupling matrix) Ψn, for the n-th BS is defined
as
[Ψn]i,k(w˜k) =

|hHnk,kw˜i|
2
|hHnk,kw˜k|
2 , i 6= k,
0, i = k.
(4.13)
At every bisection level, the SINR targets of all users served by the n-th BS are
denoted as Dn = diag{γ1, . . . , γKn}. Case 1 of the indicator function in (4.5) can be
represented as maximisek (γkIk(ϕn))/ϕk < 1. The target Dn is feasible if and only if
the min-max optimum O(Dn) < 1 [109]. The optimum O(Dn) < 1 can be written as
O(Dn) = inf
ϕ
n
>0
(
max
k∈Un
γkIk(ϕn)
ϕk
)
. (4.14)
For fixed r−n, with r−nk(ϕ) > 0, ∀k, and a known maximum SINR ∆?nNRTU of the
NRTUs attached to BS n, Ik(ϕn) will entirely depend on ϕn. In [109], it was shown
that there exists a standard interference function Ik(ϕn) [110] such that
Ik(ϕn) := Ik(ϕn). (4.15)
This identity allows Ik(ϕn) to be treated as a special case of the standard interference
function Ik(ϕn), and it can therefore be characterised by the following axioms [109] for
any ϕn ≥ 0:
1. Positivity: Ik(ϕn) is nonnegative on R
Kn+1
+ .
2. Scalability: Ik(βϕn)(1) = βIk(ϕn)(2) for β ∈ R+.
3. Monotonicity: Ik(ϕn)(1) ≥ Ik(ϕn)(2) if ϕ(1)n ≥ ϕ(2)n .
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4. Strict Monotonicity: Ik(ϕn)(1) ≥ Ik(ϕn)(2) if ϕ(1)n ≥ ϕ(2)n and ϕ
(1)
nKn+1
≥ ϕ(2)nKn+1.
It is argued that if a function is standard, then it has a fixed point solution [108].
Define a set containing all the possible power allocations for which the SINR target Dn
is satisfied, as
Pn(Dn) = {ϕn > 0 : ϕk ≥ γkIk(ϕn), k ∈ Un}. (4.16)
Problem in (4.10) is redefined into its compact form as
minimise
ϕk
∑
k∈Un
ϕk, subject to ϕn ∈ Pn(Dn). (4.17)
Yates [110] showed that if the set Pn(Dn) is non-empty, (id est, O(Dn) < 1), there exists
an optimiser of problem in (4.17) given by a fixed-point iteration
ϕ(t+1)n = DnI(ϕ(t)n ), (4.18)
where t is the time index. This provides an optimiser at each BS during qualification
stage. Since during every play round, players will adaptively change their beamformers,
a new r−n will be learned; hence, the BR of each player is to solve (4.18) repeatedly for
every new values of r−n. With the assumption that the maximum SINR ∆?nNRTU of the
NRTUs attached to BS n is known, the BR of each BS at each game round is defined as
ϕ?n = BRn(ϕ−n) = DnI(ϕn). (4.19)
Hence, (4.1) will have an optimiser at the maximum possible SINR target D?n. The
game will converge only when the newly learnt r−n causes no change to the previous
power vector ϕn. It is possible that the mixed QoS will not converge. This occurs when
the SINRs of the RTUs, at a particular qualification stage, become infeasible for a given
r−n. In order to force the game to converge, it is assumed the affected players will adopt
their previous feasible beamformers and power allocation.
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4.3.3 Fall Back Mechanism
Unlike the conventional max-min problem, the mixed QoS SNG may become infeasible
if the SINR targets of the RTUs are not satisfied. This could be due to inadequate
transmission power, interference, and/or bad channels. Consequently, for the case of
multiple BSs, if the mixed QoS problem turns out to be infeasible for any of the BSs;
then, the game model in (4.7) will not hold. In order to retain a valid game model,
a fall back mechanism is introduced for all BSs. If the mixed QoS feasibility problem
in (4.8) is infeasible during the first play round/qualification stage; then, only max-min
problem will be considered for both RTUs and NRTUs at the affected BS. Alternatively,
the affected BS may choose to admit only a subset of its RTUs by solving the admission
control problem [105]. Even though this may readily give a valid game model, and
possibly give rise to an increased performance of the NRTUs, it totally excludes the
dropped users from taking part in the bargaining process; hence, this is not considered
in this work.
The mixed QoS SNG described in Algorithm 3 includes the fall back mechanism
option at step 16. In Algorithm 3, the qualification stage (the first play round), involves
each BS solving (4.8) with r−nk = σ
2, ∀k (id est, ignoring interference from other BSs)
iteratively using a bisection method. This is the stage that determines if the fall back
mechanism should be activated or not.
4.4 Mixed QoS Bargain Games
The focus of this section is bargain games under mixed QoS criterion. Since the
global optimisation problem in (4.1) is concerned with fairness, a mixed QoS Egalitarian
bargain game (EBG) and mixed QoS Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain game (KSBG) are
studied. In the mixed QoS EBG, the players will have equal share of the remaining
feasible region, enclosed between the NE and the Pareto boundary, denoted hence-forth
as Q+. On the other hand, the mixed QoS KSBG allows players to acquire a share that
is proportional to what they will achieve in the absence of competition. ADMM [33,88]
is adopted to decompose the mixed QoS problem.
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4.4.1 Mixed QoS EBG
The ADMM is used to reduce the amount of information shared between BS. Unlike
in [88], where the searching space of the algorithm is defined by Q, it is demonstrated
that during bargaining, the search space is reduced to Q+. The achieved SINRs at
NE-mixed QoS at the n-th BS are denoted as ΓNEn = [γ
NE
1 , . . . , γ
NE
Kn
]. The global system
Egalitarian problem is formulated as
maximise
Wn∈Wn,∀n
min
k∈U
SINRk
αk
subject to SINRn ≥ ΓNEn , k ∈ U , n ∈ N ,∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22 ≤ ϕmaxn , k ∈ U , n ∈ N .
(4.20)
where αk is either a 0 or 1. Ideally, if the SINR targets of the all the RTUs at each BS
are attained at the NE-mixed QoS, then the values of αk will be set to 0 for all RTUs
and to 1 for all NRTUs. In this case, NRTUs will have equal share of Q+. When αk is
0, then the term SINRk/αk will go to infinity, thereby removing it from the objective
of (4.20). A case may arise whereby at NE-mixed QoS, one or more of the RTUs fail to
achieve its SINR target. For this case, the players would give the affected RTU a high
priority during bargaining by initially setting αk = 1 for the affected RTU, and αk = 0
for all NRTUs. Once the RTUs reach their SINR targets, their SINRs will be fixed, and
the remaining resources will be shared equally amongst the NRTUs by setting αk = 1
for all NRTUs.
A mixed QoS optimisation is performed over Q+. Denote the optimal SINRs from
Egalitarian bargain game solution at each BS as ΓEBGn = [γ
EBG
k , . . . , γ
EBG
Kn
]. The optimal
mixed QoS Egalitarian bargain game solution will allocate equal share of resource to the
NRTUs given as
cn = γ
EBG
k − γNEk , k ∈ UNn . (4.21)
This means that we expect the optimal SINRs of the NRTUs at each BS to give equal
value cn if the RTUs achieved their SINR targets at the Nash equilibrium. If this is not
the case, the values of cn may be different because the affected RTUs will have a share
on Q+.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the steps involved during each play round in the mixed
QoS and the bargaining games.
4.4.2 Mixed QoS KSBG
In the KSBG, players get pay-offs that are proportional to what they would achieve
if there was no competition. Define an ideal operating point at which each player
experiences no intercell interference as the utopia point, un = [u1, . . . , uKn ]. The overall
mixed QoS KS optimisation problem for the whole system is defined as
maximise
Wn∈Wn,∀n
min
k∈U
SINRk − γNEk
αk
(
uk − γNEk
)
subject to SINRn ≥ ΓNEn , k ∈ U , n ∈ N ,∑
k∈Un
‖wk‖22 ≤ ϕmaxn , k ∈ U , n ∈ N .
(4.22)
We denote the optimal SINRs from Kalai-Smorodinsky solution at each BS as ΓKSn =
[γKSk , . . . , γ
KS
Kn
]. The optimal mixed QoS Kalai-Smorodinsky solution will yield a value
vn defined as
vn =
γKSk − γNEk
uk − γNEk
. (4.23)
The values cn and vn in (4.21) and (??) reveal the relationship between the Egalitarian
bargain game and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain solutions. Thus, an algorithm that will
provide solution to both the mixed QoS EBG and the mixed QoS KSBG is proposed.
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4.4.3 System Model for Bargaining Solutions
Consider the system in Section 4.2. The players strategies are decoupled by using
the same approach discussed in Section 3.8. The same procedures therein, will yield the
following ADMM:
Wt+1n , κ˜
t+1
n := argmin
Wn,κ˜n
Lρ
(
Wn, κ˜n,κ
s
n,u
t
n
)
, n ∈ N , (4.24)
κt+1n := argmin
κn
Lρ
(
Wt+1n , κ˜
t+1
n ,κn,u
t
n
)
, (4.25)
ut+1n := u
t
n + κ˜
t+1
n − κt+1n n ∈ N , . (4.26)
where t is the iteration index. The solution to the mixed QoS EBG and KSBG is
summarised in Algorithm 4. The steps in (4.24) to (4.25) are combined with a bisection
method to provide the optimal solution to the mixed QoS problems in (4.20) and (4.22).
4.4.4 Convergence of the Bargaining Games
As in [33], the critical assumptions required for the cooperative game to converge is
that fn (Wn, κ˜n) is closed, proper, convex and the unaugmented Lagrangian L0 has a
saddle point. Under these assumptions, the iterations of ADMM satisfies the following:
1. The dual residual (κ˜tn − κtn)→ 0 as t→∞.
2. The objective function in (3.35) converges id est, fn (Wn, κ˜n)→W? as t→∞.
3. The dual variable converges, i.e, ytn → y?n where y?n is the dual optimal point.
4. The local variable κ˜tn and the global variables κ
t
n do not necessarily have to con-
verge to the optimal values [33].
The indicator function in (3.29) has the characteristics defined above and satisfies all the
three conditions. This means that the ADMM algorithm will converge to the globally
optimal solution, and if there is a unique point, it will be reached as t approaches ∞. A
summary of the mixed QoS BG algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4: Mixed QoS BG algorithm
Data: ϕmaxn , penalty ρ > 0, stopping criterion, δ > 0, SINRk ≥ γNEk ,∀k,
Γuppern ,id est,(Γ
upper
n = un for mixed QoS KSBG), i = 0,
αk = 0,∀k ∈ URn , αk = 1,∀k ∈ UNn , ∀k, ∀n.
Data: ΓNEn , fn,∀n: determined via Algorithm 3.
Data: Initialisation: set {κn}n∈N = 0,{κ˜n}n∈N = 0,{yn}n∈N = 0,
Γlowern = 0
Result: Optimal beamforming vectors {Wn}n∈N
1 while Γuppern − Γlowern > δ do
2 Set i = i+ 1,
3 Set Γcandidaten =
Γuppern +Γ
lower
n
2
4 if fn = 0, ∀n ∈ N and i = 1 then
5 αk = 1,∀k ∈ URn , Γcandidaten (k) = ξk − γNEk , ∀k ∈ URn
6 Set γ∗k = Γ
NE-mixedQoS
n (k) + αkΓ
candidate
n (k), ∀k;
7 Steps 4 - 11 in Algorithm 2.
8 αk = 0, ∀k ∈ URn , αk = 1,∀k ∈ UNn .
9 Steps 4 - 15 in Algorithm 2.
4.5 Numerical Examples
To investigate the performance of Algorithms 3 and 4, a network topology shown
in Figure 4.2 (also refer to Figure 4.1) is used. The network has two BSs (id est two
players), each equipped with M = 4 antennas. The maximum transmission power at
each BS is ϕmaxn = 20 dB. Each BS serves three single antenna MSs that include two
NRTUs and one RTU. The SINR targets for the RTUs at the first BS and the second
BS were set to 10 dB and 12 dB, respectively. The line search accuracy at each BS is
set to δ = 10−4. The maximum iteration is set to 15 for the mixed QoS SNG and all
bargaining games. All channel vectors, hnk,k, are chosen from the distribution CN (0, I),
which resembles uncorrelated frequency flat Rayleigh fading. Only a single sub-carrier
is considered, but the algorithm can be applied to multi-carrier transmission. In that
case, the algorithm has to be applied to each resource block. The noise power was set
to σ2 = 1 W, for all users. The centralised solutions are used as a reference system for
performance comparison. Under the mixed QoS framework, there are two main possible
scenarios:
1. The SINR target of at least one RTU is not satisfied because:
(a) of intercell interference,
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Figure 4.2: A multiuser multicell network topology. User 1 and user 4 are RTUs
while the remaining users are the NRTUs.
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Figure 4.3: The SINR evolution using Algorithms 3 and 4 under scenario 1. All the
sub-figures show the mixed QoS NE and a transition from the mixed QoS SNG to the
mixed QoS EBG and the mixed QoS KSBG.
(b) or during the first play round, one or both of the BSs fail to pass the qualifi-
cation stage. Using the fall back mechanism, the affected BS then considers
a pure max-min problem. This will introduce interference to the other BSs
and may encourage them to consider bargaining.
2. The SINR targets of both the RTUs are satisfied.
4.5.1 Results Under Scenario 1
The results in Figure 4.3, show the SINR evolution of the users, under Algorithms 3
and 4. In Figure 4.3a, it is noted that, during the mixed QoS SNG, only BS2 managed to
balance the SINRs of its NRTUs while achieving the SINR targets of its RTU. BS1 failed
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Figure 4.4: The SINR evolution using Algorithms 3 and 4 under scenario 2.
to achieve the SINR target of its RTU due to intercell interference. During mixed QoS
EBG, BS1 managed to achieve the SINR target of its RTU during the first iteration into
bargaining. The remaining resources were then shared equally amongst all the NRTUs.
The SINRs achieved by the mixed QoS SNG and mixed QoS EBG were compared to the
centralised Egalitarian solution. It is observed that, NRTUs at BS1 achieved SINRs that
are lower than the balanced SINRs they will achieve under the centralised Egalitarian
solution. During the mixed QoS SNG, the NRTUs at BS2 achieved balanced SINRs
that are below the balanced SINRs provided by the centralised Egalitarian solution.
But during the mixed QoS EBG, the NRTUs at BS2 managed to attain balanced SINRs
that are more than the balanced SINRs offered by the centralised Egalitarian solution.
Figure 4.3b shows the transition from the mixed QoS SNG to the mixed QoS KSBG, and
comparison is made with the centralised Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. It is noted that
in the centralised Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the NRTUs are not necessarily balanced
to the same SINR. The same trend in Figure 4.3a is observed.
4.5.2 Results Under Scenario 2
The outcome of scenario 2 is illustrated in Figure 4.4a and Figure 4.4b. Note that at
the mixed QoS NE, both RTUs achieved their SINR targets and the SINRs of NRTUs
were balanced. The convergence rate of the mixed QoS SNG is reduced under this
scenario. This is because, since both BSs are able to achieve the SINR target of their
RTUs at each qualification stage, every time a new value r−n is observed, the BSs will
have to adapt their beamformers. This is not the case in Figure 4.3a and Figure 4.3b,
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of proposed algorithms and centralised solutions in terms of
frequency of achieved SINRs over 500 random channel realisations.
wherein during the second iteration, BS1 adapts its previous beamformers and power
allocation.
4.5.3 General Performance of the Proposed Algorithms
A further analysis on the performance of mixed QoS SNG (Algorithm 3) and mixed
QoS BG (Algorithm 4) was performed using 500 random channel realisations. Figures
4.5 depicts the achieved SINRs by all users under various solutions at BS1 and BS2. In
Figure 4.5a, it is observed that both the centralised Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions are able to achieve the SINR target of the RTUs for all channel realisations.
Furthermore, the centralised solutions always balance the SINRs of the NRTUs. Note
that the mixed QoS SNG failed to achieved the SINR target of the RTUs for one of the
channel realisations. The mixed QoS SNG is inefficient as compared to the centralised
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Player BS-1 BS-2
Parameter (bits/s/Hz) Mean Variance Mean Variance
Cent. Egalitarian 12.9310 4.2634 13.5462 4.2634
Cent. Kalai-Smorodinsky 12.9755 4.6055 13.6425 5.1448
Mixed QoS SNG 11.1905 7.0076 11.2477 9.1827
Mixed QoS EBG 13.3158 8.0057 13.2866 9.7089
Mixed QoS KSBG 13.3337 8.3967 13.2889 10.0967
Table 4.1: Comparison of mixed QoS sum rate attained for 500 random channel
realisations using centralised, mixed QoS SNG and mixed QoS BG algorithms.
solutions. Similar trends are observed in Figure 4.5b. Notice that BS2 attained higher
SINRs that are below 5 dB as compared to BS1. This is because, the SINR target of
the RTU at BS2 is larger than the SINR target at BS1. Hence, this results in more
transmission power being utilised for the RTU at BS2 as compared to the NRTUs.
Nevertheless, all NRTUs at both BSs are able to achieve higher SINRs that are greater
than 20 dB as compared to the centralised solutions.
The mean and the variance of the sum rate for the mixed QoS problem are sum-
marised in Table 4.1. As anticipated, in terms of mean, the mixed QoS SNG is inefficient
compared to all the centralised and bargaining solutions. Both the bargain solutions out-
perform the centralised solutions at BS1, but this is not the case at BS2. The latter
observation comes as a consequence of the high SINR target of RTU2. As a remark,
this does not mean that the bargain solutions outperform the centralised system, but
in mixed QoS, a player may benefit more if there is no cooperation. The overall system
performance under bargaining matches that of the centralised system. It is noted that
the variance of the bargaining solutions are larger than those achieved by the mixed QoS
SNG and the centralised solutions.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a game-theoretic framework for the downlink beamformer de-
sign in a multicell network, under mixed QoS criterion. Both the mixed QoS SNG and
the mixed QoS BGs were studied. A mixed QoS SNG was formulated, whereby each
BS determines optimal downlink beamformers in a distributed manner by considering
estimate of ICI plus noise power. Moreover, two bargaining solutions, namely, the mixed
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QoS EBG and the mixed QoS KSBG, which use the NE-mixed QoS as a disagreement
point, were proposed. On average, the mixed QoS sum rate achieved by the bargain-
ing games is comparable to that of the centralised Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions. In Chapter 5, a novel auction is proposed to improve the network capacity.
Chapter 5
Single Item bidding Auctions for
User Offloading in HetNets
In this chapter, an auction based beamforming and user association algorithm for a
heterogeneous network is proposed. In particular, a wireless network with a macrocell
deployed with multiple small cells is considered. Accordingly, the macrocell base station
(MBS) wishes to offload some of its users to a number of small cell access points (SCA),
in exchange of payments based on auctioning. The proposed bid-wait auction (BWA)
method, which offers a decentralised solution, is used to coordinate the competition of
SCAs over macrocell users.
5.1 Introduction
The envisaged 5G is anticipated to address the continuously growing demand for
high capacity in wireless mobile communications [15]. Apart from advanced interference
mitigation and massive MIMO techniques; usage of small cells for cell densification
is expected to provide high spectral efficiency. Small cells have the potential to offload
MBS traffic and increase the network capacity. But, as many stakeholders have embraced
this solution, small cells are either operator-deployed or user-deployed. The latter brings
forth other challenges like inter-cell interference, mainly because the deployment process
is uncoordinated. Small cells can operate in open-access mode, hybrid mode or closed-
group mode [16,111]. In closed-access mode, only pre-registered users (id est, host users
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(HUs)) can access the transmitter, while the open-access mode allows both pre-registered
and unregistered users (id est, GUs) to access the network resource. The hybrid-access
mode allows pre-registered users access, while unregistered users get access under some
certain restrictions. Amongst these three modes, works in [16, 111] advocate for the
hybrid mode as it allows shared resources between the GUs and the HUs. Most of the
user-deployed small cells operate in closed-access mode, and this reduces the spectral
efficiency of the network. Works in [112–115] show that incentives will motivate private
owners to consider switching their small cells into hybrid mode. The operators will then
reimburse the private owners for connecting their users.
The question now becomes, how should the MUs be assigned to the accessible small
cells? Taking into consideration that reimbursement has to be made to SCAs owners, for
admitting GUs, what criterion should be used to maximise the number of GUs admitted
by the SCAs? These questions are addressed in this chapter by providing an auction
based framework, that allows the SCAs to generate profit while admitting the maximum
possible number of GUs, within the framework of multicell beamforming. Clearly, a
combination of macrocells with small cells densification and massive MIMO techniques
make the traditional network planning and optimisation techniques a complex task [14].
Furthermore, it is discussed in [16, 111] that the amount of data and information in
different backhaul links (exempli gratia; S1, X2, and internet IP interfaces), and the
latency, will be significantly increased. Consequently, there is a need for decentralised
algorithms as addressed in this chapter.
5.1.1 Related and Parallel Works
MNOs can offload some of their mobile users to third party networks where under-
utilised spectrum resources exist. The benefits of offloading traffic have been extensively
studied in the literature. Some of the traffic offloading mechanisms and analysis can be
found in [116–122]. A Wiffler system is proposed in [117] to augment mobile 3G capacity
with WiFi. The Wiffler is used in vehicular networks for delay tolerant applications to
address the availability and performance challenges. Erlang-like capacity, in a setting
with multiple macrocells deployed with picocells and femtocells, is analysed in [120].
The findings in [120] show that small cells achieve higher network capacities with good
energy efficiency. It was deduced that small cells are a good alternative to network
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densification. In [121], a small cell activation mechanism for offloading traffic from a
macrocell to small cells, while avoiding user QoS degradation is proposed. The main
idea in [121] is to offload traffic to small cells in energy saving mode only when there is
a significant energy saving gains. This approach reduces the total energy consumption
of the network. Work in [122] considered a centralised energy aware offloading scheme,
based on cloud-radio access network.
The work in [123] considered a user load balancing problem for obtaining optimal
max-min fair bandwidth allocation under bandwidth and backhaul constraints. An ap-
proach that rely on the Gibbs sampler, which does not require exact coordination infor-
mation among the wireless devices, was proposed in [124]. A self-configuring algorithm
was proposed to allow multiple interfering 802.11 access points to select their operat-
ing frequency. This was done in order to minimise interference, and to allow users
to choose the AP in order to get a fair share on the whole network bandwidth. In
[125], a network-wide utility maximisation problem was considered. A solution that
jointly optimises partial frequency reuse and load balancing was proposed to achieve
proportional fair association. In [126], an inverse problem was considered wherein the
service providers compete for femtocell under a multi-leader follower game framework.
A framework for user association in infrastructure-based wireless network considering
rate-optimal, throughput-optimal, delay-optimal, and load-equalising association poli-
cies was studied in [127]. An iterative distributed user association policy that adapts to
spatial traffic loads was proposed in [127].
In order to address the issue of incentivised offloading, auction based algorithms have
been proposed in [128–134]. In [128] and [132], the authors formulated a combinatorial
reverse auction problem, wherein a set of MNOs act as auctioneers and the wireless
APs as bidders. The commodity in auction is the under-utilised bandwidth on the side
of the APs. In the problem formulation, the APs submit bids to the MNOs who in
turn select the AP of their interest. A reverse auction framework for fair and efficient
access permission is proposed in [129]. In particular, the authors in [129] proposed a
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) based mechanism to maximise the social welfare in a
network with one wireless service provider (WSP), and several femtocell owners. In
their network model, the WSP is the buyer and the femtocells are selling their access
permissions to allow the WSP users access. The authors in [129] dealt with the cell
overlapping by partitioning the femtocell coverages into small granularity of same size
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(referred to as locations). This allows bids to be expressed as a function of access
permissions in each location. In order to tackle the complexity of the VCG mechanism,
the authors in [129] further proposed a suboptimal algorithm with low complexity.
In [130], a network with multiple MBSs, third party owned femtocells, and mobile
users is considered. In order to allow the MBSs to offload some of their traffic to the
femtocells, the femtocells bid to provide service to the MBSs. With emphasis that
the sellers (femtocells) could incur significant overheads during valuation, the authors
further propose a system which allows imprecise valuations. Therefore, the femtocells
are allowed to estimate their valuations. Another VCG based mechanism is proposed
in [131]. The work in [131] proposed a greedy algorithm in attempt to reduce the high
time complexity problem in the VCG mechanism.
A well researched method to offload the users from macro cells to small cells is the
biased cell association (also referred to as cell range expansion (CRE)) [135–138]. This
method offer preferential load balancing by giving small cells high preference over macro
cells. In [135], it was noted that the SINRs of the offloaded users, especially those in the
CRE region, is dramatically decreased when interference management techniques are not
in place. A spatial interference cancellation (SIC) scheme with biased cell association
was then proposed in [135]. In this SIC scheme, strong interference from macro cells to
users in the CRE region is mitigated in the spatial domain. Motivated by the fact that
the impact of coupled downlink-uplink offloading is not well understood, authors in [136]
proposed a tractable model which characterises the uplink SINR and rate distribution
as a function of association rules and power control parameters.
Amongst the most recent works, authors in [139] considered a problem where the
APs decide whether they need to be on open or closed mode in order to maximise
their performance. The problem was solved using a game theoretic approach. Authors
in [140] considered cell association and resource allocation problems to address jointly
the problem of user association and load balancing. A network-wide utility maximi-
sation problem was formulated, and dual decomposition method was used to derive a
distributed solution. Further works in [114, 141–144] proposed distributed algorithms
for assignment of users to the small cells using auctioning, heuristic beamforming de-
signs, Stackelberg games, and evolutionary games. Amongst these works, consideration
of joint auctioning and beamforming design techniques has not been addressed. Even
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though various auction based algorithms have been proposed in the literature, to solve
spectrum auctions as in [62,145–147], these algorithms cannot be directly applied to the
problem under consideration.
5.1.2 Contributions
In this chapter, a framework for cell association optimisation from an auctioning per-
spective is developed. The aim is to develop a close to optimal, if not optimal, distributed
algorithm that will associate MUs to the hybrid SCAs. In particular, the problem con-
sidered here is a multi-unit auction, wherein bidders are interested in multiple items.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• A novel auction called the BWA, that jointly performs downlink beamformer design
and user association, is proposed and analysed. Previous works that propose
auction based mechanisms do not consider beamformer design in their mechanism
design.
• A novel valuation function for bidders, that automatically monitors the resource
budgets of the bidder, is proposed.
• A novel payment rule, that allows the BWA to allocate items to bidders with
sparse information, is proposed and analysed. Though the proposed payment rule
is different from the VCG payment rule, it is shown that some of the principles of
the VCG mechanism are preserved.
• It is shown that the BWA has dominant strategy equilibrium at every auction
round, which decomposes the combinatorial nature of the problem, thereby allow-
ing sequential and parallel auctions to manifest autonomously.
• Thorough numerical analysis and comparative evaluation of the proposed BWA,
and the optimal solution for heterogeneous deployments is performed.
5.2 System Model and Assumptions
Consider a single-cell MISO downlink network consisting of a MBS deployed with
a set S = [1, . . . , S] of SCAs. It is assumed that the SCAs are privately owned and
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are operating in hybrid mode. It is further assumed that the MBS and the SCAs are
operating on non-overlapping frequency bands, as shown in Figure 1.6. The assumption
of having non-overlapping frequency bands allows the valuations of the bidders not to
depend on each other1. The SCAs can admit GUs with the provision that performance
of their HUs2 is not degraded. The MBS is equipped with MMBS antennas and each
SCA is equipped with MSCA antennas, where MMBS >> MSCA. It is assumed that the
MBS has commitment to serve M0 = |M0| MUs, where M0 >> MMBS. The latter
assumption of offloading the MBS is to illustrate the necessity for offloading users to
the SCAs. The MBS and each SCA have maximum transmission powers of ϕmax0 and
ϕmaxs , respectively. Moreover, it is assumed that all SCAs are connected to the MBS via
capacity limited wired backhaul links. These backhaul links are used for coordinating
auctions (id est transporting bids, auction invitations and announcements). All users
are assumed to have specific QoS requirements that have to be met, otherwise they will
be dropped. In order to improve the readability of this chapter, a summary of acronyms
and notations used herein, are provided in Table 5.1.
The following terms are used in the rest of the thesis:
• Preference profile: A set of all GUs that an SCA is willing to bid on, and sorted
in the order of preference.
• Valuation profile: A set of all bids (id est, valuations) corresponding to the pref-
erence profile.
• Auction coverage area: A bidder is allowed to bid for users only if the users are
within a prescribed area known as the auction coverage area.
5.2.1 Motivation
It is likely that some of the resources may not be fully utilised by SCA’s pre-registered
HUs. Therefore, a hybrid configuration is deemed suitable. This mode of operation
allows other MUs in the vicinity of the SCAs to connect to the SCAs, if such a need
1A model wherein the valuation function are dependent is not covered in this work, but it is part of
future work.
2The term home user (HU) is used interchangeable to refer to preregistered users and GUs that are
already admitted by an SCA. This is because once a GU is admitted, the SCA has the mandate to serve
that GU as its preregistered user.
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Notation Definition
HU(s) Host users, id est, SCAs’ pre-
registered user(s).
GU(s) Guest users, id est, MBS user(s) re-
questing connection to the SCAs.
MU(s) Macrocell user(s) primarily served
by the MBS. The dropped MUs that
are being auctioned are called GUs.
S A set of all SCAs.
M0 A set of all MUs with cardinality
M0 = |M0|. M0 = {1, . . . ,M0} .
Gs ⊂ G A set of all GUs in the auction cov-
erage area of the s-th SCA with car-
dinality Gs = |Gs|.
Hs A set of all HU(s) and admitted GUs
at the s-th SCA with cardinality
Hs = |Hs|.
Fs := Hs ∪ Gs A set of HUs and GUs in the auc-
tion coverage area of the s-th SCA.
As The allocation/provisional set. A
set of (provisionally) assigned GUs
for SCA s.
Cg The competitors set. A set of SCAs
competing for GU g.
Gis The conditional bidding set/condi-
tional bid. A set of favourite GUs
for SCA s.
Ps := Gs The preference set. A set of GUs
in the auction area of the SCA s ar-
ranged in the order of preference.
Rs ⊂ Gs The remainder set. A set of GUs
that are left over after determining
the favourite set Gis.
Ls ⊂ Gs The loose set. A set of GUs that
have been lost to other bidders.
T r ⊆ S Contact set during auction round r.
A set of SCAs that have to answer
queries from the MBS.
Table 5.1: Frequently used notations.
arises. In order to avoid degradation of its reputation, by having many dropped users,
the MBS’s objective is to admit as many MUs as possible. As it may be impossible at
some point for the MBS to accommodate all of its users, it will offload some of its users
to the SCAs. If the SCAs densely deployed, there is a high chance that a GU may be
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in the vicinity of more than one SCA. This chapter proposes a mechanism that resolves
the competition of SCAs for GUs in the overlaps.
5.2.2 FBWA and BBWA Algorithms
The problem of offloading users to the SCAs can be in two different approaches3:
Approach (1); the MBS can firstly admit the maximum possible MUs it can serve and
then offloads the dropped MUs to the SCAs via auctioning. Approach (2); the MBS
can firstly allow the SCAs to bid for the GUs they can serve, while guaranteeing HUs
their QoS, and then later admits the remaining MUs. Note that the auction is mainly
used to resolve the conflict that arises, when there is an overlap in the preference set
of one or more SCAs. Generally, in the first approach, the MBS greedily wants to
serve as many MUs as possible, while in the second approach, the MBS is interested
in offloading as many MUs as possible. The proposed BWA algorithm is supplemented
with the admission control algorithm proposed in [148–150] to form the forward BWA
(FBWA) and backward BWA (BBWA) algorithms. The FBWA algorithm addresses the
first approach, and the BBWA algorithm addresses the second approach.
User admission problem is a separate problem on its own, with a plethora of algo-
rithms proposed in the literature. The recently proposed user admission and beamform-
ing algorithm in [148–150] is adopted; hence, the focus of this work is entirely on surplus
maximisation problem. Nevertheless, the admission problem is used by the bidders to
complete their valuation functions. Each SCA has private valuation information, the
complexity of which increases exponentially with the number of users. The question that
needs to be addressed is, how to share enough information with the auctioneer so that
satisfactory allocation can be made. The strategic behaviour of the SCAs also needs to
be analysed. All these issues are incorporated within the BWA algorithm design. Fig-
ure 5.1 projects Figure 1.6 into an economy model that can be solved via the proposed
BWA. In the BWA model, bidders are allowed to bid for one item at a time.
3There is another approach that falls in between which is excluded from this chapter, wherein the
MBS acts as both the bidder and the auctioneer. Not all countries allows auctioneers or sellers to
participate in the auction as bidders. But often, auctioneers can participate by using their bid as the
reserve price. Therefore, this approach can be studied via auctions with reserve prices.
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Figure 5.1: A competitive market comprising of one MBS, G guest users and S hybrid
SCAs. Each SCA’s most preferred GU is indicate with a green dot.
5.2.3 System Metric Design
Index the MBS by 0 and the s-th SCA by s. The instantaneous downlink SINR of
the m-th MU is given by
SINR0m =
|hH0mwm|2∑
i∈M0\m
|hH0mwi|2 + σ2m
, (5.1)
where h0m ∈ CMMBS is the channel vector from the MBS to them-th MU, wm ∈ CMMBS×1
is the transmit beamforming vector for the m-th MU, and σ2m is the receiver noise power
at the m-th MU. Note that as the MBS and the SCAs use non-overlapping frequency
bands, there is no intercell interference. Let the set of HUs and GUs served by the
s-th SCA be Hs, each denoted by h. The instantaneous downlink SINR of the h-th HU,
served by the s-th SCA is given by
SINRsh =
|hHshwh|2∑
j∈Hs\h
|hHshwj |2 + σ2h
, (5.2)
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where hsh ∈ CMSCA is the channel vector from the s-th SCA to the h-th HU, wh ∈ CMSCA
is the transmit beamforming vector for the h-th HU, and σ2h is the receiver noise power
at the h-th HU.
5.2.4 User Admission Problem
Now, let the predefined QoS targets of the MUs be defined as Ξ0 = [ξ01 , . . . , ξ
0
M0
]. A
set of admitted users is denoted by M′0 ⊆ M0, which is a parameter to be maximised.
The user admission problem P0−UM at the MBS is formulated as
P0−UM1 : maximise card(M′0)
subject to SINR0m ≥ ξ0m, m ∈M0,∑
m∈M0
‖wm‖22 ≤ ϕmax0 ,
(5.3)
where card(M′0) denotes the cardinality of the setM′0 ⊆ {1, . . . ,M0}. It is assumed all
MUs have identical QoS requirements. This latter assumption encourages the SCAs to
admit as many GUs as possible as shown later. In this thesis, the capacity of the network
is measured in terms of the number of admitted users. This motivates the objective in
(5.3) and allows the commodity or the items to be users4. The problem in (5.3) is non-
convex because the objective function and the QoS constraints are non-convex. The
QoS constraints can be rewritten in their equivalent SOC as
SINR0m ≥ ξ0m =⇒
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
hH0mw1
...
hH0mwM0
σm
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
√
1 + ξ0m
ξ0m
<(hH0mwm), (5.4)
=(hH0mwm) = 0, ∀m, (5.5)
where the first line is the second order cone (SOC) constraints and the second line is the
affine constraints. The operators <(·) and =(·), extracts the real part and the imaginary
part of the argument, respectively. Let the matrix W0 = [wm]m∈M0 be defined by
concatenating the column vectors wm at MBS.
4By choosing the objective as the maximum possible number of users admitted deprives the problem
at hand from exploring multiuser diversity and channel conditions, bandwidth and frequency diversity.
Nonetheless, these parameters will be considered in the future work.
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By introducing the slack variables a0 = [a01, . . . , a
0
M0
], problem in (5.3) can be rewrit-
ten as
P0−UM2 : minimise{wm},{a0}
‖a0‖0
subject to

√
1 + 1
ξ0m
hH0mwm + a
0
m
hH0mW0
σ
 SOC 0, m ∈M0,
=(hH0mwm) = 0, ∀m,
a0 ≥ 0, ∀m,∑
m∈M0
‖wm‖22 ≤ ϕmax0 , ∀m,
(5.6)
where ‖a0‖0 denotes the `0-norm of a0, which is the number of nonzero elements in
a0. The value of each a0m indicates the feasibility gap for the corresponding user, and
therefore, it is the indication of how much a user is preferred by the transmitter. From
the SINR constraints in (5.6), when the channel of the m-th user is good, then the
value of a0m will be as close to zero as possible. Contrary, when the m-th user has bad
channel, then the value of a0m will be large. The notation SOC denotes the generalised
inequalities with respect to the SOC [12]. The objective function in (5.6) is not a
convex function. By replacing the `0-norm with its convex hull, id est, `1-norm, a good
approximation can be attained [150]. Now the problem in (5.6) is reformulated as
P0−UM3 : minimise{wm},{a0}
‖a0‖1
subject to

√
1 + 1
ξ0m
hH0mwm + a
0
m
hH0mW0
σ
 SOC 0, m ∈M0,
=(hH0mwm) = 0, ∀m,
a0 ≥ 0, ∀m,∑
m∈M0
‖wm‖22 ≤ ϕmax0 , ∀m.
(5.7)
Problem (5.7) is a convex problem and can be solved using the convex programming
package CVX [151]. In order to obtain an optimal admission setM′0, as proved in [148,
150], the elements of a0 are rearranged in ascending order and the MUs are sequentially
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admitted beginning with the smallest a0m to build up the optimal set M′0. This is done
by checking for feasibility at every admission by solving
P0−UA : minimise
{wm}
∑
∀m∈M′0∪m
‖wm‖22
subject to SINR0m ≥ ξ0m, ∀m ∈M′0 ∪m,∑
m∈M′0
‖wm‖22 ≤ ϕmax0 , ∀m,
(5.8)
Once the newly admitted user makes the constraints in (5.8) infeasible, it is removed
from the set M′0. The resulting admission set M′0 is now optimal. If the MBS is using
FBWA, all the dropped MUs by the MBS will be considered as GUs for the SCA. The
MBS will then send invitation to all SCAs to participate in a sealed-bid auction, for the
GUs. The same process is used under BBWA algorithm, but the set of MUs available
for admission at the MBS, are those that were unable to be admitted by the SCAs.
5.2.5 Source of Revenues
Each served user pays the MBS an amount of κ per unit of data rate, and therefore,
the revenue generated from the MUs that are being served by the MBS is given by
κ
∑
m∈M′0 r
0
m, where r
0
m is log2(1 + ξ
0
m). It should be noted that using channel capacity
to determine the customers’ payments could result in overpayments. A more accurate
approach is to transform the target SINRs to their corresponding channel quality in-
dicator (CQI) [152, 153] and derive a payment using the CQI. But for simplicity, the
former approximation is used in this work. Since the MBS auctions some of its users
to the SCAs, for the purpose of valuation of serving users, it is assumed that the SCAs
also charge the GUs κ per unit of data rate for the connection. The auctioneer will
generate some revenue by collecting payments from the SCAs. Therefore, the total rev-
enue generated by the MBS is given by κ
∑
m∈M′0 r
0
m +
∑
s∈S ps, where ps is the total
payment made by s-th SCA to the MBS. However, in reality, the GUs admitted by
an SCA will pay their bills to the MBS, which will in turn pay an SCA the difference
between the GU’s payment and the payment to be paid to the MBS by the SCAs. The
main objective of the bidders is to maximise their revenue, while the auctioneer aims to
maximise the surplus. The misalignment of the objectives between the auctioneer and
the bidders may bring many difficulties in auctioning [50]. In the mechanism design for
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the BWA in Section 5.4, the objectives of the bidders and the auctioneer are aligned,
such that both of them would aim to maximise the number of admitted GUs.
5.3 Surplus Maximisation via BWA
The proposed BWA aims to maximise the surplus of the auctioneer. The design of
the BWA is aligned to the VCG mechanism proposed in [53].
Proposition 5.1
The surplus maximisation mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) which optimises social surplus pointwise [53–55].
The BWA is a collection of concurrent sealed-bid single-item auctions, wherein the SCAs
have a fixed set of items they can bid on. During the auction, every g-th GU on auction
must be assigned to exactly one SCA; therefore, there will be multiple auction rounds
in the BWA. Define a set Gs ⊆ G to contain all GUs that can be assigned to s-th SCA,
and a competitors’ set Cg, which contains all SCAs competing to connect the g-th GU.
A feasible assignment A, is the set of SCA-GU pairs (sg), with g ∈ Gs. An SCA can be
part of more than one pair (sg) ∈ A. In the proposed BWA, the MBS plays the rule of
the auctioneer, and its objective is to assign the GUs to those SCAs that value them the
most in a sequential manner. This will indirectly associate GUs to SCAs and maximise
the number of admitted GUs. Therefore, the number of admitted users is treated as
the performance metric. For every admitted user, there is a cost incurred in terms of
the transmission power. Denote the QoS target of the g-th GU at the s-th SCA as ξsg.
The minimum revenue a bidder would like to generate, by admitting a GU, is denoted
by ψsg ≥ 0. The connection cost incurred by the s-th SCA during r-th auction round,
is denoted as crsg. The marginal value of the g-th GU by the s-th SCA during the r-th
auction round, is given by
vrsg = κ log2(1 + ξ
s
g)− crsg − ψsg. (5.9)
Note that the value vrsg is conditioned on the admitted users. Without loss of gener-
ality, it is assumed ψsg = 0. Let the cost per unit power be denoted as µ. The cost of
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connecting the g-th GU, during the r-th auction round, is given by
crsg = µ
 ∑
∀i∈Hs∪g
‖ŵi‖2 −
∑
∀k∈Hs
‖wk‖2
 , (5.10)
where ŵi is the beamformer vector of the i-th HU given that GU g is admitted, and wk
is the beamformer vector of the k-th HU before the GU g is admitted. The first term in
(5.10) is the total transmission power after the connection of the g-th GU, and the last
term is the total transmission power before g-th GU is admitted.
The social surplus maximisation problem at the MBS is
maximise
xsg
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
vrsgx
r
sg
subject to
∑
g∈G′s
xrsg ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S,
∑
s∈Cg
xrsg ≤ 1, ∀g ∈ G, ∀r,
xrsg ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(sg) ∈ A′,
(5.11)
where R is the total number of auction rounds, A′ is the set of all possible SCA-GU
assignment pairs (sg)(A′ ⊆ A) and (xrsg)g∈G′s are binary decision variables, indicating
association of SCAs. xrsg = 1 means SCA s is assigned to GU g and otherwise xrsg = 0.
The second and third constraints ensure that each SCA can be assigned to one or more
GUs, and each GU can be assigned to only one SCA.
The problem in (5.11) could be viewed as the multi-assignment problem. Multi-
assignment problems are usually solved using the combination of the forward and reverse
auctions as in [154]. Unlike the work in [154], the problem in discussion can take any
asymmetry form, whereby the number of GUs could be more or equal to the number
of SCAs, or vice versa. Another approach used in [20, 155, 156] is to relax the last con-
straint, by allowing it to take any real value in the interval [0, 1]. A rounding approach
is then used to approximate the values of xrsg. In this work, (5.11) is solved by running
simultaneous sealed-bid single-item auctions, wherein at each auction round, each bid-
der’s action is a bid brsg on the most preferred GU. If a bidder wins, he pays a price prsg
to the auctioneer (MBS), which is the second highest bid from the set Cg. The bidders
utility model at r-th auction round, on the bid/action profile br = [br1g, . . . , b
r
Sg] is a
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quasilinear utility model, define as
ursg(b
r) = vrsg(b
r)xrsg(b
r)− prsg(br), (5.12)
where the subscripts g and g could refer to the same or different GUs.
Since BWA iteratively runs concurrent sealed-bid auctions, it is a requirement to
define the allocation rule xr and the payment rule pr for every r-th auction round. The
allocation rule declares the winner, and the payment rule determines the amount to
be paid, as described in detail in Section 5.4. The overall objective of the SCA is to
maximise
R∑
r=1
ursg(b
r). (5.13)
By assuming positive utility at each auction round, the utility in (5.13) is maximised by
admitting as many GUs as possible. This is because all the MUs/GUs are assumed to
have identical QoS targets5. The preference profile of each SCA tells the bidder the most
preferred GUs at each auction round. In Section 5.4, it is shown that a bidder will also
maximise his revenue by bidding according to the preference profile. For the purpose of
comparison, two different preference profile criteria are investigated as follows:
5.3.1 Fixed Preference Profile (FPP) Criterion
In this criterion, it is assumed that bidders determine their preference profile once,
at the beginning of the auction, and fix it for the entire auction. This approach could
lead to an optimal solution if each GUs cause the same amount of interference to each
other. Unfortunately, it is almost improbable to encounter that kind of environment
in practical wireless communication systems. In the problem at hand, the locations
and the CSI of the GUs, dictate how admitting GUs will affect the HUs. Therefore,
it is anticipated that the preference profile will dynamically change as users are being
admitted.
The fixed preference profile (FPP) is computed as follows: Each SCA identifies the
GUs it can possibly accommodate, which is a set of all the GUs that fall within its
auction coverage area. This is followed by determining the FPP, by solving the admission
5An offloading problem with user having differential QoS will be considered as future work. Consid-
ering differential QoS for the GUs will require vigorous analyses on the behaviour of bidders.
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problem. Define the QoS targets of the HUs and GUs as Ξs = [ξs1, . . . , ξ
s
Fs
]. The auxiliary
variables as = [as1, . . . , a
s
Fs
] are introduced. The same procedures for deriving (5.3)-(5.7)
are used to form an `1-norm admission problem for an SCA as
Ps−UM : minimise
{wj},{as}
‖as‖1
subject to

√
1 + 1ξsj
hHsjwj + a
s
j
hHsjWs
σ
 SOC 0, j ∈ Fs,
=(hHsjwj) = 0, ∀j,
as = 0, j = 1, . . . ,Hs,
as ≥ 0, j = Hs + 1, . . . , Fs,∑
j∈Fs
‖wj‖22 ≤ ϕmaxs , ∀j,
(5.14)
where the third constrained ensures that the HUs are given first priority. To build
up a preference set of GUs G′s ⊆ Fs, the vector as is sorted in ascending order. The
corresponding indices of the sorted as with an exclusion of the index of HUs give the
FPP fs. It should be noted that at this stage, no valuation profile that corresponds to fs
is determined. It is unnecessary to value the preferred users at this stage, as there is no
guarantee that all GUs in the preference set will be won. The valuations are calculated
on the “need-to-know” basis. At every auction round, a bidder will use (5.9) to place a
value on the most preferred GU.
5.3.2 Adaptive Preference Profile (APP) Criterion
As highlighted earlier, it is anticipated that the level of preference over GUs will be
reduced if an admission of a particular GU is already made due to the substitute nature
of the GUs. Therefore, the preference profiles need to be revised every time a new GU is
admitted. The valuations for every GU g ∈ Gs is performed separately, and then sorted
in descending order to determine the current preference profile. A bid is then placed on
the GUs with the highest valuation. Let the QoS targets of the HUs (this includes all
the admitted GUs) and g-th GU be defined as Ξs = [ξs1, . . . , ξ
s
Hs
, ξsg]. Also, let the set
Hs be a set of HUs and admitted GUs. For every available GU g ∈ Gs, each of the SCA
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determines the connection cost by solving the following feasibility problem:
minimise
{wk}
∑
∀k∈Hs∪g
‖wk‖22
subject to SINRsk ≥ ξsk, ∀k ∈ Hs ∪ g,∑
∀k∈Hs∪g
‖wk‖22 ≤ ϕmaxs .
(5.15)
Unlike the user maximisation problem (5.14) which does not necessarily give optimal
beamformers, problem in (5.15) will always give an optimal beamformer. Therefore,
the valuation can be determined straight away, by finding the difference in transmission
power before and after admission, using (5.10). With the exception of the first auction
round, note that for every auction round, losers (id est, bidders who lost the items
they bid on) from the previous round do not need to revise their preference profiles.
The bidders on WAIT (id est, bidders are on WAIT if the decision on their bid is
withheld) do nothing, while the winners are required to revise their preference profiles
and submit new bids. The losers from the previous round only need to submit the bid
on the next most preferred, and available GUs, since the valuation has already been
determined. Contrast should be made that when FPP is utilised, all contacted bidders
need to calculate the new valuations for admitting the next most preferred and available
GU.
In the case whereby the preference profile needs to be updated at the SCA, all the
valuations of the available GUs need to be calculated. Though this could seem costly,
it offers the SCAs with the capability to identify and prune away all the GUs that will
never be feasible for admission. This is not applicable when FPP is used, wherein for
every SCAs in the contact set T r (id est, a set of SCAs that are eligible to submit new
bids during auction round r), only the value of the next preferred, and available GU
is determined. This will continue until admitting the next preferred and available GU
becomes infeasible. In both the FPP and APP criteria, once admitting any GU becomes
infeasible, the SCA will drop out from the auction.
Assuming all bidders bid according to their preference profiles, then the bids from
each SCA are expected to be monotonically decreasing. Another common and crucial
characteristic between the FPP and APP criteria is that, bidding on a subset of users
could be allowed once there is no intersection between preference profiles. Since the MBS
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Figure 5.2: An example of the steps performed by the BWA.
has access to the preference sets of all SCAs, it can monitor the intersections between
these sets. For any preference profile that does not conflict with others, the MBS will
permit the corresponding SCA to submit bundle bids on the largest possible set of the
GUs6. This functionality allows parallel sub-auctions, while the main auction progresses,
and it will potentially increase the rate of convergence. If any SCA has knowledge that
some of the GUs are not considered by other SCAs, there is a potential for unfaithful
bidding. However, as it is difficult for any SCA to acquire preference profiles of other
SCAs; therefore, this work excludes this possibility from the analysis.
5.4 Mechanism Design for the BWA Algorithm
The proposed BWA algorithm is utilised to solve the surplus maximisation problem in
(5.11). In order to reduce the amount of information shared between the auctioneer and
the bidder, the BWA uses iterative indirect mechanism, to gather useful information
from bidders. As it is assumed that the MBS has knowledge of the locations of all
the bidders and the GUs, it can formulate the preference sets of all the SCAs. With
this knowledge at the MBS, and preference profiles at the SCAs, the auctioneer sets
a rule such that, each bidder should submit one bid at a time. The bids should be
monotonically decreasing in each auction round. Furthermore, it is required that only
6It is important to note that, once the preference set of a particular bidder is decoupled from others, it
is unnecessary for that bidder to have fear on competition. Therefore, truthful bidding will be dominant
strategy for that bidder.
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one bid should be submitted per GU during the entire BWA. Even though the BWA
uses some of the principles from the VCG mechanism, it is emphasised that the two are
totally different. The following example, with the aid of Figure 5.2, is used to highlight
the differences:
Example 5.1 (A Sample of a BWA)
Consider a bid-wait-auction (BWA) with six GUs. Assume there are four active bid-
ders SCA1, SCA2, SCA3 and SCA4 with preference sets {GU2,GU3,GU4,GU5,GU6},
{GU1,GU2,GU3,GU4,GU6}, {GU2,GU3,GU4,GU5}, and {GU1,GU2,GU4,GU5},
respectively. The BWA will iterates as shown in Figure 5.2. Note that unlike the
VCG, which charges the winner the second highest bid on the item won, the BWA
charges the winner the second highest price from the competitor’s set. The set
CGU3 := {SCA1,SCA2, SCA3} is the competitors set for GU3. Therefore, in the
first auction round, the BWA allocates GU1 to SCA1, and charges it 7 from bidder
SCA2. SCA2 and SCA4 are then put on WAIT, while SCA1 and SCA3 are put on
the contact set T 2, making them the only two bidders who are allowed to submit
new bids in the second round. This same process is repeated until the T r is empty.
The BBWA and the FBWA algorithms summarised in Algorithms 5 and 6, utilise
this BWA in their main loops.
5.4.1 Existence of Equilibrium in the BWA
During the r-th auction round, the valuation of the s-th bidder on the g-th GU is de-
noted by vrsg, and a collection of all bidders’ valuations are denoted as v
r = [vr1g, . . . , v
r
Sg],
where g and g are the identity of the GUs. The GUs g and g do not need to be different.
The strategy of each bidder is denoted as srsg. Define a collection of all bidders’ strate-
gies and actions at the r-th auction round as sr = [sr1g, . . . , s
r
Sg] and b
r = [br1g, . . . , b
r
Sg],
respectively. Given R as the maximum auction rounds required for the market to clear,
the s-th bidder valuations, strategies, and actions for the entire BWA are denoted as
vs = [v
1
s1, . . . , v
R
sGs
], ss = [s
1
s1, . . . , s
R
sGs
], and bs = [b
1
s1, . . . , b
R
sGs
], respectively. The
entire BWA has the valuation, strategy, and action spaces denoted V = [v1, . . . ,vS ],
B = [b1, . . . ,bS ], and S = [s1, . . . , sS ], respectively.
Definition 5.1 (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium)
A sub-auction dominant strategy equilibrium (sDSE) at every auction round, is a
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strategy profile sr such that for all s, vrsg, and b
r−s, the utility of bidder s is maximised
by following strategy srsg(v
r
sg) [157]. Extending the definition to the entire BWA, a
DSE is a strategy space S such that for all s, vs, and B−s, the utility of bidder s is
maximised by following strategy ss(vs).
Now, the task is to develop a dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mech-
anism for the BWA, and prove that the BWA has a unique sDSE at each auction round
and a unique DSE for the entire BWA. Recall that the BWA is a collection of con-
current sealed-bid single-item auctions. The single-parameter environment [50], which
treats single-item auction as a special case, can be used for BWA mechanism design. The
outcome of such mechanism is the allocation and payment vectors xr = [xr1,g, . . . , x
r
S,g]
and pr = [pr1,g, . . . , p
r
S,g]. The mechanism and the profile of equilibrium strategies induce
ex post allocation and payment rules, that map the valuation profile vr to the allocation
xr(vr) and payments pr(vr) [157].
5.4.2 Allocation Rule
If the bids from a particular bidder are not monotonically decreasing, its current bid
will not be accepted and the bidder is dropped from the auction. This ensures that all
SCAs will bid on the GUs, in the sequence defined in their preference profiles. Every bid
submitted should be on the most currently preferred GU. At every auction round, the
bidders aim to maximise their quasilinear utilities defined in (5.12), while at a higher
level, the aim of bidders is to maximise the number of GUs admitted, as shown in (5.13).
In every auction round, the BWA allocates the GU to the bidder with the highest bid,
if the feasible assignment set A has the minimum required information. Hence forth,
multiple assignments can be made in a single auction round if bidders bid for different
GUs. The BWA takes advantage of the main objective of the auctioneer, who is not
primarily interested in revenue maximisation, but surplus maximisation, by using the
information from the sparse feasible assignment set A, to allocate GUs.
Proposition 5.2
Assume the auctioneer has the preference sets of all bidders Gs, ∀s ∈ S. Suppose
bidders j and k are the only bidders who are eligible to bid on item m. If during the
r-th auction round, item m is bidder j’s first preference with a bid of brjm, and the
current bid from k’s bidder is brkp on item p (id est, item p has more preference than
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item m from bidder k’s perspective), then the following conditions exist:
1. If brjm > b
r
kp, it suggests that b
r
jm > b
r
km, concluding that bidder k stands no
chance in winning item m. The item m is then assigned to bidder j. Under this
condition, the auctioneer has complete bid information on item m. The bid brkp
is henceforth referred to as bidder j’s critical bid. Critical bids can only come
from bidders in the set Cm.
2. If brjm < b
r
kp, then bidder k still stands a chance to win item m. Therefore
bidder j will have to WAIT (hence the term BID-WAIT), until the auctioneer
has the right information to announce the winner between bidders j and k.
Under this condition, the auctioneer has incomplete bid information on item
m. The bids brjm and b
r
kp are henceforth referred to as bidder j’s wait bid and
potential bid, respectively.
Proof 3 Since the auctioneer has access to the preference sets and uses the one bid
at a time rule, and by assuming truthful bidding, the preference profiles at the SCAs
dictates that the bids submitted should be monotonically decreasing at each auction
round. Therefore, the next bid on the next available preferred item is always less or
equal to the current submitted bid. 
Regardless of the sparseness of the collected bids at each auction round, the auctioneer
will have complete bid information on at least one GU. This means at every auction
round, there will be a winner. For every auction round, the BWA utilises an allocation
rule xr, that allocates the GU to the bidder with the highest bid [50,53,157], defined as
xr(br) = argmax
A
∑
s∈S
brsgx
r
sg. (5.16)
5.4.3 Payment Rule
The second-price payment rule used in the VCG mechanism which charges the winner
the second highest bid is invoked. The BWA extends the second-price rule, by charging
the winner the second highest bid from the bidder in competitors’ set Cg, id est, the
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Algorithm 5: Forward Bid-Wait Auction (FBWA) Algorithm
Data: Initialisation: Guest user set G := ∅, assignment set A := ∅,
auction round : i = 0.
Result: Optimal Allocation set A′ ⊆ A.
MBS-MU admission
1 Solve (5.3) and (5.7) to get R′0 and G.
2 T 1 := {all eligible SCAs}.
SCA-GU admission: BWA
3 while T r 6= ∅ do
4 r = r + 1
5 Auctioneer contacts bidders in T r
6 Active bidders submit their bids brsg on most preferred GU(s).
7 if brsg = ∅ or brsg > br−1sg then
8 Bidder is dropped from auction.
9 Auctioneer declares winners on items with complete bid information.
10 if item has incomplete bid information then
11 Current best bidder WAITS.
12 Auctioneer determines mathcalT r+1.
Algorithm 6: Backward Bid-Wait Auction (BBWA) Algorithm
Data: Initialisation: T 1 := {all eligible SCAs}, G :=M0, A := ∅,
auction round : r = 0.
Result: Optimal Allocation set A′ ⊆ A.
SCA-GU admission: BWA
1 Perform step 3-12 of Algorithm 5.
2 Set M0 =M0 \ G′.
MBS-MU admission
3 Solve to (5.3) and (5.7) to get M′0.
critical bid. It is very important to note that the critical bid need not to be the second
highest bid on a particular item, as elaborated in Example 5.1 and Proposition 5.2, con-
dition 1. As explained in Section 2.5.2, using the Clarke pivot rule [59,60] to charge the
winning bidder its externalities is the only way to enforce truth-telling. In Proposition
5.2 condition 1, the payment to the auctioneer by bidder j would be bkkp.
Theorem 5.1
Truthful bidding is a weak dominant strategy in the bid-wait-auction.
Proof 4 Consider an arbitrary bidder s, its valuation at r-th auction round on the
g-th GU is vrsg and br−s are the bids of other bidders. The bids br−s do not necessarily
have to be placed on the g-th GU. The valuation vrsg is an immutable valuation for bidder
s on the g-th GU. Let B = maxt6=svrtg denote the highest bid by some other potential
bidder of g-th GU (id est, g-th GU belongs to the preference set of bidder t). The bid B
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us =

0, if brsg < B
r+1,
(vrsg −Br) + 0, if Br+1 ≤ brsg < Br,
(vrsg −Br) + 0, if brsg ≥ Br, br+1sg < Br,
(vrsg −Br) + (vrsg − r+1sg|g −Br), if brsg ≥ Br, br+1sg ≥ Br,
(5.17a)
(5.17b)
(5.17c)
(5.17d)
max{0, us} =

0, if vrsg < B
r+1,
vrsg < B
r+1,
0, if Br+1 ≤ vrsg < Br,
vrsg < B
r+1,
(vrsg −Br+1), if Br+1 ≤ vrsg < Br,
Br+1 ≤ vrsg < Br,
(vrsg −Br) + (vrsg − r+1sg|g −Br+1), if vrsg ≥ Br,
Br+1 ≤ vr+1sg < Br,
(vrsg −Br) + (vrsg − r+1sg|g −Br+1), if vrsg ≥ Br, vr+1sg ≥ Br.
(5.18a)
(5.18b)
(5.18c)
(5.18d)
(5.18e)
is the critical bid of bidder s (Proposition, 5.2 condition 1). The GU g could be the g-th
GU or any other GU. Now, given the bid B, there are only two distinct outcomes for
bidder s. If bidder s bids brsg < B, he loses and receives utility u
r
sg = 0. But if he bids
brsg ≥ B, and by assuming that the ties are broken in favour of bidder s, then he wins
and receives utility ursg = v
r
sg − B. In the BWA, the ties are broken by random choice.
Now the following cases exist. If vrsg < B, maximum utility that bidders s will obtain is
max{0, vrsg−B} = 0. On the other hand, if vrsg ≥ B, maximum utility that bidders s will
obtain is max{0, vrsg −B} = vrsg −B, which occurs by bidding truthfully and winning. 
Note that, by using the bidder’s critical bid as the payment in the BWA, tends to
have the same advantages over the second-price auction as the n-th random price auction
proposed in [158]. One of the deficiencies of the second-price auction is that, bidders
whose valuations are far below or above the market-clearing price, may bid untruthfully
and remain unnoticed. This could be a setback, especially when the auctioneer tries
to learn the bidding behaviour of the bidders in order to determine the entire demand
curve of the auction. Contrary to this, both the proposed BWA and the n-th random
price auction proposed in [158], are able to engage all bidders to bid truthfully. The
n-th random price auction randomly picks a bid other than the highest bid and set it
as a price for the goods. This filters all the users whose bids are below the set price,
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and will potentially punish those bidders who bid insincerely. In the proposed BWA,
the assumption that the bidders will bid on the most preferred GUs, and the sparseness
of the collected bids, greatly reduces the margin between the market-clearing price and
the valuations of the bidders. The second-price auction is ultimately a special case of
the BWA, which occurs when all the possible bids on a particular GU are available and
both the winning bid and the critical bid are on that GU.
Theorem 5.2
Bidding on the most preferred GU is a dominant strategy in the bid-wait-auction.
Proof 5 Without loss of generality, consider two items with identities g and g. Fix an
arbitrary bidder s with the preference profile fs = [g, g] at the r-th auction round. Set
its valuations profile as vs = [v
r
sg, v
r
sg] where v
r
sg > v
r
sg, and denote the bids from other
bidders as br−s, b
r+1
−s during auction rounds r and r+ 1 respectively. Again without loss
of generality, assume that all other bidders have the same preference profiles as bidder
s at the r-th auction round. Let Br = maxt6=svrtg and Br+1 = maxz 6=sv
r+1
zg denote the
critical bids for bidder s during auction rounds r and r+1, respectively. The critical bids
Br and Br+1, should satisfy Br > Br+1. If during r auction round, bidder s bids brsg on
GU g, its potential utility is us = ursg + u
r+1
sg . In this case, only three distinct outcomes
as described in (5.17) exists. In (5.17d), r+1sg|g > 0 implies a decrease in valuation on GU
g during auction round r+ 1, given that GU g is already admitted. In (5.17a), bidder s
is put on WAIT during auction round r and he loses GU g. In the auction round r+ 1,
he also loses GU g. In (5.17b), bidder s is put on WAIT during auction round r and he
loses GU g, but during auction round r + 1, he wins GU g. In (5.17c), bidder s wins
GU g during auction round r and other bidders are put on WAIT. In the auction round
r+ 1, only bidder s is allowed to submit a new bid br+1sg < b
r
sg. Still under (5.17c), if the
new bid br+1sg < B
r, then he loses GU g. In (5.17d), bidder s wins both the GUs.
On contrary, suppose bidder s places his order of preference truthfully by bidding on
item g in the r-th auction round, and g in the (r + 1)-th auction round. The potential
utility the bidder s will obtain is given in (5.18), where r+1sg|g > 0 implies a decrease in
valuation on GU g during auction round r + 1, given that GU g is already admitted.
By comparing the overall utilities in (5.17b)-(5.17c) with (5.18c), yields (vrsg − Br) <
(vrsg−Br+1). Similarly, by comparing the overall utilities in (5.17d) with (5.18d)-(5.18e),
gives (vrsg − Br) + (vrsg − r+1sg|g − Br) < (vrsg − Br) + (vrsg − r+1sg|g − Br+1). It should be
further noted that, not all the GUs in the preference profile of a bidder will always be
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feasible to admit. Therefore, bidding on a less preferred GU and winning could make
it infeasible to admit the most preferred GU. This concludes that, bidder s can get the
highest utility, only by being truthful in both the valuation and the order of preference.

5.4.4 Uniqueness of the sDSE and the DSE
Both the sDSE and DSE require that, for all s, vr, and brs,g, bidder s has a high
utility for playing strategy at vrs,g than following any other strategy at b
r
s,g, id est,
vrsg · xrsg(vr)− prsg(vr) ≥ vrsg · xrsg(brsg,vr−s)− prsg(brsg,vr−s). (5.19)
In every auction round, the proposed BWA allocates at least one GU to a bidder with
the highest bid, and charges the winner its critical bid. A unique payment rule that will
guard against insincere bidding, such that the allocation rule xr is implementable, is
derived below.
Definition 5.2
An implementable allocation rule is a function xr which when coupled with payment
rule pr is such that (xr,pr) is DSIC. An allocation rule is monotone if for every
bidder s, and for fixed bids br−s of other bidders, the allocation xrsg(brsg,br−s) to s is
increasing in its bid brsg [50].
The BWA payment rule should satisfy
prsg(b
r) ∈ [0, brsg · xsg(br)],∀s ∈ S, (5.20)
where the lower bound ensures that no payment should be made by the auctioneer to the
bidders. The upper bound guarantees a bidder that for as long as he bids truthfully, he
will have non-negative utility. For completeness, Myerson’s Lemma in [159] is invoked
to derive a unique BWA payment rule.
Theorem 5.3 (Myerson’s Lemma [159])
In a single-parameter environment, where the agents have independent utility and
quasilinear utility functions, a profile of allocation and payment rules (xr,pr) are in
sDSE and implementable only if, for all s ∈ S;
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bˆrsg · xsg(bˆrsg,br−s)− prsg(bˆrsg,br−s) ≥ bˆrsg · xsg(bˇrsg,br−s)− prsg(bˇrsg,br−s). (5.20)
bˇrsg · xsg(bˇrsg,br−s)− prsg(bˇrsg,br−s) ≥ bˇrsg · xsg(bˆrsg,br−s)− prsg(bˆrsg,br−s). (5.21)
bˆrsg
(
xsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r
−s)− xsg(bˆrsg,br−s)
)
≤
(
prsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r
−s)− prsg(bˆrsg,br−s)
)
≤ bˇrsg
(
xsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r
−s)− xsg(bˆrsg,br−s)
) (5.22)
lim
bˇrsg→bˆrsg
[
bˆrsg
(
xsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r
−s)− xsg(bˆrsg,br−s)
)]
≤ lim
bˇrsg→bˆrsg
[(
prsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r
−s)− prsg(bˆrsg,br−s)
)]
≤ lim
bˇrsg→bˆrsg
[
bˇrsg
(
xsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r
−s)− xsg(bˆrsg,br−s)
)]
= ∆|bˆrsgp
r
sg = bˆ
r
sg ·∆|bˆrsgxsg(b
r
sg,b
r
−s).
(5.23)
1. xr is is monotone and non-decreasing, and
2. there is a unique payment rule given as prs(b
r
sg,v
r−s) =
∫ brsg
0 b
r
sg ·x′s(brsg,vr−s)dbrsg,
where brsg = 0 implies p
r
s(0,v
r−s) = 0.
Proof 6 Assume that (xr,pr) is DSIC. Consider two possible bids (bˇrsg, bˆ
r
sg) from bid-
der s on item g during r-th auction round such that 0 ≤ bˇrsg < bˆrsg. Assume that the
private valuation of bidder s on its most preferred GU g during the r-th auction round
is bˆrsg, but he underbids by submitting bˇ
r
sg instead. Using the DSIC principle in (5.19)
yields (5.20). Similarly, if private valuation of the bidder s on GU g at the r-th auction
round is bˇrsg, but he overbids by submitting bˆ
r
sg instead, gives (5.21).
The payment difference (prsg(bˇ
r
sg,b
r−s)− prsg(bˆrsg,br−s)) from (5.20) and (5.21) is given
by the sandwich theorem [160], as shown in (5.22). Noting that xrsg(·,br−s) is a piecewise
constant, applying the limit inequality theorem [160] in (5.22) yields the change in
payment in (5.23), where ∆|bˆrsg is the magnitude of change at bˆ
r
sg. Now, the unique
payment formula for each bidder at the r-th auction round is given by
prsg(b
r
sg,b
r
−s) =
Crg∑
c=1
brcg ·∆|brsgxrsg(·,br−s), (5.24)
where brcg is the c-th breakpoint of the allocation function x
r
sg(·,b−s) in the range [0, brsg]
during r-th auction round, and Crg = |Crg ⊆ Cg| ≤ Cg = |Cg| is the maximum number of
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active bidders in the competitive set of the g-th GU. Note that the breakpoint occurs
at the critical bid of bidder s. Since the critical bid can only come from a bidder in
the competitive set Cg, if a bidder is invited to submit a bundle bid, he is guaranteed
that he will pay nothing for admitting new GUs. Now the overall payment formula for
bidder s for the entire BWA is given as
ps(bs,B−s) =
R∑
r=1
C′g∑
c=1
brcg ·∆|brsgxrsg(·,b−s), (5.25)
The total revenue generated from the BWA is given by
∑
s∈S ps(bs,B−s). Since the
allocation function xrsg(·,b−s) is a bounded monotone function, it is continuous and
differentiable. Assume that bˇrsg = bˆ
r
sg + dbˆ
r
sg. Now, dividing (5.22) through by dbˆ
r
sg and
following the same procedure as in (5.23), yields
d
dbˆrsg
p(bˆrsg,b
r
−s) = bˆ
r
sg ·
d
dbˆrsg
x(bˆrsg,b
r
−s). (5.26)
The unique payment formula of every bidder during the r-th auction in (5.24) can be
re-written as
prs(b
r
sg,b
r
−s) =
∫ brsg
0
brsg ·
d
dbrsg
xrsg(b
r
sg,b
r
−s)db
r
sg. (5.27)
This is in agreement to the second condition of Theorem 5.3. Hence the proof. 
Equations (5.24) and (5.25) show that the BWA has the allocation and payment rules
that lead to a unique sDSE and ultimately a unique DSE. Note that a bidder only pays
when he is assigned a GU(s).
5.4.5 Optimality and Efficiency of the BWA
Usually the optimality of an auction is measured in terms of the revenue generated.
Contrary to this, this chapter defines optimality as the ability to admit the maximum
possible number of GUs. An auction is allocative efficient if the highest bidders always
wins [40]. With these definitions in place, a remark that the BWA is suboptimal and
inefficient is made. This is because valuations of the GUs on auction are stochastically
dependent, but the BWA ignores this fact. In Section 5.5, numerical simulations are used
compare the performance of the BWA with centralised algorithm proposed in [149].
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5.5 Numerical Example
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithms, consider a network
with one MBS equipped with MMBS = 50 antennae and 25 SCAs, each equipped with
MSCA = 8 antennae. There are 100 MUs that were randomly placed within the coverage
area of the MBS. Each SCA is committed to serve one HU, with a data rate target of
2 bits/s/Hz. Low data rate are chosen for the HUs to ensure that it is always feasible
for the SCA to serve the HU. The nominal coverage radius of the MBS and each SCA
are 500 m and 30 m, respectively. The maximum transmission powers at the MBS and
each SCA are ϕmax0 = 46 dBm and ϕ
max
s = 30 dBm, respectively. The SCAs are only
allowed to bid on users that fall within twice their nominal coverage radius. Choosing
a large auction coverage area ensures that competition exists amongst bidders, and it
also ensures that untruthful bidders will always be punished. It is assumed the MBS
knows the locations of the SCAs and its 100 MUs. Based on this knowledge, the MBS
will be able to determine those SCAs that can bid on any of its MUs. The noise power
of all users was set to σ2 = 1. The cost per unit of data rate and the cost per unit
power were set to κ = 0.1 and µ = 0.00001, respectively. All other model parameters
are summarised in Table 5.2. The SCA-MUs is chosen such that there will be overlaps
on the preference sets. This introduces competition amongst SCAs.
Figure 5.3 shows the results of the FBWA and BBWA when the SCAs utilise the
FPP and APP criteria. The green squares indicate the locations of the admitted MUs
served by either the MBS or the SCAs. Those users served by the SCAs are explicitly
shown by connecting the users with the corresponding SCAs using blue lines. Those
users that are not served by any of the transmitters (id est dropped users) are shown
by red dots. The blue dots show the locations of the HUs. Figure 5.3a and Figure 5.3c
show the results of FBWA algorithm for the cases of both the FPP and the APP criteria.
The observation in both cases is that; as for the FBWA algorithm, the MBS performs
admission control first, most of the users closer to the MBS have been admitted by
MBSs and the remaining users are the contenders for bidding by SCAs. As opposed to
this, the BBWA algorithm aims to auction off the MUs to the SCAs first. As seen from
Figure 5.3a and Figure 5.3b, for the case of the FPP, with the BBWA algorithm, the
SCAs have taken even those users that were served by MBS when the FBWA algorithm
was used. This is because the choice of serving users was given to SCAs first. However,
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(a) FBWA with FPP.
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(b) BBWA with FPP.
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(c) FBWA with APP.
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(d) BBWA with APP.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of BBWA and FBWA allocation results when bidders use
FPP and APP criteria to determine values of the GUs.
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Description/Parameter Value
Macrocell radius 500 m.
Smallcell radius 30 m.
MBS downlink transmit
power ϕmax0
46 dBm.
SCA downlink transmit power
ϕmaxs
20 dBm.
MBS path and penetration
loss at d (km)
128.1 + 37.6 log10(d) dB.
SCA path and penetration
loss at d (km)
127 + 30 log10(d) dB.
Lognormal shadowing stan-
dard deviation
7 dB.
MBS-MUs minimum distance
constraint
35 m.
SCA-MUs minimum distance
constraint
3 m.
Noise variance σ2 -127 dBm.
Wall attenuation 20 dB.
Number of MUs 100.
Number of HUs per SCA 1.
Number of MBS antennas
Mmbs
50.
Number of SCA antennas
Msca
8.
Small scale fading distribution hjk ∼ CN (0,Rjk).
Physical channel model [161, Eq.(34)]
Table 5.2: Numerical parameters for numerical evaluation.
this has resulted into some users even very far from the MBS to be served by the MBS.
The same can be observed for the APP schemes as seen in Figure 5.3c and Figure 5.3d.
The revenue generated by the MBS due to those users served by the SCAs is now
studied. The Figure 5.3e depicts the number of MUs admitted by the SCAs and the
revenue generated by the MBS using the FBWA algorithm. The red lines show the
number of admitted users and the blue lines show the revenue. The result of the APP
criterion is shown by dashed lines and that of the FPP algorithm is shown by solid lines.
As seen, more revenue is generated for the MBS if the SCAs use the APP criterion. This
is because the margin between the winning bid and the critical bid is reduced, hence the
payment made by the winner is increased. Similar observation is seen for the BBWA
algorithm as well in Figure 5.3f. Also, notice from Figure 5.3e and Figure 5.3f that the
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number of dropped users is nine with the FBWA while none of the users is dropped with
the BBWA. This is explained as follows: when the FBWA is used, as the MBS chooses
the users closer to it first, there is a possibility that users that are far away from the
SCAs may not be chosen by the SCAs because serving these users is not profitable to
SCAs. However, with the BBWA, all users that are not served by the SCAs will be
taken over by the MBS.
5.5.1 General Performance of the BBWA and FBWA
Now, the performance of the proposed methods by varying the target data rate for
MUs while fixing the data rate for HUs at 2 bits/s/Hz is investigated. Figure 5.4a shows
the average number of MUs admitted by the SCAs and the MBS (shown separately).
The solid line depicts the performance of the BBWA while the dashed lines depict the
performance of FBWA. The red lines indicate the APP criterion while the blue line
indicate the FPP criterion. As similar to Figure 5.3, for a given preference criterion
(FPP/APP), BBWA admits more users than the FBWA. Also, the FPP admits more
users than APP for a given algorithm. Hence in terms of surplus maximisation, BBWA
with FPP criterion is most preferred. As seen in Figure 5.4b, in terms of revenue
generation for the SCAs, SCAs would prefer the BBWA with the APP criterion at lower
target rates, and the BBWA with the FPP criterion at higher target rates. However, as
the primary intention of the MBS is to minimise the dropped users, it will also prefer
the BBWA algorithm. As the MBS cannot impose the preference criterion to SCAs, the
SCAs will choose APP criterion at lower target rates and FPP criterion at higher target
rates. A CVX optimisation toolbox [151] was used to solve the problems in (5.7), (5.14),
and (5.15).
A comparison of the average system overhead measured in terms of the number of
invitations for bidding, number of bids submitted and the number of announcements
made is conducted. Each components of the different factors in the overhead carries
different weights7. An invitation carries a weight of 1, while a bid and an announcement
carries weight of 2. As seen in Figure 5.4c, the system overhead drops with increasing
target data rate. This is because with increasing target data rate, the SCAs will reach
7An invitation is either 1 (id est inviting a bidder to submit a new bid) or 0 (id est dropping a bidder
for not following the auction rules). A bid carries the identity of the GU of interest and its value. An
announcement carries the identity of the GU and either 1 or 0 to indicate if the GU has been won or
not.
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Figure 5.4: Average performance of the proposed BBWA and FBWA for 20 channel
realisations. There are 100 MUs and 25 SCAs.
its admission capacity quickly and there is no need for further auctioning. The average
number of auction rounds is also compared in Figure 5.4d. For the same reason, the
number of auction rounds drops with the increasing data rate.
In terms of computational complexity, it can be noted that in FBWA algorithms,
the MBS will have a huge pool of users to choose from, and therefore, most of the
computational burden will be centralised to the MBS. Once the MBS has admitted its
users, the SCAs will have a reduce pool of users to choose from which will reduce the
computational burden on the SCAs. In the BBWA algorithms, the SCAs will have a
large pool of users to choose from, but due to the auction coverage area restrictions,
the computational burden will be distributed across all SCAs. After the SCAs have
admitted their preferred users, the MBS will be faced with a reduced pool of users;
hence, it will incur less computational complexity as compared to FBWA.
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5.5.2 Evaluation of Optimality and Efficiency.
As the BWA is the main component of both the FBWA and the BBWA algorithms,
its optimality and efficiency was analysed. The BWA was compared to a branch-and-
bound (BnB) centralised solution proposed in [149], which uses YALMIP [18] to solve
the admission and user association problems. All the simulations were carried out on a
personal computer with 3.4 GHz Intel Core i5 processor. In order to reduce the com-
putational burden for the centralised system, only 6 MUs and 2 SCAs were considered.
The optimal solution was accelerated by searching for the feasible allocation space that
is known to be feasible and gives high cardinality of admitted users.
Figure 5.5 shows the optimal average number of admitted MUs and the transmission
power at each SCA as the target data rate of the MUs is varied. By comparing the BWA
and the BnB in Figure 5.5a, it is be observed that the BWA matches the centralised
solution at lower target rates. The only time when the BWA did not match the admission
capacity offered by the optimal solution is between 9 bits/s/Hz and 11 bits/s/Hz. In
Figure 5.5a, it is observed that as the target data rate of the MUs is increased, the total
transmission power increases exponentially in both schemes. From target data rate of
10 bits/s/Hz, the average number of admitted users under BWA drops from 6 to 5.75.
Consequently, the total transmission power is also dropped. A similar trend is observed
in BnB from target data rate of 11 bits/s/Hz. It should be noted that when the system
dimension is increased, the performance gap between the centralised solution and the
proposed BWA may increase. The average total time for obtaining at solution at each
target data rate is 162.2807 seconds for the accelerated optimal solution and 2.2461
seconds for the BWA.
5.6 Conclusion
A general framework that addresses user association problem in a wireless downlink
heterogeneous network by utilising auctioning has been proposed. Two approaches were
considered. In the first approach, the MBS admits as many users as it can serve and
then auctions off the remaining users to SCAs. This is solved by the FBWA algorithm.
In the second approach, the MBS auctions off as many users as possible to the SCAs
and then admits the largest possible set of users from the remaining users. This is solved
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of the BWA and the optimal solution.
by the BBWA algorithm. As the intention of the MBS is to admit as many users as
possible, either directly serving them or by auctioning them off to the SCAs, it appears
that the BBWA is the most preferred choice for MBS. In terms of revenue generation,
SCAs would prefer the FPP criterion. Hence BBWA with the FPP criterion is the
most preferred algorithm considering the preference of both the MBS and SCAs. The
proposed algorithm is able to provide closer to optimal solution with significant saving
in complexity and overheads. Unlike the proposed BWA discussed above, Chapter 6
proposes other auctions that always allow bidders to submit bundle bids.
Chapter 6
Multiple Item bidding Auctions
for User Offloading in HetNets
Similar to Chapter 5, this chapter proposes auction based algorithms for offload-
ing MUs from the MBS to various privately owned SCAs. In contrast to the BWA
based algorithms, auctions proposed here always allow bundle bidding. A simultaneous
multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA) algorithm for allocating MUs to the SCAs is
proposed. Some of the fall-backs experienced in SMRA are addressed in the proposed
altered SMRA (ASMRA), sequential combinatorial auction with item bidding (SCAIB),
and RCAIB algorithms. The SMRA and the ASMRA use the first price payment rule
while the SCAIB and the RCAIB use the second price payment rule.
6.1 Introduction and Related Works
Literature review on traffic offloading, and applications of auctioning in wireless
networks is provided in Section 5.1.1. Since this chapter is focused on combinatorial
auctions, related literature is provided. Many combinatorial auctions have received much
attention in spectrum auctioning. Combinatorial auctions allow users to submit bids on
a combinations of items [61]. Most of developed countries such as, USA, Australia,
UK, and Germany, have adopted auctioning as a pricing scheme to dynamically allocate
different spectrum bands [162–167]. Dynamic spectrum allocation extends to the field
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of cognitive radios. In cognitive radio, secondary users can opportunistically access the
radio resource that belong to the primary users [2, 168–170].
In almost all the auction environments, the auctioneers wish to sell multiple objects
to multiple bidders. The items can be homogeneous or heterogeneous [62]. On the
other hand, the bidders can have single-unit demand or multi-object demand. Inclusion
of all these characteristics and requirements makes combinatorial auction algorithm
very complex. Most of the auction methods in spectrum auctioning are classified as
simultaneous ascending auctions (SAAs). SAA is a large collection of auctions running
in parallel [50, 163]. If implemented correctly, SAA generates market prices. Authors
in [171] argued that, it is beneficial if the bidders can participate in different auctions
at the same time. Therefore, combinatorial auction with item bidding (CAIB) was
studied in [171]. This type of auction allows bidders to construct bundles with items
from different auctions. A double auction framework, for spectrum auctioning and
autonomous networks, was proposed in [62]. In order to develop distributed algorithms
that are scalable to large systems, this chapter adopts the mechanism designs in SAAs
and CAIB that are able to perform offloading and downlink beamforming.
6.1.1 Contributions
Most of the works in the literature assume that the customers are delighted to have
their SCAs in closed-access mode, which constrain them to reverse auctions. Further-
more, most works apply the VCG mechanism which is deemed “the lovely but lonely
Vickery auction” in [57]. Despite having good characteristics, the VCG is not widely
applicable in practice [57]. This is because bidders are not always willing to reveal their
true valuation. Also, the VCG is prune to collusions, wherein bidders may form illegal
coalitions to reduce competition. Contrary to the works in the literature, this chapter
explores other auctions that have been used in practice, especially in spectrum auction-
ing. The focus is on forward auctions. The incentivised offloading mechanisms have
shown that the third party owners will benefit for participating in these auctions. This
will attract a lot participants and increase competition amongst bidders. One of the mo-
tivations of this chapter is that, it is most probable that the SCAs owners are business
oriented, and therefore they would use every available opportunity to minimise the cost
of running their businesses. With high costs incurred in acquisition of the spectrum,
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under-utilization of this spectrum will be a liability to the business. In this regard, it is
assumed that the privately owned SCAs are willing to buy users from the MNOs so as
to fully occupy their under-utilized resource. On the other hand, the MNOs are highly
interested in exploiting mechanisms that will increase their network capacity, without
deploying extra BSs, so that their capital expenditure (CAPEX) can be reduced. These
self interests of both parties create a marketplace environment, that will be used to
develop auction based algorithms.
The focus of this chapter is on a multi-unit auction settings, wherein the bidders have
budget constraints in terms of their ability on the number of users they can accommo-
date. These budget constraints are private i.e., they are not known to the auctioneer
and other bidders. In particular, SMRA [172] and CAIB [171] are investigated. In the
SMRA method, the items are simultaneously sold in an iterative fashion. In the CAIB,
items are sold separately and independently in a one shot auction. Thus, every bidder
submits a single bid for each item, and each item is sold independently as in a single-item
auction.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• New auction based algorithms that jointly perform downlink beamformer design
and user association are proposed and analysed.
• Two SMRA based algorithms are proposed to facilitate the offloading process.
The first algorithm directly applies the classical SMRA, which is used in spectrum
auctioning. In order to reduce the valuation overheads incurred by the bidders,
a second algorithm, referred herein as the altered SMRA (ASMRA), is proposed.
These two algorithms preserve the privacy of bidders’ valuations. In SMRA and
ASMRA the item is given to the bidder with the highest bid and the payment is
the winner’s bid. In SMRA, Bidders are allowed to add and remove items on their
bidding set as they wish. Contrary, in the ASMRA, bidders are allowed to add
and remove items on their bidding set only when they have permanently lost an
item on their current bidding set.
• In addition, two forward CAIB algorithms are proposed; the sequential CAIB
(SCAIB) and the repetitive CAIB (RCAIB). These algorithms use the second-price
rule (id est, VCG payment). In the RCAIB, standing highest bids are advertised
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to competitors. Advertising the highest bids will provide more information to com-
petitors, and thus encourage retaliations. The SCAIB tries to avoid this problem.
In SCAIB and RCAIB, the item is allocated to the bidder with the highest bid
and the payment is the second highest bid. The difference between SCAIB and
RCAIB is that, in SCAIB a bidder can submit a bid on item once while in the
RCAIB a bidder is allowed to bid on an item as many times as possible.
• It is shown that truthful bidding leads to individual rationality, and it is the best
response for every bidder. Furthermore, it is demonstrated how truthful bidding
leads to a Walrasian Equilibrium, where the supply equals the demand.
• Thorough numerical analysis is conducted, and validation of the proposed algo-
rithms is carried out by comparing the proposed algorithms, with the optimal
solution for heterogeneous deployments.
For readability, please refer to Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 for notations.
6.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider the system model described in Section 5.2. In current HetNets, MUs can
only be served by the MBS. This type of setting has shown to be very inefficient in terms
of spectral and energy usage. With an ever increasing traffic, network operators can take
advantage of the privately owned SCAs to serve some of their MUs, especially those at
the boundary of the coverage area. To achieve this, incentives should be in place to
encourage SCAs to operate in hybrid access modes, id est to serve own users and guest
users. In this chapter, a compensation model to provide incentives is formulated using
auction theory. In particular, a study on the utilisation of the forward ascending and the
combinatorial auctions is conducted. If the SCAs are densely deployed, there is a high
chance that a GU may be in the auction coverage area of multiple SCAs. This stimulates
a competitive market as shown in Figure 6.1. To analyse this competitive market, an
auction environment in which the MBS is the auctioneer, the SCAs are the bidders, and
the GUs are the items, is formulated. In Chapter 5, it was recommended that, for high
network capacity, the MBS should auction out the MUs to the SCAs before it performs
admission control for the remaining users.
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Figure 6.1: An auction market setting in a heterogeneous network. Guest users GU1,
GU2, GU5, GU9, and GU10 are over-demanded items. GU11 is under-demanded.
6.2.1 General Auction Environment
The MBS intends to perform surplus-maximisation, for an economy with G hetero-
geneous items (id est, GUs), via auctioning. It is assumed that all SCAs have private
marginal values (see (6.1)) on the items and private budget constraints. In order to
maximise their utilities, all bidders wish to admit their favourite GUs subject to the
transmission power constraints and QoS requirements of their own HUs. Note that the
budget constraints of the bidders emanate from their transmission powers. Later, it will
be shown that these budget constraints set the upper bound on the maximum number
of GUs a bidder can accommodate.
Each bidder has private valuations vs(G′s) for every possible bundle of GUs G′s ⊆ Gs
in its auction coverage area. This will result in immense private parameters. A valuation
function of Gs number of items is a function vs(Gs) : 2Gs → R, such that vs(∅) = 0.
Free disposal is assumed, hence the monotonicity condition such that vs(G′s) ≤ vs(G†s),
whenever G′s ⊆ G†s . Consider two disjoint sets G′s, and G†s at the s-th SCA. The marginal
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value of G†s with respect to the set G′s is defined as
vs(G†s |G′s) = vs(G′s ∪ G†s)− vs(G′s). (6.1)
For a price profile q ∈ RG, the utility of s-th bidder for acquiring G′s GUs is a quasi-linear
function defined as
us(G′s) = vs(G′s)−
∑
g∈G′s
q(g). (6.2)
It is assumed that there are no externalities on the valuation functions of the bidders.
Thus, the valuation of each bidder depends only on the set of items it acquires.
6.2.2 System Metric Design
The system metrics are similar to those defined in Section 5.2.3.
6.2.3 Bidders’ Valuation Functions
Prior to bidding, all SCAs have to determine their valuations on their favourite
GUs. With the assumption that all the GUs require the same QoS in terms of SINR
target and that the initial prices of all GUs are 0, the valuation function in the first
auction round/iteration will be achieved by solving the user admission control prob-
lem. This involves solving the user maximisation (PUM) and user admission (PUA)
problems. The QoS targets of the HUs and GUs at the s-th SCA are defined as
Ξs = [ξs1, . . . , ξ
s
Hs
, ξsHs+1, . . . , ξ
s
Fs
]. Following the procedures for deriving (5.3)-(5.7)
in Section 5.3.1, the optimisation will result into `1-norm user maximisation problem
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Ps−UM as in (5.14), which is restated here as
Ps−UM : minimise
{wh},{as}
‖as‖1
subject to

√
1 + 1ξsh
hHshwsh + a
s
h
hHshWs
σ
 SOC 0, h ∈ Fs,
=(hHshwsh) = 0, ∀h,
as = 0, h = 1, . . . ,Hs,
as ≥ 0, h = Hs + 1, . . . , Fs,∑
h∈Fs
‖wsh‖22 ≤ ϕmaxs , ∀h.
(6.3)
To build up a preference set of GUs Ps ⊆ Gs, the vector as is sorted in ascending
order. The corresponding indices of the sorted as with an exclusion of the index of HUs
give the preference profile fs. To build up an optimal favourite set G′s ⊆ Ps and to
determine the marginal values vsg for each g-th user, the GUs are sequentially admitted
beginning with the one corresponding to the smallest ash. This is done by checking for
feasibility at every admission by solving
Ps−UA : minimise
{wsh}
∑
∀h∈Hs∪g
‖wsh‖22
subject to SINRsh ≥ ξsh, ∀h ∈ Hs ∪ g,∑
∀h∈Hs∪g
‖wsh‖22 ≤ ϕmaxs .
(6.4)
When a newly admitted user makes the constraints in (6.4) infeasible, it is removed
from the set G′s. Note that in the first auction round/iteration, solving Ps−UM and
Ps−UA will give the favourite set with its corresponding marginal values. Essentially,
the favourite set G′s is determined using
G′s := argmax
Ps⊆G\As
{
vs(Hs ∪ Ps)−
∑
g∈As
q(g) +
∑
g∈Ps
(q(g) + δ)
}, (6.5)
where As is the already admitted GUs, and δ is the price increment. In SMRA and
ASMRA, (6.5) is used without alteration. In SCAIB, δ = 0 and q = 0, and in RCAIB,
δ = 0 and q(g) = argmax
∑
s∈Cg b
r
sgx
r
sg, where r is the auction round index. Note that if
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the prices of all the GUs on the auction are identical, the utility of an SCA is maximised
by admitting as many GUs as possible. Therefore, the very first favourite set is the
upper bound on the maximum number of GUs that an SCA can admit. This first
favourite set, denoted as Gˆs, forms a budget constraint on the bidder. In an iterative
auction, the cardinality of the favourite set can only decrease as the auction progresses.
During the auction, the prices are bound to be different, hence, the bidder is obliged
to determine the favourite set by exhaustively trying all the possible combinations of
the GUs available using (6.5). For a given favourite set G′s, the valuation process will
provide values that are downward-sloping such that vs1 ≥ vs2 ≥ · · · ≥ vsG′s . The total
valuation of the favourite set is given by vs(G′s) =
∑
g∈G′s vsg.
At every admission stage, the bidders determine the marginal value of the newly ad-
mitted GU. Let the charge per unit of the data rate paid by the every GU for connection,
and the cost per unit power, be denoted as µ and κ, respectively. The marginal value
of the admitted g-th GU is determined as
vsg = κ log2(1 + ξ
s
g)− csg, (6.6)
where the marginal cost csg, is given by
csg = µ
 ∑
∀k∈Hs∪g
‖ŵsk‖22 −
∑
∀h∈Hs
‖wsh‖22
 . (6.7)
In (6.7), ŵsk is the beamformer vector of the k-th HU given that GU g is admitted,
and wsh is the beamformer vector of the h-th HU before GU g is admitted. The first
term in (6.7) is the total power consumed after the connection of the g-th GU and the
last term is the total power consumption before g-th GU is admitted. Summing over all
users before and after admission, the valuation in (6.6) is expressed as
vs(g|Hs) = vs(Hs ∪ g)− vs(g) (6.8)
6.3 Surplus Maximisation Problem
The objective of the MBS is to maximise its surplus, which is measured in terms of
the number of users that are offloaded to the SCAs. The general surplus maximisation
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problem at the MBS can be cast as the following integer program (IP):
PIP : maximise
xsAs
S∑
s∈S
∑
As⊆G
vsAsxsAs
subject to:
∑
j∈As
∑
s
xsAs ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ G,
∑
As
xsAs ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S,
xsAs ∈ {0, 1}, ∀s ∈ S,As ⊆ G.
(6.9)
The first constraint ensures that every GU is matched with at most one SCA. The second
constraint ensures that every SCA should get at most one bundle. In the SMRA, the
objective will reduce to
∑
s∈S
∑
g∈G vsgxsg. In the CAIB, As(b) is used to denote the
allocation for a bid profile b. Let b = (bs,b−s) denote the bid profile where SCA s bids
bs and all other SCAs bid b−s = (b1, . . . ,bs−1,bs+1, . . . ,bS). In CAIB, the allocation
and payment rules require the GU to be matched with the highest bidder at a price equal
to the second highest bid. For a given allocation As(b) ⊆ G′s, the sum of the highest
bids are denoted by
Bhigh(As(b),b) =
∑
g∈As(b)
max
t
(bt(g)),
Bhigh−s (As(b),b−s) =
∑
g∈As(b)
max
t6=s
(bt(g)).
(6.10)
Using (6.2) and the second price rule, the utility of the s-th SCA is given by
us(b) = vs(As(b))−Bhigh−s (As(b),b−s). (6.11)
6.3.1 Existence of the Walrasian Equilibrium
In [58, 173], it is argued that if a WE exists, any efficient allocation must solve the
relaxed PIP. In order to address the existence of the WE in the SMRA and the CAIB,
the following definitions are required.
Definition 6.1 (Demand)
Given a valuation function vs(Gs) : 2Gs → R and a vector of prices q ∈ R, the
demand (Ds(vs,q)) of bidder s at the price of q is given by
Ds(vs,q) := {G′s ⊆ Gs : us(G′s) ≥ us(G†s), ∀G†s ⊂ Gs}. (6.12)
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Definition 6.2 (Allocation)
An allocation is a partition of G into pairwise disjoint sets of items A1,A2, . . . ,AS .
Definition 6.3 (Submodular Valuation)
Bidders utilities are deemed to be decreasing marginal utilities if the marginal value
of an item decreases as the number of already accumulated items increases. This is
equivalently defined via the submodular valuation definition. A valuation function
vs is submodular if for a pair G′s ⊆ G†s , and a GU g, vs(g|G′s) ≤ vs(g|G†s).
Definition 6.4 (Complementary Free)
A valuation function vs is complementary free if for all sets of items G′s and G†s , the
following holds:
vs(G′s) + vs(G†s) ≥ vs(G′s ∪ G†s). (6.13)
6.3.2 Submodularity of the Valuation Function
Theorem 6.1
The valuation function vs in (6.8) is a submodular valuation function.
Proof 7 In [174, 175], a valuation function vs is submodular if and only if any of the
following conditions hold.
1. Decreasing marginal utilities: For any g, g† ∈ G and G′s ⊆ G, then vs(g|G′s) ≥
vs(g|G′s ∪ {g†}).
2. Monotonicity: For any G′s,G†s ,G‡s ⊆ G, such that G′ ⊆ G†, then vs(G‡s |G′s) ≥
v(G‡s |G†s).
3. Complementary free: For any G′s,G†s ⊆ G, then vs(G′s) + v(G†s) ≥ vs(G′s ∪ G†s) +
v(G′s ∩ G†s).
It is sufficient to qualify for one of the conditions above. The decreasing marginal utilities
condition is considered. Using (4.9), define the wsh =
√
ϕhw˜sh, where ϕh is the power
and w˜sh is the unit-norm beamforming direction for the h-th HU. Further, denote power
allocation vector ϕs = [ϕ1, . . . , ϕHs ]. The SINR in (5.2) can be expressed as
SINRsh(ϕs) =
ϕh
Ih(ϕs) , (6.14)
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where
Ih(ϕs) = min‖w˜sh‖=1[Ψs(w˜sh)ϕs]h +
σh
|hHshw˜sh|2
. (6.15)
The constant link gain matrix (id est, a coupling matrix) Ψs for the s-th SCA is defined
as
[Ψs]sh(w˜sh) =

|hHshw˜sj |2
|hHshw˜sh|2
, j 6= h,
0, j = h.
(6.16)
It was proven in [110] and [109] that Ik(ϕs) is a standard function (also see Section 4.3.2).
Now, consider that the preference profiles of bidder s as Ps := {g1, g2, . . . , gu−1, gu, gu+1, . . . , gGs}.
Assume that during sequential admission of GUs, the set of HUs isHs := {g1, g2, . . . , gu−1}
with the corresponding power allocation vector of ϕHss . Assume that in the next admis-
sion, SCA s considers GU gu, with the resulting power allocation vector ϕ
gu|Hs
s . Due to
the monotonicity of Ik(ϕs) on ϕs and using (6.14), it is argued that 1Tϕgu|Hss ≥ 1TϕHss .
Now, suppose before admitting GU gu, bidder s admits GU gu+1 first. Note that GU gu+1
has equal or lower preference to bidder s as compared to GU gu. Denote the power alloca-
tion vector by ϕ
gu+1|Hs
s , when GU gu+1 is admitted first. With the same argument given
earlier, the new power allocation vector will satisfy 1Tϕ
gu+1|Hs
s ≥ 1Tϕgu|Hss ≥ 1TϕHss . If
GU gu is admitted after GU gu+1, with the corresponding power allocation vector being
ϕ
gu|Hs∪{gu+1}
s , it should be the case that 1Tϕ
gu|Hs∪{gu+1}
s ≥ 1Tϕgu+1|Hss ≥ 1Tϕgu|Hss ≥
1TϕHss .
Now by utilising (6.8) and (6.7), gives
vs(gu|Hs) = κ log2(1 + ξsgu)−
(
1Tϕgu|Hss − 1TϕHss
)
≥ κ log2(1 + ξsgu)−
(
1Tϕgu|Hs∪{gu+1}s − 1Tϕgu+1|Hss
)
= vs(gu|Hs ∪ gu+1)
(6.17)

Lemma 6.1
The valuation function vs is submodular for every subset Qs, and the marginal val-
uation function vs(·|Qs) is complementary free.
Proof 8 Using theorem 6.1, it is required to proof that for all G′s,G†s ∈ Gs, it is such
that vs(G′s) + v(G†s) ≥ vs(G′s ∪ G†s) + v(G′s ∩ G†s). Let Qs := G′s ∩ G†s , G¯′s := G′s \ Qs,
and G¯†s := G†s \ Qs. By using (6.1), define the following marginal values: vs(G′s) =
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vs(G¯′s|Qs) + vs(Qs), vs(G†s) = vs(G¯†s |Qs) + vs(Qs), vs(G′s ∪G†s) = vs(G¯′s ∪ G¯†s |Qs) + vs(Qs),
and vs(G′s ∩ G†s) = vs(Qs). The third condition of theorem 6.1 is equivalently written as
vs(G′s) + v(G†s) ≥ vs(G′s ∪ G†s) + v(G′s ∩ G†s)
⇒ vs(G¯′s|Qs) + vs(Qs) + vs(G¯†s |Qs) + vs(Qs) ≥ vs(G¯′s ∪ G¯†s |Qs) + vs(Qs) + vs(Qs)
⇒ vs(G¯′s|Qs) + vs(G¯†s |Qs) ≥ vs(G¯′s ∪ G¯†s |Qs).
(6.18)
This suggests that v(·|Qs) is complement free as per (6.13). With the properties of
the interference function given in (6.15), and the conclusion in (6.17), it is argued
that 1Tϕ
G¯′s|Qs
s ≤ 1TϕG¯
′
s∪G¯†s |Qs
s , 1Tϕ
G¯†s |Qs
s ≤ 1TϕG¯
′
s∪G¯†s |Qs
s , and 1Tϕ
G¯′s|Qs
s + 1Tϕ
G¯†s |Qs
s ≤
1Tϕ
G¯′s∪G¯†s |Qs
s . Thus, (6.18) is confirmed.
To conclude the proof, it is required to prove that for all Qs and G¯′s, G¯†s ⊆ Qcs, it
is such that vs(G¯′s|Qs) + vs(G¯†s |Qs) ≥ vs(G¯′s ∪ G¯†s |Qs). Let G′s = G¯′s ∪ Qs and G†s =
G¯†s ∪ Qs. With these definitions, the same marginal valuations as before are observed:
vs(G′s) = vs(G¯′s|Qs)+vs(Qs), vs(G†s) = vs(G¯†s |Qs)+vs(Qs), vs(G′s∪G†s) = vs(G¯′s∪G¯†s |Qs)+
vs(Qs), and vs(G′s∩G†s) = vs(Qs). Due to vs being a submodular function, the condition
vs(G¯′s|Qs)+vs(G¯†s |Qs) ≥ vs(G¯′s∪G¯†s |Qs) is equivalently written as vs(G¯′s|Qs)+vs(G¯†s |Qs) ≥
vs(G¯′s ∪ G¯†s |Qs). Use of the same arguments made above concludes the proof. 
6.3.3 Gross-substitute of the Valuation Function
A much stronger property of the valuation function is the gross-substitute condition.
Definition 6.5 (Walrasian Equilibrium)
In a market with G = |G| items, S = |S| agents, and valuations vs, a WE is a
price q? ∈ R+ and a partition of goods in disjoint sets G := ∪Ss=1As such that
As ∈ Ds(vs,q). The WE corresponds to the market-clearing prices where every
bidder receives a bundle in his demand set [50]. At WE the following conditions
must hold:
• Condition 1: Each bidder s is matched to its preferred item g ∈ argmax{vsg −
qg}g∈G∪{∅}.
• Condition 2: An item g ∈ G is unsold only if qg = 0.
Chapter 6. Multiple Item bidding Auctions for User Offloading in HetNets 134
Definition 6.6 (Gross Substitute Condition, Kelso and Crawford [176])
A valuation vs over the items Gs satisfies the gross substitution (GS) condition if
and only if for any price profile q ∈ R and G′s ∈ Ds(vs,q), if q′ is a price profile such
that q′ ≤ q, then there is a set G†s ∈ Ds(vs,q′) such that G′s∩{g : q(g) = q′(g)} ⊆ G†.
In brief, Definition 6.6 suggests that, if a bidder has GS valuation and demands a set G′s
of items at the price profile q, if the price of some of the items subsequently increase,
the bidder still demands some of the items in G′s whose price remained unchanged.
Proposition 6.1
The valuation function in (6.8) is a gross valuation function.
Proof 9 Fix a bidder s, vs and v−s. Let the corresponding marginal values for the
favourite set G′s be denoted as vs1, vs2, . . . , vsG′s . Suppose bidder s gets matched with
all the GUs in its favourite set at price vector q. Now, introduce a new bidder t who
has a favourite set G′t such that G′t ∩ G′s := {g2}. Assume that vsg ≥ vtg, g ∈ G′s \ g21.
Assuming truthful bidding, bidder s will loose GU g2 to bidder t as the price of GU g2
will increase. This change in allocation will result in a new power allocation vector ϕ†s
such that ϕ†s  ϕs, with ϕ†s(g2) = 0. The monotonicity axiom for (6.15) from [109,110]
is invoked, and it is stated that Ih(ϕs) ≥ Ih(ϕ†s). With this being true, loosing GU g2
will increase the marginal values of all other GUs in the favourite set G′s \ g2 and thus
making them more attractive to SCA s. 
6.3.4 Computation of the WE prices
The linear programming relaxation (LPR) of PIP is
PLPR : maximise
xpg
S∑
s=1
∑
As⊆G
vsAsxsAs
subject to:
∑
j∈As
∑
s
xsAs ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ G,
∑
As
xsAs ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S,
0 ≤ xsAs ≤ 1, As ∈ G, ∀s ∈ S
(6.19)
1It is assumed that all tie breaks are in favour of bidders s. In this proof, g2 is chosen to be the only
GU that bidder s lost. This is to simplify the proof.
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Even thoughPLPR has G+S variables, it has an exponential number of constraints. The
works in [58,173] propose solving the dual of PLPR by utilising separation based linear
programming algorithm. The dual linear programming relaxation (DLPR) is defined as
PDLPR :
minimise
xpg
S∑
s=1
us +
∑
g∈G
p(g)
subject to: us ≥ vs(As)−
∑
g∈As
p(g), ∀s ∈ S,As ∈ G,
p(g) ≥ 0, u(s) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, g ∈ G,
(6.20)
where p and us are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in PLPR.
For completeness, the following well known theorems are stated:
Theorem 6.2 (First Welfare Theorem [50])
Suppose (q,A1, . . . ,AS) is a WE, then the allocation (A1, . . . ,AS) maximises the
social welfare, id est, maximises
∑
s∈S vs(As).
Proof 10 Let Q =
∑
g∈G q(g) be the sum of prices of all GUs and let the alloca-
tion (A?1, . . . ,A?S) be any welfare maximising allocation. Since As ∈ D(vs,q), then by
utilising condition 1 of Definition 6.5, the following holds
vs(As)− q(As) ≥ vs(A?s)− q(A?s). (6.21)
Summing over all s yields
∑
s∈S
vs(As)−
∑
s∈S
q(As) ≥
∑
s∈S
vs(A?s)−
∑
s∈S
q(A?s). (6.22)
When summing over all GUs that have non-zero price, it concludes that
∑
s∈S vs(As) ≥∑
s∈S vs(A?s). 
Theorem 6.2 is complemented by the Second Welfare Theorem via the duality theorem
in linear programming.
Theorem 6.3 (Second Welfare Theorem [50])
Suppose an optimal solution for PLPR exists, then a WE whose allocation is the
given solution also exists.
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Proof 11 Let the optimal allocation to PLPR be (A?1, . . . ,A?S). Suppose the op-
timal solution to PDLPR is given by (p?, u?1, . . . , u
?
S). It is required to show that
(p?,A?1, . . . ,A?S) is a WE. Since KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for the
optimality to PLPR and PDLPR, then for each SCA for which xsA?s > 0, it is such that
xsA?s = 0 in P
LPR and us = vs(A?s) −
∑
g∈A?s p
?(g) in PDLPR being true. Therefore,
for any other bundle As
us = vs(A?s)−
∑
g∈A?s
p?(g) ≥ vs(As)−
∑
g∈As
p?(g). (6.23)

Theorem 6.3 means that, if (p,A1, . . . ,AS) is a WE and (A?1, . . . ,A?S) maximises the
surplus
∑
s∈S vs(A?s), then (p,A?1, . . . ,A?S) is also a WE. Both theorems 6.2 and 6.3
suggest that the WE exists if there is strong duality betweenPLPR andPDLPR. In order
to solve PDLPR, two ascending auction algorithms (SMRA) and two CAIB algorithms,
based on the Walras’ tatoˆnnement (id est, trial and error) procedure [177], are proposed.
6.4 The SMRA and CAIB Algorithms
First the iterative SMRA and ASMRA algorithms are proposed. These two algo-
rithms enable SCAs to preserve privacy of the valuations. Furthermore, two variations
of the CAIB are proposed. Initially, a sequential CAIB (SCAIB), wherein the auction-
eer runs different CAIB in a sequential manner, is proposed. In this setting, a bidder is
allowed to submit a bid on a particular item only once for the entire auction. Finally, a
repetitive CAIB (RCAIB) is proposed. In RCAIB, bidders are allowed to correct their
bids by rebidding on items, for as long as they believe they constitute their favourite
item set.
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6.4.1 The Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction Mecha-
nism
Algorithm 7 describes how to compute WE using an SMRA. First, define a conditional
bidding set2 Gis at every iteration3 i as the set that contains all the GUs that bidder
s wishes to bid on given that it has admitted the provisional set As. The assumption
is that bidder s automatically bid on each GU g ∈ As. In this regard, any bidder is
not allowed to withdraw its bid on any GU that it has been matched with. For an
SCA to relinquish a GU, one of its competitors has to outbid it on that GU. The MBS
predefines the set on which each SCA can bid on by setting the auction coverage area for
each bidder to αςs, where α is the scaling factor and ςs is the SCA’s nominal coverage
area. The prices of all the GUs are initialised as q(g) = 0, ∀g ∈ G. The initial contact
set T contains all SCAs with at least one auctioned GU in their auction coverage area.
The set G of GUs that are on the auction is initialised as all MUs that fall within the
auction coverage areas of all SCAs. For all SCAs, the provisional set As, the conditional
set Gis, the loose set Ls are initialised as empty sets.
The Algorithm 7 iterates as follows: The MBS invites all bidders in the contact
set T to indicate their conditional bidding sets. Each SCA submits their conditional
bidding sets Gis ⊆ Gs \ As to the MBS, with the assumption that the price of each GU
g ∈ Gs \ As has price qi(g) = qi−1(g) + δ. The prices for all GUs g ∈ As are assumed
to be unchanged, id est, qi(g) = qi−1(g). In step 7 to step 16, the MBS updates the
provisional sets by randomly allocating a GU to any bidder that is interested in it. In
cases when there is a tie, the winner is picked randomly. The MBS then updates the
prices of all the GUs that are over demanded and updates the contact set.
Now suppose the current set of competitors for GU g is empty. This implies that
GU g does not appear in any of the conditional sets, g /∈ ∪Ss=1Gis. The price for GU g is
set to qi+1(g) = qi(g) and the provisional winner remains unchanged, id est, if g ∈ As
during iteration i then g ∈ As in iteration i + 1. If |Cg| = 1, supply equals demand,
then GU g is matched with the SCA s ∈ Cg. Otherwise if |Cg| > 1, then GU g is over
demanded. Under this condition the GU g changes hands by a random assignment to
2Conditional bidding set is the favourite set. The conditional bidding set is sometimes referred to as
the conditional bid.
3The terms iteration and round are reserved to describe the state of an iterative auction and a
sequential auction, respectively.
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Algorithm 7: SMRA Algorithm
Data: Initialisation: δ > 0, q(g) = 0, ∀g ∈ G, (S,G) ∈ Z+, GUs’
set G := ∪Ss=1Gs, assignment set As = ∅, ∀s ∈ S, lost items
set Ls = ∅, ∀s ∈ S, Gis = ∅, ∀s ∈ S, auction round : i = 0.
Result: Optimal Allocation set A?s, ∀s ∈ S.
1 while T 6= ∅|| ∪Ss=1 Gis 6= ∅ do
2 i← i+ 1
3 Auctioneer asks each bidder for its conditional bidding set Gis.
4 Bidders determines new preference profiles and marginal
values for their favourite subset Gis (using (6.5)) of items not
assigned to them, given the admitted GUs and the current
prices qi.
5 Bidders submit their conditional bidding set.
6 Auctioneer set T = ∅, Ls = ∅
7 for g ∈ ∪Ss=1Gis do
8 if |Cig| > 1 then
9 pick a random bidder s: As ← As ∪ g
10 ∀k 6= s, Ak ← Ak \ g, T ← T ∪ ∀k 6= s
11 Lk ← g,∀k ∈ Cig \ s
12 qi+1(g)← qi(g) + δ
13
else if |Cig| = 1 then
14 As ← As ∪ g, G ← G \ g
15 else
16 pick a random winner s from subset of the bidders in
T : As ← As ∪ g
a bidder in the set Cg, with the exception of its previous provisional winner. The same
process becomes repeated until the contact set is empty or when the conditional bidding
sets of all bidders become empty.
6.4.2 Altered SMRA Algorithm
Note that in Algorithm 7, for the SCAs to maximise their utilities, they are forced
to exhaustively check for every possible bundle in Gs in every iteration. This could be
computationally costly on both the bidders and the auctioneer. To reduce the overheads
incurred by the SCAs during valuation, the MBS use the activity rule as follows: once
a bidder places a bid on a GU g, it must commit to bid on that GU g in every iteration.
Otherwise if an SCA fails to submit a bid on GU g, then this SCA is erased from the
competitors set Cg and it cannot join later. Therefore a bidder is forced to commit
bidding to its current favourite set until it loses at least one of the GUs. The SCAs are
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Algorithm 8: ASMRA Algorithm
Data: See Algorithm 7.
Result: See Algorithm 7.
1 while T 6= ∅|| ∪Ss=1 Gis 6= ∅ do
2 Algorithm 7 steps 2-3.
3 if Ls 6= ∅||i = 1 then
4 Algorithm 7 step 4.
else
5 for g ∈ Gi−1s do
6 if vsg > q(g) then
7 Gis ← g
8 else
9 Gis ← Gi−1s \ g
10 Algorithm 7 Steps 5 - 16.
only allowed access to the prices of the GUs they are currently bidding on. Once an
SCA registers a lose, the MBS reveals all the prices of the GUs in its remainder set to
that particular SCA. The favourite set can now be augmented with new favourite GUs
in the remainder set Rs := Ps \ Gˆs. For as long as bidder does not exceed its budget,
it is allowed to bid on the remainder set Rs whenever a lose occurs. The ASMRA is
summarised in Algorithm 8.
6.4.3 The CAIB Algorithms
Two different CAIB under the second price mechanism are proposed. Even though
the second price mechanism has dominant strategies under single-item auction, it is
unlikely to expect the same property to hold under CA [171]. In [171], the authors
analysed price of anarchy in a non-truthful combinatorial auction when bidders have
subadditive (id est, submodular) valuations. In the proposed algorithms, it is assumed
that the bidders are truthful. Firstly,a sequential CAIB (SCAIB), where the auctioneer
runs separate CAIB in a sequential manner, is proposed. Secondly, a repeated CAIB
(RCAIB), wherein the MBS runs a CAIB repetitively, is studied. Note that in SCAIB,
once an SCA s has acquired GU g, it cannot be auctioned again unless it is a case such
that g ∈ Rt, t ∈ Cg \ s. In contrast, in RCAIB environment, the MBS posit the winning
bid to all potential bidders. Therefore, if any of the potential bidders is able to outbid
the provisional winner, the GU is reassigned to the new provisional winner. This process
is repeated until no new conditional bids are received from the SCAs.
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Algorithm 9: SCAIB Algorithm
Data: Initialisation: q(g) = 0, ∀g ∈ G, (S,G) ∈ Z+, GUs’
set G := ∪Ss Gs, assignment set As = ∅,∀s ∈ S, lost
items set Ls = ∅,∀s ∈ S, Gis = ∅, ∀s ∈ S, auction
number : r = 0.
Result: Optimal Allocation set A?s,∀s ∈ S.
1 while T 6= ∅|| ∪Ss=1 Grs 6= ∅ do
2 r ← r + 1
3 MBS invites SCAs to submit bids, ∀s ∈ T .
4 if Ls 6= ∅||r = 1 then
5 Bidders determines new preference profiles and
valuations for their favourite subset Grs (using
(6.5)) of items in the remainder set Rs given the
admitted GUs.
6 MBS collects bids from SCAs ∀s ∈ T .
7 Auctioneer set T = ∅, Ls = ∅
8 for g ∈ ∪Ss=1Grs do
9 if |Crg | > 1 then
10 pick the current bidder s with the highest bid:
As ← As ∪ g
11 ∀k 6= s, Ak ← Ak \ g, contact only bidders who
have submitted a bid T ← T ∪ ∀k 6= s
12 Lk ← g,∀k ∈ Crg \ s
else
As ← As ∪ g, G ← G \ g
6.4.4 Sequential Combinatorial Auction With Item Bidding
Similar initialisations as in Algorithm 7 are carried out in Algorithm 9. Unlike in
the SMRA, here the MBS does not post prices. Instead the MBS runs several single
shot CAIB sequentially. In every CAIB, an SCA in the contact set sends bids on its
conditional bidding set. An SCA can only bid on a GU at most once. In step 9, if a
GU g has a competitors set such that Cg 6= ∅, and it appears in at least one conditional
bidding set g ∈ Gs, ∀s ∈ Cg, then it is provisionally assigned to the highest bidder at
price equal the second highest bid. The provisional bidder will remain assigned to this
GU if no competitor outbids it in the successive auction rounds. After losing some of
its favourite GUs in the previous round, an SCA may advance some of the GUs from
its reminder set to form an entirely new conditional bidding set. Due to the budget
constraint, it is clear that the conditional bidding sets will diminish as the number of
CAIB are being run. Once no new conditional bids are submitted the SCAIB halts.
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Algorithm 10: RCAIB Algorithm
Data: See Algorithm 7.
Result: See Algorithm 7.
1 while T 6= ∅|| ∪Ss=1 Gis 6= ∅ do
2 i← i+ 1
3 MBS invites SCAs to submit bids, ∀s ∈ T .
4 Algorithm 8 step 3 - 9.
5 Algorithm 9 steps 6 - 7
6 for g ∈ ∪Ss=1Gis do
7 Algorithm 9 steps 9 - 12
8 qi+1(g)← argmax ∑
s∈Cig
brsgx
r
sg
6.4.5 Repetitive Combinatorial Auction with Item Bidding
The RCAIB is summarised in Algorithm 10. The prices of all the GUs are initialised
to zero. In the very first iteration, the MBS collects bids on bidders favourite sets. The
MBS allocates a GU to the current highest bidder. In the successive iterations, the MBS
use the current standing highest bid on a GU as the reserve price for that item. If an
SCAs loses some of its favourites GUs, the marginal values of the accumulated GUs in
its provisional set increases due to reduced interference. This creates capacity for a new
conditional bidding set. In step 4 the SCAs determine their new bidding sets which may
contain the GUs that were previously lost. Therefore it is possible for an SCA to recoup
a GU after it was lost to a competitor. This process is repeated until no new conditional
set is available.
6.5 Bidding Strategies
In order for an auction to accurately discover the market prices, truthful bidding
should at least be guaranteed. In all auctions, unfaithfulness can manifest if any SCA
has knowledge about the preference sets of its competitors. However, as it is difficult
for any SCA to acquire preference profiles of other SCAs. This possibility is excluded
in the mechanism design and analysis. Unfortunately, SMRA has two setbacks that
may encourage bidders to deviate from their truthfully bidding strategies. In [172] it
is claimed that if the valuation function of bidders satisfy gross-substitute condition,
then truthful bidding becomes compatible with SMRA for any price trajectory. But
due the demand reduction and sniping issues in the ascending auctions, truthful bidding
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is unlikely to occur. Demand reduction is a bidder request for fewer items in order to
lower competition, hence maximises its utilities. Snipping is when a bidder observe the
activities in the auction, without participation and then later makes an offer. In the
SMRA, the bidder use the local improvement method wherein a bidder add, delete or
replaces items. This strategy has proven to find the optimal demand set when the valua-
tion functions are gross-substitutes [60]. In SMRA an SCA’s strategy can be influenced
by what it can infer from the auction history. In iterative auctions like the SMRA, the
action sets of bidders can be history-dependent and as a result these sets get quite rich.
The information learned by a bidder from his sequence of provisional sets of items, his
sequence of conditional bids, and the price trajectory will have great influence on his
bidding strategy function. The strategy of a bidder is defined as the function that maps
the bidder’s valuation to any of other bidders’ possible actions.
Definition 6.7
Let V1, . . . ,VS be the possible private valuations of the bidders. A strategy profile s =
[s1 · · · sS ] is an ex-post Nash equilibrium (EPNE) if, for every SCA s and valuation
vs ∈ Vs, the action s(vs) is the best-response to every action profile s−s(v−s) where
v−s ∈ V−s [50].
Now, the focus is to analyse if sincere bidding, as a strategy profile, can lead to an
equilibrium. First, assume that all bidders are ex-post individual-rational. That is,
bidders play risk-free strategies in order to avoid getting negative utilities. Authors
in [178] argued that if bidders are ex-post individually-rational, and have submodular
valuation functions, then every mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian auction
(id est, auctions in which valuations are private) provides a 2-approximation4 to the
optimal social welfare.
6.5.1 Individual Rational Bidding
With the assumption of ex-post individual rationality, an SCA will never take action
that will result in negative utility. Define a bidding strategy to be supportive if it is
individual rational.
4An algorithm is referred to as an approximation algorithm if it produce a solution that is guarantee
to be within a some approximation factor k. Therefore 2-approximation algorithm gives a solution within
a factor of 2 of the optimum solution.
Chapter 6. Multiple Item bidding Auctions for User Offloading in HetNets 143
Definition 6.8
Given the s-th SCA with provisional set Ais at iteration i, a conditional bid Gis is
secure if for any given A′s ⊆ Ais ∪ Gis, it is a case such that vs(A′s) ≥ q(A′s).
Proposition 6.2
Denote Ais, Gis, and qi as the provisional set, the conditional bidding set, and the
price profile at iteration i ∈ Z+ with i ≤ iˆ. If an SCA makes a non-secure bid during
iteration iˆ, then there exist secure SCAs who can bid consistently with the history
such that SCA s gets a negative utility in the final allocation.
Proof 12 Assume all other SCAs other than SCA s bid sincerely. Suppose that the
s-th SCA bid inconsistently on a particular GU g and finally acquires it5. Define the
maximum possible marginal value of GU g ∈ Gs \ Ais as vˆsg = vs(∅ ∪ g). Suppose GU g
has the highest preference amongst all other GUs in the set G iˆs, then the marginal value
of GU g during iteration iˆ is viˆsg = vs(Ais ∪ g) − vs(g). Then the GU g will contribute
maximum utility of usg = v
iˆ
sg−q(g) to the total utility us = vs(As)−
∑
g∈Gs q(g) earned
by SCA s. If bidder s bids inconsistently during iteration iˆ with vˆsg < q(g), then there
exist at least one SCA t ∈ Cg \ s who values GU g more. One of the following outcomes
are feasible at the end of the auction:
us =

u−s = usg, if A?s := g,
u−s , if A?s := G iˆs ∪ g, |usg| > |usG iˆs |,
u+s ≤ ucs, if A?s := G iˆs ∪ g, |usg| ≤ |usG iˆs |,
(6.24a)
(6.24b)
(6.24c)
where u−s means the utility is negative, u+s means the utility is positive and ucs is the
utility attained by bidding consistently and securely. The first case in (6.24a) follows
immediately from the fact that vˆsg < q(g). The second case in (6.24b) suggests that
if the absolute utility from winning GU g is greater than the absolute utility of other
admitted GUs Gs, then bidder s will get a negative utility. The third case in (6.24c)
shows that bidder s might achieve a positive utility but the achievable utility cannot
exceed that under consistent bidding. The proof shows that bidding securely is the best
response for SCA s. 
5This proof can easily be extend to a case where the SCA bids inconsistently on a set of GUs. For
simplicity, only one GU is chosen.
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Proposition 6.2 carries forward to the ASMRA. Note that in ASMRA, if an SCA under-
bids on a particular GU so that it has access to the prices of the GUs in the remainder
set, it is not allowed to rebid on that particular GU at a later stage. It will be a very
risky move for an SCA to underbid on any of the GUs in the current conditional bidding
set as the prices of the GUs in the remainder set may be very high.
Proposition 6.3
Truthful bidding is individual rationality in the SCAIB and the RCAIB.
Proof 13 The proof below is for the SCAIB but it can easily be extended to RCAIB.
Consider an SCA s during auction round r with conditional bidding set Grs . An SCA
can have a truthful bidding function vcs that arranges the GUs in the set Grs according
to their preference order and computes the truthful marginal values. On the other, the
marginal values can be computed using another function vus . For example, the function
vus could map the GUs to the values different from those that they will have when vcs is
used, simply by changing their order of preference. Both valuation functions will have
the following cases: SCA s
1. bids truthful and consistently according to the valuation function,
2. underbids on at least one of the GUs,
3. overbids on at least one of the GUs,
4. underbids and overbids on two different sets of GUs.
It is assumed that, there exists a set of competitors who have the conditional bidding
set Grs as a subset of their conditional bidding sets. Fix a set Yrs ⊆ Grs which contains
the GUs that an SCA s underbids/overbids on. The following cases are possible:
• Case 1: If an SCA bids truthfully, and consistently using the valuation function
vcs , it gets a utility of u
c
s(bs) = v
c
s(As(bs))−Bhigh−s (As(bs),b−s).
• Case 2: If an SCA underbids with
¯
bs, then there is a possibility that another SCA
will outbid it on some of the GUs in Yrs . Since the allocation is monotone in b,
then As(
¯
bs) ⊆ As(bs). Note that if an SCA loses some of the GUs YrLs ⊂ Yrs , then
the marginal values of the remaining GUs in Grs \As(¯bs) will increase. Denote the
total increase of the marginal values by rs, and the utility contributed by the set
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YrLs as us(YrLs ). If rs > us(YrLs ), the auction may suffer from demand reduction.
Demand reduction is more prominent in iterative and sequential auctions wherein
bidders use history reliant strategies for their next move. Fortunately the SCAIB
uses one shot auctions in a sequential manner, therefore use of demand reduction
could be very risky. Moreover, in SCAIB, if the SCAs use demand reduction to
maximise their profit during auction r, they will simulate a reduction on their
budget, which is learned by the MBS in the first auction round, thereby reducing
the number GUs they can bid on in the forthcoming auction rounds. The attained
utility for underbidding is ucs(¯
bs) = v
c
s(As(¯bs))−B
high
−s (As(¯bs),b−s).
• Case 3: If an SCA overbids with b¯s, then there is a possibility that it could
outbid its competitors on some of the GUs in Yrs , and attain a set YrWs ⊆ Yrs
in the allocation set As(b¯s) such that As(
¯
bs) ⊆ As(bs) ⊆ As(b¯s). The utility
contributed by the set YrWs is us(YrWs ). By overbidding, the utility of SCA s is
ucs(b¯s) = v
c
s(As(b¯s))−Bhigh−s (As(b¯s),b−s).
• Case 4: Suppose an SCA submits a bid profile
¯
b¯s with underbids and overbids.
First, denote the sets which an SCA s underbids and overbids on as Y¯rs ⊂ Yrs and
Y¯rs ⊂ Yrs , respectively. Further, denote the sets of GUs that an SCA s lose and win
for underbidding and overbidding as Y¯rLs and Y¯rWs , respectively in the allocation set
As(
¯
b¯s). The resulting utility is given by u
c
s(¯
b¯s) = v
c
s(As(¯b¯s))−B
high
−s (As(¯b¯s),b−s).
At the end of the auction round, the pay-off received by SCA s is given in (6.32).
Underbidding can lead to demand reduction as shown in (6.32a). Note that an SCA
cannot improve its utility by overbidding during a particular auction round. In (6.32f)
and (6.32h), if |us(Y rWs )| > |us(As(b¯s)| or |us(Y¯ rWs )| > |us(As(¯b¯s)| then the utility of
an SCA will be negative. Therefore the latter strategies are not supportive. Failure to
maximise the utility during a particular auction round by unfaithful bidding will result
in more utility loss in the forthcoming rounds because of the increased prices on the GUs
and the decreasing valuations. When an SCA uses the bidding function vus , then an SCA
will have a combination of overbidding and underbidding. Following the same arguments
stated above, there will be no improvement on the utility by unfaithful bidding. 
Since overbidding is not individual rational, strong no-overbidding assumption used in
[178,179] is assumed.
Chapter 6. Multiple Item bidding Auctions for User Offloading in HetNets 146
urs =

ucs(¯
bs) > u
c
s(bs), if As(¯bs) ⊂ As(bs), 
r
s > us(Y rLs ),
ucs(¯
bs) < u
c
s(bs), if As(¯bs) ⊂ As(bs), 
r
s < us(Y rLs ),
ucs(¯
bs) = u
c
s(bs), if As(¯bs) := As(bs),
or if As(
¯
bs) ⊆ As(bs), rs = us(Y rLs ),
ucs(b¯s) = u
c
s(bs), if As(b¯s) := As(bs),
ucs(b¯s) < u
c
s(bs), if As(bs) ⊂ As(b¯s), us(Y rWs ) < 0,
ucs(¯
b¯s) < u
c
s(bs), if As(¯b¯s) ⊂ As(bs), 
r
s < us(Y¯ rLs ), Y¯ rWs := ∅,
or if As(
¯
b¯s) ⊂ As(bs), rs ≤ us(Y¯ rLs ),
us(Y¯ rWs ) < 0,
or if As(
¯
b¯s) ⊂ As(bs), us(Y¯ rWs ) < 0, Y¯ rLs ; = ∅,
ucs(¯
b¯s) = u
c
s(bs), if As(¯b¯s) := As(bs),
or if rs = us(Y¯ rLs ), Y¯ rWs := ∅,
ucs(¯
b¯s) > u
c
s(bs), if As(¯b¯s) ⊂ As(bs), 
r
s > us(Y¯ rLs ), Y¯ rWs := ∅,
or if As(
¯
b¯s) ⊂ As(bs), rs > us(Y¯ rLs ),
rs > |us(Y¯ rWs )|.
(6.32a)
(6.32b)
(6.32c)
(6.32d)
(6.32e)
(6.32f)
(6.32g)
(6.32h)
(6.32i)
(6.32j)
(6.32k)
(6.32l)
(6.32m)
6.6 Numerical Example
The setup used in Section 5.5 is used here. In order to reduce the computational com-
plexity and the system overheads, the price increment in the SMRA and ASMRA were
adapted using δ = 0.001 × (target data rate)/(0.5)[bits/s/Hz]. The model parameters
are summarised in Table 5.2.
The results in Figure 6.2 gives the topographical overview of the network after running
the SMRA, the ASMRA, the SCAIB and the RCAIB algorithms when the target QoS
of all the MUs was set to 8 bits/s/Hz. The green squares and the red dots indicate the
locations of the admitted MUs and the dropped MUs, respectively. The HUs locations
are indicated by the blue dots. Those users served by the SCAs are explicitly indicated
by connecting the users with the corresponding SCA using blue lines. All admitted users
without connecting lines are served by the MBS. Figure 6.2a and Figure 6.2b show the
results of the SMRA and the ASMRA, respectively. Since the ASMRA is the sub-optimal
version of the SMRA, it is observed that the ASMRA sometimes to fail to associate users
to the closest SCAs. This is observed between SCA-1 and SCA-3, between SCA-22 and
SCA-23, and between SCA-21 and SCA-24. The reason is that in the ASMRA, since
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(a) User allocation under SMRA.
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(b) User allocation under ASMRA.
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(c) User allocation under SCAIB.
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(d) User allocation under RCAIB.
Figure 6.2: Comparison of user association under different auctions.
an SCA is confined to bid on a particular set of GUs until it experiences a lose, by the
time it bids on the GUs in its remainder set, the cheapest GUs may be further away.
The user admission results for the SCAIB and the RCAIB are shown in Figure 6.2c
and Figure 6.2d. In these figures, another pattern of user association is observed. Even
though these two algorithms provide a very similar user association pattern, a difference
is observed between SCA-21 and SCA-24. It is further observed that for this partic-
ular channel realisation, all four algorithms admit the same set of users, but the user
association to various SCAs may differ. These close performances are explained by the
sub-modularity and gross-substitute characteristics of the valuation functions.
6.6.1 General Performance of the proposed Algorithms
In Figure 6.3, the performances of the SMRA, the ASMRA, the SCAIB and the
RCAIB are averaged over 20 random channel realisations. Since the BBWA with FPP
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Figure 6.3: Average performance of the proposed BBWA and FBWA for 20 channel
realisations. There are 100 MUs and 25 SCAs.
criterion is the recommended solution from Chapter 5, it is used here as a benchmark.
Figure 6.3a shows the average of the total admitted MUs/GUs by the SCAs and the MBS.
The dotted line shows the average admitted MUs in the absence of auctioning. The solid
lines depicts the performance of the proposed algorithms. It is observed that there is
a huge improvement on user admission when the SCAs are taking part in the auction.
Even though the performances of SMRA, ASMRA, SCAIB and RCAIB are relatively
close, it is observed that SCAIB always gives highest user admission performance at
lower target rates. At higher target data rates, the two CAIB algorithms outperforms
SMRA and ASMRA algorithms. This is because in CAIB algorithms, the MBS and the
SCAs learn the market price of a particular GU earlier, hence providing the SCAs with
a chance to explore other cheaper GUs earlier. The average performance of SMRA and
ASMRA are equal.
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In comparison with the BBWA with FPP criterion that was proposed in Chapter 5, it
is observed that the BBWA with FPP criterion matches the performance of the SCAIB
at lower targets rates. At higher target rate, the BBWA with FPP criterion matches the
performance of the SMRA and the ASMRA. The Figure 6.3b depicts the total number
of dropped MUs. As expected, and for the same reasons stated earlier, CAIB algorithms
have the lowest dropped number of users as compared to SMRA and ASMRA.
Figure 6.3c illustrates the revenue generated by the MBS from the payments made
by the MUs and the SCAs. The left y-axis is for the BBWA with FPP criterion and the
right y-axis is for the various algorithms proposed in this chapter. The MUs’ payments
are explicitly from the MUs that are admitted by the MBS. Though very minimal,
the differences between the revenues earned from MUs, under the proposed algorithms,
suggest that the sets of MUs left behind after auctioning are different from one auction to
the other. From the graphs depicting the revenues generated from the SCAs’ payments,
the SCAs make the lowest payments to the MBS under SMRA and more payments
under ASMRA. This is because by forcing the SCAs to commit to a bidding set until
there is a lose, ramps up the competition and ultimately increases payments for bidder
under ASMRA. Note that by conducting an auction, the MBS generates more revenue
as compared to when it greedily serves the MUs alone. The BBWA with FPP criterion
always generate more income to the MBS. This is because the set from which the critical
bid (or payment) is being pulled from (id est the competitors’ set) is very rich in the
BBWA with FPP criterion.
The revenues generated by the SCAs under the SMRA, ASMRA, SCAIB and RCAIB
algorithms, are illustrated in Figure 6.3d. At lower target data rates, the revenues earned
by the SCAs under all the proposed algorithms are almost equal. It is noted that in
SMRA, the SCAs are able to generate highest revenue in the data rate range from 6
to 16 bits/s/Hz. This is due to the local improvement method which is not present in
SCAIB. The effect of the local improvement method in RCAIB is weaker, and much
weaker in ASMRA, hence depriving the SCAs from maximising their profits especially
at moderate target rates. Nonetheless, it is observed that the revenue generated under
CAIB and SCAIB is more than that of SMRA and ASMRA at lower and higher target
data rates when the competition is respectively higher or lower. This due to the quick
price discovery in CAIB algorithms, which allows SCAs to quickly discover GUs with
less competition, and lower prices. Ultimately the payments to the MBS are reduced.
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It is observed that ASMRA always generate the lowest revenue. This is because the
SCAs are not allowed to explore other opportunities until they experience a lose on the
set they are bidding on. Since in the BBWA with FPP criterion, bidders make more
payments to the MBS, their profit is very low as compared to the SMRA, ASMRA,
SCAIB and RCAIB algorithms.
Figure 6.4a and Figure 6.4b show the average transmission powers at the MBS and
SCAs, respectively, under the utilisation of SMRA, ASMRA, SCAIB, and RCAIB. In
Figure 6.4a, SMRA and the ASMRA lead to the same transmission power. This is
because these two algorithms perform equally in terms of the admitted and the dropped
GUs, respectively. The transmission power of the MBS under SMRA and the ASMRA
are comparable to that of RCAIB at lower target rates. At high target data rates, the
transmission power of SMRA and ASMRA are comparable to that of SCAIB. Note that
when there is no auctioning, the MBS will utilise more power relative to the admitted
MUs. In Figure 6.4b, RCAIB has the least transmission power, while SMRA has the
most transmission power. This suggests that the under RCAIB, the SCAs chose the
GUs that are closer to them while under SMRA, the SCAs chose the GUs that are
further away from them. This reveals the effect of the local improvement method in
SMRA, which allows the SCAs to identify cheaper GUs. Usually GUs that are further
away are likely to have lower prices. The performance of ASMRA and SCAIB, in terms
of the transmission power, lies between that of SMRA and RCAIB.
Figure 6.4c and Figure 6.4d show the number of auction rounds/iterations and the
system overheads under each auction. The overheads are measured in terms of the
number of invitations for bidding, number of bids submitted and the number of an-
nouncements made. SMRA and ASMRA use the left y-axes, while SCAIB and CAIB
use the right y-axes. In Figure 6.4c, the number of iterations/rounds reduces as the
target data rates are increased. This is because at high target data rates, the GUs
(mainly those further away from the SCAs) get less attractive, which induce decou-
pled preference sets. Ultimately the SCAs will drop out of the auction quickly, thereby
increasing the convergence rate. Note that in SMRA and ASMRA, the smaller the
price increment δ, the higher the number of iterations. This will be even worse when
the values of the GUs are increased. Earlier, it was specified that δ is adapted us-
ing δ = 0.001 × (target data rate)/(0.5)[bits/s/Hz]. If the price increment is fixed to
δ = 0.001, the number of iterations required in SMRA and ASMRA can reach 104, at
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of SMRA, ASMRA, SCAIB, and RCAIB in terms of number
of auction iterations/rounds and system overheads.
target rate between 5 bits/s/Hz and 10 bits/s/Hz. In Figure 6.4c the highest iterations
required is 52. SCAIB and RCAIB registered maximum of 3.5 auction rounds/iterations.
This is for the same reason explained earlier that in CAIB algorithms, the rate of price
discovery is very high, therefore the auctions quickly reach the WE. The same course is
observed in Figure 6.4d. SMRA and ASMRA have large system overheads as compared
to SCAIB and RCAIB. This is because in SMRA and ASMRA, the price are increased
with a very small value in every iteration.
Due to the one bid per round rule in the BBWA with FPP criterion, it is observed
that the BBWA with FPP criterion requires more auction rounds as compared to SCAIB
and RCAIB. But since the SCAIB and the RCAIB use combinatorial bids, they incur
more system overheads as compared to the BBWA with FPP criterion. As a remark, it
is observed that the number iterations/rounds are linked to the system overheads. But,
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of SMRA, ASMRA, SCAIB, and RCAIB and the centralised
solution.
since the SMRA and the ASMRA use the same payment rule, it is observed that the
ASMRA incur less system overheads than the SMRA even when the number of iterations
are identical. This is due to the altering rule in the ASMRA that prevents bidders from
exploring other GUs until there is a loss in the provisional bidding set Gs.
The performance given above clearly shows that by using auctioning mechanism
to offload users from the macrocell to the SCAs, there is gain in user admission and
revenue. From the results, CAIB algorithms outperform SMRA and ASMRA in almost
all performance measurements. Though SMRA generates more profit for the SCAs, its
benefits are overshadowed by the costs incurred in system overheads and computational
complexity. In terms of surplus maximisation, SCAIB is the most preferred. Since
SCAIB always generate the second highest revenues for the SCAs, the SCAs will prefer
SCAIB.
6.6.2 Optimality of the Proposed Algorithms
The proposed algorithms were compared to a centralised solution proposed in [149],
which uses the branch-and-bound (BnB) method to solve the admission and user associ-
ation problems. In order to reduce the computational burden for the centralised system,
a network with 6 GUs and 2 SCAs is considered. The system parameters of the SCAs
and the GUs remain unaltered. Figure 6.5a shows the user admission performance of
the auctions proposed here and the centralised solution. All the proposed algorithms
match the performance of the centralised solution at lower target data rates. At higher
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data rates, all the proposed algorithms attain reduced user admission as compared to
the centralised solution. This is because in auction based algorithms, the SCAs objec-
tive is to maximise their profits, whereas in the centralised solution, the objective of the
SCAs is user maximisation. In Figure 6.5b, it is observed that at lower target rates,
SCAIB transmission power is higher than that of the other auctions. This is for the same
reasons explained earlier. Therefore, SCAIB has a shortfall in associative efficiency at
lower target data rates. At higher data rates all the proposed algorithms utilise the same
amount of power for the same number of admitted GUs. Moreover, as expected, it is
noted that the centralised solution, is more power efficient as compared to the proposed
algorithms67.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated a joint offloading and downlink beamformer problem
in heterogeneous networks. The offloading problem was formulated as a combinatorial
auction which readily provides decentralised algorithms. Various algorithms namely;
SMRA, ASMRA, SCAIB, and RCAIB algorithms have been proposed to offer incen-
tivised offloading mechanisms. In these algorithms, the SCAs design downlink beam-
formers during their valuations. The analysis proved the existence of the Walrasian
equilibrium for the proposed valuation functions. SCAIB algorithm is the most pre-
ferred algorithm since it provides high admission rate and competitive revenues for the
SCAs. The proposed algorithms match the performance of the centralised solution at
low target data rates. The following chapter summarises this thesis and discusses future
works.
6As mentioned in Section 5.5.2, increasing the system dimension may increase the performance gap
between the centralised solution and the proposed algorithms.
7As highlighted in Chapter 5, using throughput as the performance metric would result in different
performance for the proposed algorithms. This is part of the future works.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Conclusion
The focus of this thesis has been on the development and analysis of distributed
optimisation techniques for wireless networks. Distributed algorithms are very vital
in large systems, as they relief the backhaul links from overhead informations. In ad-
dition, distributed algorithms decentralise the computation tasks amongst transmit-
ters, hence reducing the computational complexity experienced in centralised systems.
Game-theoretic models, decomposition techniques, and auction theory, have been used
to decouple the optimisation problems under consideration. This thesis has addressed
strategic non-cooperative games (SNGs), cooperative games, traffic offloading, admis-
sion control, user association, and downlink beamformer design in wireless networks.
The main findings and contributions are as follows:
• In Chapter 3, novel game theoretic and dual decomposition frameworks for a wire-
less network with users having different classes of quality of service (QoS) were
studied. The mixed QoS criterion is attractive for energy efficient wireless com-
munication as suggested in [91]. This work addressed situations where access
points (APs) can simultaneously be confronted by both power minimisation and
SINR balancing problems. This multi-objective optimisation (MOP) is addressed
by the mixed QoS criterion. A mixed QoS SNG and bargain game were proposed.
It was shown that, in comparison to the conventional Nash equilibrium (NE), the
NE-mixed QoS is capable of attaining higher sum rate with less power.
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• Chapter 4 proposed and analysed a novel mixed QoS SNG for a multicell multiuser
network, with RTUs and NRTUs. The mixed QoS SNG offers a fully distributed
algorithm for downlink beamformer design. It was shown that the mixed QoS SNG
reaches an inefficient NE-mixed QoS. Due to the possibility of non-convergence of
the mixed QoS SNG, a fall back mechanism was proposed. In addition, players
were assumed to apply their last known feasible beamformers whenever infeasibility
arises during the course of the game. In order to improve the performance of the
NE-mixed QoS, mixed QoS EBG and mixed QoS KSBG algorithms were proposed.
Via numerical analysis and comparative evaluations, it was shown that the mixed
QoS sum rate of the bargaining games is comparable to that of the centralised
solutions.
• A novel auction, called the bid-wait-auction (BWA), that jointly performs down-
link beamformer design and user association, was proposed and analysed in Chap-
ter 5. Moreover, a novel payment rule, that allows the BWA to allocate items to
bidders with sparse information, was proposed and analysed. It was shown that
the proposed payment rule preserve some of the principles of the VCG mechanism.
It was shown that the BWA has dominant strategy equilibrium at every auction
round, which decomposes the combinatorial nature of the problem, thereby allow-
ing sequential and parallel auctions to manifest autonomously. Numerical analysis
revealed the proposed BWA is close to optimum. In terms of admission rate, it
was shown that the backward (BBWA) is preferred over the forward (FBWA).
• In Chapter 6, two SMRA based algorithms were proposed, to address the offload-
ing and user association problems. The first algorithm directly applies the classical
SMRA, which is used in spectrum auctioning. A novel altered SMRA (ASMRA)
was proposed to reduce the valuation overheads incurred by the bidders in SMRA.
In addition, two novel CAIB algorithms were proposed; namely, the sequential
CAIB (SCAIB) and the repetitive CAIB (RCAIB). SCAIB and RCAIB utilise the
VCG payment rule. In RCAIB, the auctioneer posit the standing highest bids to
competitors. Since the advertisement of the highest bids to competitors can en-
courage retaliations, the SCAIB avoids this problem. It was shown that truthful
bidding is the best response for every bidder. An analysis on how truthful bid-
ding leads to a Walrasian equilibrium (WE) was conducted. Through numerical
analysis, it was demonstrated that the proposed algorithms match the centralised
Chapter 7. Conclusions 156
solution at low target rates of the GUs. Numerical results showed that, by auc-
tioning its users to the SCAs, the MBS gain both in user admission and revenue.
On the other hand, the SCA gain in terms of revenue and spectral efficiency.
• In contrast with the state of the art distributed optimisation techniques in the lit-
erature, this thesis has proposed distributed algorithms with heterogeneous users.
In addition, auction based algorithms proposed here are able to reflect the eco-
nomic implications on the choice of optimisation approaches. All the auction based
algorithms proposed here can be directly used in networks with both private and
operator owned small cells. Hence, the proposed solution are scalable to large/d-
ifferent systems.
7.2 Future Works
While working towards achieving the objectives of this thesis, other challenges and
ideas that are worthwhile to be investigated further came up. These challenges and ideas
are elaborated below.
• Game-theoretic approach was used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to develop dis-
tributed algorithms. The mixed QoS criterion was used to demonstrate how game
theory can be used to solve MOP problems. In this work, the MOP problem in-
cludes power minimisation and SINR balancing. It would be interesting to add
more objectives to the mixed criterion. This may include: sum rate and propor-
tional fairness utilities.
• It is worth considering other types of games to solve the mixed QoS problems in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Games that can be applied to solve the mixed QoS
problem include; hierarchical games (exempli gratia, Stackelberg game), coalition
games, and Bayesian games.
• Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 considered an economy with no production. It is worth
investigating the same user offloading problem, while considering an economy with
production. For example, the production rate can be captured as the rate of
incoming traffic.
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• Similar to the mixed QoS criterion used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, it is worth
investigating differential objectives for the bidders and the auctioneer in Chapter 5
and Chapter 6. Furthermore, a multiuser and frequency diversity would make
significant contribution. This would change the behaviour of the bidders and the
equilibrium of the market.
• Extension of the auctions in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to a setting with multiple
auctioneers and multiple bidders will bring substantial contributions. The auction
can then be analysed for cases when the auctioneers are synchronised (cooperat-
ing) or unsynchronised (non-cooperative). Bidders can also be allowed to form
coalitions to reduce competition. Further, an analysis wherein bidders collude is
very crucial.
• The valuation functions used by the bidders are computationally intensive, as
they use interior point methods. This resulted in prolonged simulation times. In
practice, prolonged simulations would induce delays in decision making; hence, it
may take longer to reach equilibrium. In addition, due to the mobility of users,
delays in bidding can result in outdated valuations, and consequently inefficient
equilibria. It will be worth considering estimation models for bidder valuations
functions. Moreover, the assumption of independent valuation can be lifted, by
allowing interference amongst bidders.
• The items considered in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are substitutes. It would be in-
teresting to study and analyse a market with complementary items, or a combina-
tion of complementary and substitutes items. Complementary items can manifest
when there are users who request the same data. If the transmitters are content
aware, they can identify complementary items. Complementary effects can be
investigated by considering items with positive synergies.
• The entire thesis concentrated on downlink transmission. Formulating uplink prob-
lems and applying the same methods may present different mathematical analysis.
Also, it would be very crucial to consider offloading users from the macrocells to
the WiFi systems.
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